Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BERLIN2157, german response u.s. National intelligence

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERLIN2157.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERLIN2157 2007-12-03 19:18 2011-05-19 23:30 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #2157/01 3371918
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031918Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9945
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0314
S e c r e t <> 002157

Sipdis

Noforn

Sipdis, state for p,t, nea/ir, isn, eur/ags

E.o. 12958: decl: 12/03/2017
Tags: knnp, mnuc, parm, gm, ir
Subject: german response u.s. National intelligence
estimate on iran's nuclear program

Ref: secstate 162558

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeff Rathke for reasons 1.4
(b)/(d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Post delivered demarches to senior
Chancellery and MFA officials on December 3. Both National
Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA State Secretary
Reinhard Silberberg considered the assessment to be
potentially "good news." Heusgen added that the Chancellery
will seek additional assessments from its intelligence
agency, and noted that the international community still had
reason for concern about Iranian intentions, its
unwillingness to disclose details of its nuclear programs and
its continued enrichment. Heusgen also noted some concern
about potential domestic political backlash, given the
Chancellor's recent work to persuade German companies to
withdraw from their Iran business dealings. Silberberg
detailed German agreement to EU <> against Bank Melli,
to be implemented by late January, calling the "new" policy a
signal of German willingness to go beyond
proliferation-related issues in application of <>,
coupled with continued reticence at more wide-reaching
measures for fear of harming the Iranian people. END SUMMARY.


-----------------------------
chancellery response
-----------------------------

2. (S/NF) Ambassador delivered reftel points and nonpapers
to National Security Advisor-equivalent Christoph Heusgen on
December 3. Also present was Chancellery Senior
Director-equivalent for Security Policy and Disarmament Geza
von Geyr. Heusgen noted that he had just completed a telcon
on the same subject with APNSA Hadley. (NOTE: Heusgen
appeared still to be digesting his conversation with Hadley.
He was initially negative, but his thinking became more
positive and operationally focused during the conversation.
END NOTE) Heusgen noted that German intelligence he had seen
indicated a continued weaponization program; he has asked the
BND chief for a new assessment. The BND will also conduct
its weekly briefing on December 4 and will present their
latest assessment. He added that Germany will not publicly
react to the NIE.

3. (S/NF) Heusgen expressed concern about the timing of the
information and potential political fallout, particularly in
light of Chancellor Merkel's efforts to use moral suasion to
convince German companies to end investment in Iran. In this
regard, he noted that Chancellery Chief of Staff Thomas de
Maziere is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with German
Federation of Industry (BDI) chief Juergen Thumann and
leaders of German energy giant E.ON regarding their interest
in LNG in Iran. He added that DNI McConnell's scheduled
visit to <> on December 4 is timely.

4. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that we still need to be alarmed
about the Iranian intent and unwillingness to disclose their
program, particularly given their continued enrichment and
ballistic missile programs, evidenced by Iran's unveiling of
the Ashura ballistic missile last week. He noted that the
Chancellery will have to see to it that the public reaction
to the NIE is a moderate one and to ensure that the focus is
not only on the information on the Iranian nuclear weapons
program, but also emphasizes that the IAEA sees many open
points and that Iran has not abided by IAEA requests on
enrichment and coming clean on its activities thus far.

5. (S/NF) In terms of further UNSCR <>, von Geyr
added that in light of this information it will be harder to
get Russia and China on board; Heusgen indicated that
Kislyak's absence from the P5 1 Political Directors meeting
on December 1 meant that Russia's intentions regarding a new
UNSCR remain unclear. He once again repeated that he would be
seeking assessments from other foreign intelligence agencies
(naming the French) in addition to the NIE. It is necessary
to remain vigilant on Iran because of Iran's continued
failure to meet IAEA requirements, he said, as well as
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's public threats
against Israel. In terms of <>, Heusgen added that
with this acknowledgment from the U.S., perhaps Iran would be
willing to suspend briefly. If this information is verified,
why don't the Iranians suspend enrichment as they do not need
it, he posited, having neither a weapons program nor power
plants that could use enriched uranium.

6. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery would work

with the MFA to develop a joint press line. Heusgen noted
that President Bush and Chancellor Merkel are scheduled to
discuss the topic tomorrow following Merkel's return from the
CDU Party Convention being held in Hannover. Heusgen
continued by repeating the German view on potential public
statements: The Chancellery does not comment publicly on
intelligence matters. If the news is confirmed it is good
news about this aspect of the Iranian program, but it is also
another reason to urge Iran to stop enrichment. Von Geyr
added that much must still be clarified by the Iranians; the
IAEA report shows many open points.


----------------------------
foreign ministry response
----------------------------


7. (S/NF) DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA State Secretary
Silberberg, and left them as non-papers. Silberberg said it
was "good news" the US intelligence community had concluded
that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program due to
international scrutiny and <> as of fall 2003 and had
not resumed the program as of mid-2007.

8. (S/NF) With regard to further steps against Tehran's
defiance of the Security Council, Silberberg went on, the
German government has agreed to move ahead with designation
of Bank Melli, though not immediately. Germany, France, and
the UK, he said, have agreed to work now toward a quick
resolution in the Security Council, and detect some positive
signs from the Russian side. If the UNSCR effort succeeds,
the <> it contains will nonetheless be weak, and the
EU-3 will seek to supplement them with EU measures by the end
of December, including the designation of Bank Melli. Asked
about the timeline for EU autonomous <>, including
designation of Bank Melli, should the Security Council fail
to pass a third <> resolution, Silberberg said this
could come at the end of January. He described his own role,
and that of the MFA, as "active" in securing agreement to
this approach from the ministries of finance and economy and
the Chancellery. Key elements of this "new" German policy
were (1) willingness to go beyond proliferation-related
issues in application of <> and (2) judgment that it
is "not yet" time for total economic and financial isolation
of Iran, as this would harm the Iranian people
disproportionately. Silberberg noted that debate continued
in the EU on possible designation of Bank Saderat, but
Germany believed that to do so now, in conjunction with
designating Bank Melli, would move too far in the direction
of a total embargo.
Timken jr