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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA8478, PRESIDENT URIBE DISAVOWS THIRD TERM, BUT DOUBTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BOGOTA8478 2007-12-11 21:20 2011-04-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #8478/01 3452120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 112120Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0473
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9656
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC 9115
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5704
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0963
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6398
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4211
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1880
id: 133834
date: 12/11/2007 21:20
refid: 07BOGOTA8478
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07BOGOTA8430
header:
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #8478/01 3452120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 112120Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0473
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9656
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC 9115
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5704
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0963
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6398
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4211
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1880


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR CO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE DISAVOWS THIRD TERM, BUT DOUBTS 
REMAIN 
 
REF: BOGOTA 8430 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Public debate continues over whether 
President Uribe will seek a second re-election in 2010. 
Uribe  has publicly said he will not do so, and presidential 
political strategist Jose Obdulio Gaviria categorically told 
us Uribe will not run again.  Still, U Party Secretary 
General Luis Giraldo continues to collect the signatures 
needed to start the process to amend the constitution to 
allow for a third Uribe term.  Many believe Uribe wants to 
keep the door open for a third term to delay lame duck status 
and enhance his leverage in selecting a successor. Amending 
the Constitution would likely require 12-18 months--meaning a 
serious reelection effort would have to be underway by 
mid-2008 to allow Uribe to stand in 2010. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) President Uribe publicly said on November 28 that he 
will not run again, noting that "to try and stay in power 
would take away from the essence of democracy, and for that 
reason, the country needs to start thinking about new 
leaders."  Presidential advisor Jose Obdulio Gaviria 
privately told us December 7 "you can count on it," Uribe 
will not seek a third term.  Gaviria publicly said, "I can't 
enter the soul of the President, but I would tell those that 
want to succeed Alvaro Uribe to prepare themselves because 
there is not going to be a re-election."  U Party President 
Carlos Garcia also said Uribe is not interested in running 
again and that the U Party is considering other candidates 
(see reftel). 
 
3. (C) Gaviria told us Uribe understands he would pay a high 
political, institutional, and personal price if he were to 
run again.  First Lady Lina Moreno has made clear she does 
not want her husband to seek a third term, and other 
observers note that the political deals required to achieve 
reelection would jeopardize Uribe's legacy.  Weekly magazine 
Semana noted that a third Uribe term would risk comparisons 
with Venezuelan President Chavez and raise questions about 
his commitment to democratic principles.  Any re-election 
proposal would require support from Uribe's coalition 
political parties in Congress, especially the Conservatives 
and Cambio Radical.  Leaders from both parties say they would 
not support such an effort and want to run their own 
candidates. 
 
4. (C) Still, efforts to promote a third Uribe term continue. 
 U Party Secretary General Luis Giraldo announced prior to 
the October 28 local elections that he would collect 
signatures to start the constitutional amendment process to 
allow for a third term.  Despite Uribe's disavowal, Giraldo 
says he will continue his campaign--which is in the 
organizational phase.  Gaviria told us Giraldo's efforts 
enhance Uribe's leverage to choose his successor and ensure 
the continuation of his policies.  Garcia told us the 
"referendum ploy" was a way for the U Party to garner support 
in the October elections and to create more political space 
for Uribe during the remainder of his second-term.  Gaviria 
added, however, that the lack of a clear Uribe successor 
would lead center-right leaders and the business community to 
press Uribe to stand again.  Opinion polls show a slight 
majority of Colombians would support a third term. 
 
5. (U) Amending the constitution is difficult and would 
require a minimum of 12 to 18 months to complete, according 
to most experts.  A serious amendment effort would have to be 
underway by mid-2008 for Uribe to run in 2010.  It can be 
done in three ways:  1) Congress can pass a constitutional 
change through two separate, consecutive rounds of four 
debates in one Congressional year (session), with subsequent 
approval of the change by the Constitutional Court;  2) 
Congress can call a Constituent Assembly;  and 3) signatures 
can be gathered (equal to five percent of the population) 
calling for a referendum.  Congress and the Constitutional 
Court must then approve the referendum language.  Finally, 
the change must be approved by 50 percent plus one of voters 
in the referendum--with a minimum of twenty-five percent of 
the voting population participating.  The U Party effort 
would utilize the third route. 
 
Brownfield 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================