Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BRASILIA2262, BRAZIL: UNWILLING TO ENDORSE ARGENTINE CLAIMS ON

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BRASILIA2262.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BRASILIA2262 2007-12-12 14:06 2011-07-11 00:00 SECRET Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO9898
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2262/01 3461406
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121406Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6443
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5162
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7476
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5550
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1302
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2027 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL BR AR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: UNWILLING TO ENDORSE ARGENTINE CLAIMS ON 
AMIA 
 
REF: A. (A) BUENOS AIRES 002222 
     B. (B) BRASILIA 002070 
     C. (C) BUENOS AIRES 000520 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A 
ND D 
 
1. (S) Summary: With its abstention on the vote to confirm 
issuance of international capture notices for five Iranian 
nationals and one Lebanese suspected of involvement in the 
1994 terrorist attack in Buenos Aires at the Interpol General 
Assembly session on November 7 the Government of Brazil has 
now twice refused to take a formal and public position on the 
Argentine case, likely due to extreme sensitivities over 
Argentine allegations that some support for the attack may 
have been provided by individuals in the Triborder Area of 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil (TBA).  A vote to issue the 
red notices would undermine their long-standing claim that 
there is no evidence of an operational terrorist presence in 
Brazil.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Argentine Officials Miffed 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (S) In the aftermath of the Interpol General Assembly vote 
to confirm the Interpol Executive Committee's decision to 
issue the international capture notices, Gustavo Beguet, 
Political Counselor for External Affairs and Guillermo 
Devoto, Political Counselor for Internal Affairs at the 
Argentine Embassy called on Poloffs to exchange thoughts on 
Brazil's actions prior to and during the Interpol vote.  Both 
indicated that Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations 
(Itamaraty) contacted the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia just 
prior to the Interpol General Assembly vote, "out of 
courtesy," to inform the Government of Argentina that the 
Brazilian delegation would abstain during the vote. 
According to Beguet, Itamaraty explained that since the 
Argentine case includes evidence of links between the 
perpetrators of the attack and the TBA--a claim Brazil does 
not acknowledge--it could not vote in favor of issuing the 
notices. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Iranian Lobbying Key to Brazil's Abstention? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (S) During the meeting, Beguet offered speculation that 
Iranian lobbying--he mentioned the visit of Muhammad 
Nahavandian of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security 
to Brazil in early September--also may have played a part in 
Brazil's abstention. 
 
4. (S) Argentine suspicions of an Iranian role go back to 
Interpol's Executive Committee (EC) meeting on March 15th, 
when the EC approved issuance of capture notices.  The 
Brazilian representative was the only EC member not to attend 
the March 15 session.  At the time, a source at the Argentine 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs speculated Brazil may have wanted 
to avoid complicating its relations with Iran (Ref C). 
(Note:  Post intends to follow up with various contacts on 
Argentine speculation on a possible Iranian role behind 
Brazil's actions.  End Note.) 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
5. (S) With two missed opportunities to back up often 
repeated claims of solidarity with Argentina over the two 
terrorist attacks it suffered in 1992 (Israeli Embassy 
Bombing) and 1994 (AMIA Jewish Center Bombing), and a recent 
string of hard questioning  about the usefulness of the 3 1 
mechanism, post believes Itamaraty is taking its 
sensitivities with regards to the TBA to new heights.  With 
its initial reluctance to support reversion of the 3 1 agenda 
back to its original focus on transnational criminal issues 
(something which Brazil had in the past supported) Itamaraty 
seems determined not to give up an inch of ground publicly to 
the US on a counterterrorism issue that affects Brazil. 
While working level cooperation with Brazil's law enforcement 
agencies has not changed and remains productive, Itamaraty's 
obstruction is starting to be felt in more than symbolic 
ways. 
 
BRASILIA 00002262  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Sobel