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Viewing cable 07ANKARA2969, TURKEY: 2007 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA2969 2007-12-14 15:13 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2162
RR RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #2969/01 3481513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141513Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4668
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3635
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 2530
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INL FOR JOHN LYLE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: STATE 136780 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2007 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY 
REPORT PART ONE 
 
 
Turkey 
 
I. Summary 
 
Turkey is a major transit route for Southwest Asian opiates to 
Europe and serves as a staging area for major narcotics traffickers 
and brokers. Turkish law enforcement organizations focus their 
efforts on stemming the traffic of drugs and intercepting precursor 
chemicals. The Turkish National Police (TNP), under Interior 
Ministry control, is responsible for security in large urban areas. 
The Jandarma, paramilitary forces under joint Interior Ministry and 
military control, is responsible for policing rural areas. The 
Jandarma is also responsible for specific border sectors where 
smuggling is common; however, the military has overall 
responsibility for border control. Turkish law enforcement 
cooperates closely with European and U.S. agencies. While most of 
the heroin trafficked via Turkey is marketed in Western Europe, some 
heroin and opium is also smuggled from Turkey to the U.S., but not 
in quantities sufficient to have a significant impact on the U.S. 
There is no appreciable cultivation of illicit narcotics in Turkey 
other than marijuana grown primarily for domestic consumption. There 
is no known diversion from Turkey's licit opium poppy cultivation 
and pharmaceutical morphine production program. Turkey is a party to 
the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Turkey is a major transshipment point. Turkey is also a base of 
operations for international narcotics traffickers and associates 
trafficking in opium, morphine base, heroin, precursor chemicals and 
other drugs. Opium, morphine base, and heroin are smuggled from 
Afghanistan to Iran. Both morphine base and heroin are then smuggled 
from Iran to Turkey and ultimately to Western Europe. A small amount 
of opium and heroin is trafficked to the U.S. via Turkey. Turkish 
law enforcement agencies are strongly committed to disrupting 
narcotics trafficking. The Turkish National Police (TNP) remains 
Turkey's most proactive counter narcotics force, with the Jandarma 
and Customs continuing to play a significant role. Turkish 
authorities continue to seize large amounts of heroin and precursor 
chemicals. It is estimated that multi-ton amounts of heroin are 
smuggled through Turkey each month. 
 
Turkey and India are the only two traditional licit opium-growing 
countries recognized by the USG and the International Narcotics 
Control Board (TNCB). Opium for pharmaceuticals is cultivated and 
refined in Turkey under strict domestic controls and in accordance 
with all international treaty obligations. There is no appreciable 
illicit drug cultivation in Turkey other than cannabis grown 
primarily for domestic consumption. Turkish law enforcement 
authorities continue to seize synthetic drugs that have been 
manufactured in Northern and Eastern European countries. The 
majority of the synthetic drug seizures have occurred as the drugs 
were being shipped through Turkey to other countries in the Middle 
East. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs In 2007 
 
Policy Initiatives. The Government of Turkey devotes significant 
financial and human resources to counter narcotics activities. 
Turkey continues to play a key role in Operation Containment (a DEA 
regional program to reduce the flow of Afghan heroin to Western 
Europe), as well as in other regional efforts. The Turkish 
International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC), 
established under the Turkish National Police (TNP), continues to be 
a key agency leading the fight against drug abuse in Turkey. In 
2004, TNP increased the number of drug training and prevention units 
it previously established in various provinces to cover most parts 
of Turkey. These units conducted intensive training programs for 
parents, teachers and students in these provinces, making a major 
contribution to the GOT's drug prevention efforts. 
 
Accomplishments. TADOC organized 72 training programs for 748 local 
and regional law enforcement officers in 2007. A total of 27 
programs for 441 foreign officers were held at TADOC this year, 
including officers from the Balkans, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, 
Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Montenegro, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, 
Macedonia, Malta, Germany, Gambia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan, 
Guinea, and Pakistan. These training programs focused on drug law 
enforcement, intelligence analysis, illegal immigration and human 
smuggling, interview techniques, surveillance techniques, and 
antiterrorism training for judges and prosecutors. TADOC conducted 
training in several foreign countries, including Montenegro, 
Romania, Macedonia, Syria, and Yemen.  TADOC also trained a total of 
1100 officers in computer-based training centers through Turkey in 
2007. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  Istanbul continues to serve as a transit 
 
ANKARA 00002969  002 OF 003 
 
 
point for large amounts of heroin being smuggled to western Europe 
via the Balkan route.  In April, the Turkish National Police seized 
13 tons of acetic anhydride, a precursor which is used to make 
heroin.  In October, the Jandarma arrested five people and seized 
160 kilograms from two vehicles.  In November, TNP seized 88.5 
kilograms from a vehicle and arrested a Bulgarian in Istanbul. 
January-October 2007 drug seizure statistics for Turkey are as 
follows: 
 
Heroin:            9205 kgs 
Hashish:           9463 kgs 
Opium:             569 kgs 
Cocaine:           100 kgs 
Amphetamine (Captagon):  11,463,379 dosage units 
Ecstasy:                 1,002,003 dosage units 
 
Corruption. As a matter of government policy, Turkey does not 
encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of 
narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or 
the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 
Similarly, no senior level government official is alleged to have 
participated in such activities. Turkey ratified the UN Corruption 
Convention in November 2006. 
 
Agreements and Treaties. Turkey is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and 
the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. 
Turkey is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its protocols on migrant smuggling, trafficking 
in persons, and illegal manufacturing and trafficking in firearms. 
The U.S. and Turkey cooperate in law enforcement matters under a 
1981 treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in legal matters. 
 
Cultivation/Production. Illicit drug cultivation, primarily 
cannabis, is minor and has no impact on the United States. The 
Turkish Grain Board strictly controls licit opium poppy cultivation 
quite successfully, with no apparent diversion into the illicit 
market. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit. Turkey remains a major route and staging area for 
the flow of heroin to Europe. Turkish-based traffickers and brokers 
operate in conjunction with narcotics smugglers, laboratory 
operators, and money launderers in and outside Turkey, who finance 
and control the smuggling of opiates to and from Turkey. Afghanistan 
is the source of most of the opiates reaching Turkey. Morphine base 
and heroin are smuggled overland from Afghanistan, sometimes through 
Pakistan, to Iran and then to Turkey. Opiates and hashish are also 
smuggled to Turkey overland from Afghanistan via Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Some criminal elements in Turkey reportedly 
have interests in heroin laboratories operating in Iran near the 
Iranian-Turkish border. Turkish-based traffickers control much of 
the heroin marketed to Western Europe. Turkish authorities reported 
an increase in synthetic drug seizures throughout Turkey beginning 
in 2005. Turkish law enforcement has seen an increase in synthetic 
drug production, primarily amphetamines (captagon). 
 
Demand Reduction. While drug abuse remains modest in scale in Turkey 
compared to other countries, the number of addicts using treatment 
clinics is increasing. Although the Turkish Government is 
increasingly aware of the need to combat drug abuse, the agencies 
responsible for drug awareness and treatment remain under-funded. 
Eight Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment and Education Clinics 
(AMATEM), which serve as regional and drug treatment centers, have 
been established. Due to lack of funds, only a couple of the centers 
focus on drug prevention as well as treatment. The most recent 
clinic was opened in Izmir in 2006, at a research hospital.  The 
clinic opened in Ankara in 2004 serves as the countrywide 
coordinating center for drug and alcohol treatment and education. 
The Health Ministry has not conducted a drug abuse survey since 1995 
due to lack of resources. The Ministry of Health was planning to 
conduct the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other 
Drugs (ESPAD) in 2007; however, objections from the Ministry of 
Education with regard to survey questions postponed this survey to 
2008. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives. Until fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Government 
extended $500,000 annually in assistance. In February 2007, the U.S. 
Government spent approximately $40,000 in previously-obligated funds 
to bring DEA trainers to Turkey to conduct a course for 
counternarcotics commanders, with 5 Turkish and 15 Afghan law 
enforcement officers. The goal of this project was to enhance the 
investigative abilities of both Turkish and Afghan investigators, to 
increase their willingness to cooperate internationally on joint 
cases, and to build relationships between the two countries' law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
ANKARA 00002969  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Bilateral Cooperation. DEA reports excellent cooperation with 
Turkish officials. Turkish counternarcotics forces are both 
professional and technically sophisticated. 
 
The Road Ahead. U.S. policy needs to continue work to strengthen 
Turkey's ability to combat narcotics trafficking, money-laundering 
and financial crimes. Considering Turkey's important role as a 
transit country for drugs and the unstinting cooperation we receive 
from Turkish officials, we strongly advocate for additional funding 
for both training and practical cooperation to curb drug flows 
through Turkey.  These funds could be used to train Turkish National 
Police on the skills and tactics necessary to conduct investigations 
and expand the scope of their cooperation with both domestic and 
international law enforcement agencies.  We could also assist with 
TADOC's role in bringing regional police together for joint training 
and team-building exercises. 
 
Wilson