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Viewing cable 07VIENTIANE839, 2007-2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07VIENTIANE839 2007-11-15 09:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Vientiane
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVN #0839/01 3190928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150928Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1641
UNCLAS VIENTIANE 000839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL INCSR COORDINATOR JOHN LYLE 
DEPT ALSO FOR INL/AAE - CHARLES BOULDIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR LA
SUBJECT: 2007-2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY 
REPORT - PART I - LAOS 
 
REF: STATE 136782 
 
1.(U) As requested by the Department's telegram under 
reference, this message transmits Embassy Vientiane's draft 
of part I of the 2007-2008 INCSR for Laos.  As noted para 7 
reftel, advance in the due date for this report to November 5 
has made it impractical for post to obtain and include 
complete statistics from the host government for such 
activities as drug law enforcement during the year.  Post 
will make every effort to secure the most complete available 
statistics and transmit them to update this draft no later 
than February 1, 2008. 
 
2.  BEGIN TEXT:  LAOS 
 
I.  Summary 
 
Laos made tremendous progress in reducing opium cultivation 
between 2000 and 2007, and estimates by the USG and UNODC of 
poppy cultivation in 2007 were at the lowest levels ever. 
However, the momentum of this effort may be slowing, and 
gains remain precarious.  Thousands of former poppy growers 
who have yet to receive alternative development assistance 
create a substantial potential for a renewal of poppy 
production.  Trafficking in illegal drugs and controlled 
chemicals continues unabated throughout the country.  Both 
awareness programs and treatment capacity targeting abuse of 
methamphetamines expanded during 2007, but remain 
insufficient to respond to the very high level of 
methamphetamine abuse which now affects virtually every 
socio-economic level of Lao society.  Law enforcement 
capacity is woefully inadequate, and the inability to 
establish an effective deterrent to regional trafficking 
organizations makes Laos a transit route of choice for 
Southeast Asian heroin, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), 
and precursor chemicals en route to other nations in the 
region.  The combination of weak law enforcement, a central 
geographic location, and new highways and river crossings 
connecting China, Thailand and Vietnam will be likely to 
exacerbate this already troubling transit situation.  Laos 
became party to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Drugs in 2004. 
 
II.  Status of Country 
 
In 2007, the Government of Laos continued its battle to 
eliminate cultivation of opium, with continuing but 
diminishing assistance from international donors.  Donors 
largely sought primarily to alleviate rural poverty, and 
derivatively to reduce cultivation of illegal drugs.  High 
unprocessed opium prices, driven by a reduction in supply and 
a remaining population of opium addicts estimated at 8-10,000 
or more, frustrated efforts to completely end poppy 
cultivation.  Inhabitants of many villages in former opium 
growing regions face increasingly desperate circumstances. 
Many former poppy growers, finding themselves without 
assistance they were told they could expect, face severe food 
security problems.  These circumstances create significant 
incentives for resumption of poppy cultivation by growers and 
communities that had abandoned it.  Only the provision of 
adequate medium- to long-term agricultural and economic 
assistance will enable the Laotian authorities to completely 
and sustainably eliminate opium cultivation. 
 
Methamphetamine and similar stimulants constitute the 
greatest current drug abuse problem in Laos.  The abuse of 
methamphetamines, once confined primarily to urban youth, is 
becoming more common among agricultural workers in highland 
areas, and has had some visible impact on virtually every 
socio-economic group in Laos.  The scope of this problem has 
overwhelmed the country's limited capacities to enforce laws 
against sale and abuse of illegal drugs, and to provide 
effective treatment to addicts.  Methamphetamine in Laos is 
largely consumed in tablet form, but drug abuse treatment 
centers report admission of a growing number of users of 
injected amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).  Continued 
emphasis on drug abuse prevention through comprehensive drug 
awareness programs, and greatly increased capacity to provide 
effective treatment to addicts, are both essential to control 
the growth in domestic demand for ATS. 
 
Heroin abuse in Laos, once limited to foreign workers and 
tourists, has emerged as a potentially serious problem in 
highland areas bordering Vietnam.  Injected heroin is 
replacing smoked opium as the preferred method for illegal 
drug abuse in some ethnic minority communities, bringing with 
it an attendant potential for increased transmission of 
HIV/AIDS, hepatitis or other blood-borne diseases.  The 
Laotian government is working to develop a treatment capacity 
to address this new problem, but at present, there is only 
 
one facility in Laos which has a capability marginally to 
address the problem of heroin abuse. 
 
Laos occupies a strategic geographic position in the center 
of mainland Southeast Asia.  It contends with long, remote 
and geographically difficult borders which are very difficult 
to effectively control.  Illicit drugs produced in Burma and 
precursor chemicals diverted from China are trafficked 
through landlocked Laos to Thailand and Vietnam, and from 
major ports in those countries to other nations in the 
region.  Recently completed sections of the Kunming-Bangkok 
Highway in northwestern Laos, and the Danang-Bangkok Highway 
in southern Laos, have further aggravated this problem, as 
new high-speed truck routes overwhelm limited existing border 
control capacity.  Enhanced law enforcement and border 
control, and more effective regional cooperation, could 
assist in ameliorating this problem, but will require 
substantial investment in Laos and its neighboring countries. 
 Laos has become a significant transit area for illegal drugs 
and controlled precursor chemicals being trafficked by 
multinational criminal organizations throughout the region. 
 
III.  Country Actions against Drugs in 2007 
 
Policy Initiatives.  Laos did not introduce any significant 
new drug control policy initiatives in 2007.  The Lao 
government instead emphasized implementing existing policies, 
including its policy commitment to complete elimination of 
opium cultivation, and on securing sufficient support from 
international donors to make drug control policies effective 
in practice. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  Laos' law enforcement and criminal 
justice institutions remain inadequate to deal effectively 
with the problems created by domestic sale and abuse of 
illegal drugs and international trafficking in drugs, 
chemical precursors and other contraband.  Laos does not 
currently possess means to accurately assess the extent of 
production, transit or distribution of ATS or its precursors. 
 There has been an increase in reported seizures of ATS 
moving in transit through Laos to neighboring countries. 
Methamphetamine addiction and related crime in Laos have 
grown rapidly. 
 
Laos' principal narcotics law enforcement offices are Counter 
Narcotics Units (CNU's), the first of which was created in 
1994 and which now exist as elements of provincial police in 
most provinces.  The CNU's, however, remain generally 
understaffed, poorly equipped, and with personnel 
inadequately trained and experienced to deal with the drug 
law enforcement environment in Laos.  CNU's in most provinces 
generally number fewer than 15 officers, who are responsible 
for patrolling thousands of square kilometers of rugged rural 
terrain.  This limited law enforcement presence in rural 
areas creates an obvious vulnerability to establishment of 
clandestine drug production or processing activities by 
regional organizations seeking new locations, although it 
cannot be confirmed that this has yet actually happened. 
Assistance provided by the USG, UNODC, South Korea and China 
has mitigated equipment and training deficiencies to some 
extent, but prosecutions that do occur almost exclusively 
involve street-level drug pushers or low-level couriers.  As 
in many developing countries, Lao drug enforcement and 
criminal justice institutions have demonstrated a continuing 
serious inability to investigate and develop prosecutable 
cases against significant drug traffickers without external 
assistance, and Lao authorities have generally pursued such 
major cases only under international pressure.  Laos is 
preparing new criminal laws that would provide an enhanced 
legal basis for seizure of illegal assets.  At present, 
prosecutors lack legal means to pursue assets of convicted 
drug traffickers unless such assets were the instruments of 
the drug trafficking offense.  Extrajudicial asset seizures 
reportedly may occur in some cases. 
 
Laos did not make significant progress in disrupting domestic 
distribution of illegal drugs in 2007.  There is no reliable 
estimate of illegal sales on a national basis, but secondary 
information, such as increasing property crime, the emergence 
of youth gangs, growing methamphetamine addiction and the 
emergence of heroin addiction among Lao and ethnic minority 
groups, all suggest that trafficking in drugs for internal 
sale and abuse in Laos is increasing.  Individuals or 
small-scale merchants undertake the majority of street-level 
methamphetamine sales.  Criminal gangs involved in drug 
trafficking across the Lao-Vietnamese border, especially 
gangs that involve ethnic minority groups represented on both 
sides of the border, constitute a particular problem for Lao 
law enforcement.  Such cross-border gangs now reportedly play 
a leading role in the significant expansion of injected 
 
heroin use in northern Laos, and in the cultivation of 
marijuana for export in the central province of Bolikhamxai. 
 
Opium distribution is now relatively limited.  Net production 
within Laos has diminished below estimated consumption 
levels, making Laos now probably a net importer of 
unprocessed opium.  The majority of opium addicts still 
reside in households or villages that produce, or used to 
produce, opium poppy.  There is some opium distribution 
between villages, especially as remaining opium cultivation 
is displaced to more distant and remote locations.  Despite 
progress made by the Lao government in reducing the number of 
opium addicts, Laos continues to suffer from one of the 
highest opium addiction rates in the world. 
 
Corruption.  Corruption in the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (PDR), long present in many forms, may be increasing 
as the flow of illicit drugs and precursors in and through 
Laos grows.  Lao civil service pay is inadequate, and persons 
able to exploit official position to personal advantage, 
particularly police and customs officials, can augment their 
salaries through corruption.  This is especially true in 
areas distant from central government oversight.  Lao law 
explicitly prohibits official corruption, and some officials 
have been removed from office, and/or prosecuted, for corrupt 
acts.  The GOL has made fighting corruption one of its 
declared policy priorities, and has made serious efforts to 
do this, but such efforts confront entrenched corruption 
throughout much of the government bureaucracy.  As a matter 
of government policy, Laos strongly opposes the illicit 
production or distribution of narcotic drugs, psychotropic or 
other controlled substances, and the laundering of the 
proceeds of illegal drug transactions.  No senior official of 
the Government of Laos is known to engage in, encourage, or 
facilitate the illicit production or distribution of illegal 
drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds of illegal 
drug transactions.  The Government of Laos signed the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption in December 2003, but 
has not yet ratified that Convention. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  The USG signed initial agreements 
to provide international narcotics control assistance in Laos 
in 1990, and has signed further Letters of Agreement (LOAs) 
to provide additional assistance to projects for Crop 
Control, Drug Demand Reduction, and Law Enforcement 
Cooperation annually since then.  Laos has no bilateral 
extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements with the 
United States.  During 2007, Laos delivered no suspects or 
fugitives on drug offenses to the United States under any 
formal or informal arrangement. 
 
Laos acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 
December 2004.  It has made substantial progress in the 
control of opium cultivation, production and addiction, but 
has not yet achieved all objectives of this 1988 UN 
Convention.  Laos is party to the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, but is not yet party to the 1972 Amending 
Protocol to the Single Convention.  Laos acceded to the 1971 
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1997. 
 Laos acceded to the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its protocols in 2003, and signed the UN 
Convention Against Corruption in December 2003 but has not 
yet ratified it.  GOL officials consult frequently with UNODC 
on narcotics control issues and strategy, and UNODC continues 
to support a number of crop control, demand reduction and law 
enforcement programs. 
 
Laos has legal assistance agreements with China, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia.  Lao membership in 
ASEAN and APEC has increased the number of bilateral and 
multilateral legal exchanges for Laos since 2000, and 
training programs supported by several international donors 
are improving the capacity of the Ministry of Justice, 
police, customs and immigration officials to cooperate with 
counterparts in other countries. Laos has declared its 
support for the ASEAN initiative to promote a drug-free 
region by 2015.  Laos has extradition treaties with China, 
Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia.  The GOL has assisted in the 
arrest and delivery of individuals to some of those nations, 
but does not use formal extradition procedures in all cases. 
Laos has participated in bilateral conferences with Thailand 
on drug control cooperation, and cooperates with Thailand and 
UNODC in measures to prevent drug trafficking along the 
Mekong.  Laos has met trilaterally on narcotics issues with 
Vietnam and Cambodia, and participates in an occasional 
regional consultative group on drug issues under UNODC 
auspices which brings together officials from those four 
countries, Burma and China. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  In 2007, Laos again made measurable 
progress in further reducing opium poppy cultivation 
Estimates of poppy cultivation in Laos by the UNODC (1500 
hectares, down from 2500 hectares in 2006) and the USG (1100 
hectares, down from 1700 hectares in 2006) stood at the 
lowest level since such estimates were first prepared in the 
1980's.  The remaining poppy cultivation observed in these 
surveys was encountered in five northern provinces: 
Phongsaly, Luang Namtha, Oudomxay, Luang Prabang and Huaphan. 
 
Opium production, as estimated by UNODC, also declined from 
2006, from an estimated 20 metric tonnes in 2006 to an 
estimated 9.2 metric tonnes in 2007.  UNODC reported that its 
survey found a reported average price for opium in Laos of 
$974/kilogram, nearly double the $550/kilogram reported in 
2006.  With the decline in estimated production and 
increasing price, UNODC estimates that Laos has now become a 
net importer of opium to supply its remaining population of 
opium addicts.  (USG survey estimate for opium production not 
available to NAS Vientiane when INCSR initial draft was 
prepared; INL please insert and correct narrative if 
necessary.) 
 
Most opium produced in Laos is consumed domestically in 
northern border areas, where raw and cooked opium is smoked 
or eaten.  The share of the opium product in Laos at this 
time that is refined into heroin is thought to be very small 
or nonexistent.  Sustained high farm prices in growing areas 
suggest that the supply of available opium is decreasing more 
rapidly than the demand.  Reportedly, increased prices for 
opium were one of the factors that led to a notable spread in 
injected heroin abuse among ethnic minority groups resident 
in poppy-growing border areas during 2007. 
 
The USG Crop Control projects implemented in Laos from 1990 
to date have not employed chemical herbicides or any other 
form of compulsory eradication of opium poppy.  The Embassy 
has received some reports, particularly in recent years, that 
some compulsory eradication of opium poppy has been employed 
in some localities, at the discretion of local officials. 
Within the areas of the Lao-American Projects for opium poppy 
reduction in Houaphan, Phongsaly and Luang Prabang, growers 
themselves, or officials of their villages, carried out 
eradication of poppy as a condition of written agreements 
between villages and GOL authorities that villages would 
cease production of opium.  In recent years, and particularly 
since it declared Laos to be formally opium-free in 2006 (a 
policy assertion it justifies by arguing that net eradication 
which GOL officials carry out reduces harvestable cultivation 
to insignificant levels), the GOL has stated that it may 
employ compulsory poppy eradication in selected areas where 
alternative development programs are not available, or have 
not by themselves sufficed to reduce and eliminate poppy 
cultivation.  The GOL reported to UNODC that its officials 
eradicated a total of 779 hectares of poppy in 2007. 
 
Despite the positive results of the 2007 opium crop survey, 
the UNODC Resident Representative in Laos noted in announcing 
those results that the situation of the farm population that 
has depended primarily or exclusively on poppy cultivation 
remains "precarious" and that "the current reduction in 
cultivation is dependent on the existence and creation of 
appropriate and sustainable livelihood opportunities." 
However, UNODC reports that international donor support for 
such alternative development programs continues to diminish. 
UNODC has repored that many former opium growers survived the 
loss of income from opium only by consuming their savings, 
generally in the form of livestock.  Such savings, where they 
existed, are now depleted.  The Embassy has received frequent 
reports from the World Food Program of serious food security 
concerns among rural populations, but the WFP and other 
donors also report diminishing international resources 
available for food security assistance.  Villages and farming 
groups who stopped growing poppy because they believed 
promises from their government or international donors of 
support for alternative livelihoods find promises without 
prospects an indigestible meal.  Continued diminution in 
medium-term international support for alternative livelihoods 
among populations previously dependent on poppy cultivation 
creates a substantial continuing risk that 2008 and future 
years will be characterized by resumption of poppy 
cultivation by farm populations that correctly perceive no 
other remaining alternative but to starve. 
 
After several years in which cannabis cultivation and 
reported seizures diminished, there now again appears to be 
substantial "contract" cannabis production in central Laos, 
as evidenced by significant recent seizures in that region. 
Continuing use of cannabis as a traditional food seasoning in 
some localities complicates attempts to eradicate this crop. 
 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Laos' highly porous borders are dominated 
by the Mekong River and remote mountainous regions.  This 
terrain is notoriously difficult to control, and is permeable 
to trafficking of illicit drugs or other contraband, although 
there are no reliable estimates of the possible volume of 
such flows.  An increase in the number and size of seizures 
in neighboring countries of drugs that reportedly passed in 
transit through Laos suggests an increasing transit problem. 
Illegal drug flows include methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana 
and precursor chemicals destined for other countries in the 
region, as well as methamphetamine and other drugs to be 
distributed and sold for consumption in Laos.  Illicit drugs 
that have been reported found in transit to the United States 
have included very limited quantities of unrefined opium and 
local formulations of methamphetamine. 
 
New regional transportation infrastructure, trade agreements, 
and special economic zones intended to facilitate regional 
trade and development may inadvertently also benefit 
transnational criminal trafficking organizations.  The 
opening of two new transit arteries in Southeast Asia that 
pass through Laos, one a continuous paved highway running 
from Da Nang in central Vietnam to Bangkok, and another from 
Kunming, China to Bangkok, have greatly complicated the 
already difficult challenge posed by illicit transit of drugs 
or other contraband for Lao law enforcement and border 
control agencies.  Truck-borne cargo containers transit Laos 
from the Chinese border at Boten to the Thai border at 
Houayxai in six hours, and the trip from Lao Bao, Vietnam, 
through southern Laos to Mukdahan, Thailand takes only four 
hours.  There are also indications of continued drug and 
chemical smuggling on the Mekong River.  Laos is not a 
principal destination for the majority of cargo that transits 
its territory, but the volume of traffic overwhelms Laos' 
limited capacity for border control, and becomes a continuing 
problem for Laos' geographic neighbors. 
 
In addition to increased volume, new bilateral and regional 
trade agreements will also probably result in proportionally 
fewer cargo inspections and a greater reliance on 
intelligence to identify suspect shipments of drugs or other 
contraband.  Laos, which has very limited capabilities of 
this nature, will have to rely substantially on regional 
cooperation with its neighbors to effectively impede 
trafficking in illegal drugs or other contraband.  While 
clearly beneficial for legitimate trade, the potential for 
abuse of these developing arrangements for illicit 
trafficking in drugs or other contraband is considerable. 
Illicit trafficking in drugs may also be growing on less 
developed routes; there have been unconfirmed reports that 
heroin destined for southern Vietnam may now be moving along 
sections of the former Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. 
 
There is no reliable information on the transportation or 
financing of illicit drugs in Laos.  Transit costs are low, 
and anecdotal evidence suggests that some trafficking 
organizations formerly involved with opium may now be 
shifting to moving and marketing methamphetamine, which is 
easier to move and has a growing market in Laos.  There have 
been some reports that individuals or organizations that 
traffic in drugs are also involved in legitimate businesses. 
 
Domestic Programs.  Laos made limited advances during 2007 in 
reducing the demand for and consumption of illicit drugs. 
The most significant single new development was the opening 
of a new 100-bed drug addiction treatment facility in Udomxai 
Province, built with funds from China.  Brunei funded 
construction of two smaller drug abuse treatment facilities 
in Sayabouri, which opened in January 2007.  The United 
States supported the renovation of the women's rehabilitation 
facility at the Somsagna treatment center on the outskirts of 
Vientiane, which can house up to 64 female patients.  The 
U.S. is also preparing to finance construction of a new 
smaller center in Vientiane Province about 70 kilometers from 
the capital, which is scheduled for completion in 2008. 
Despite this augmentation of Laos' treatment capacity, the 
capacity of existing facilities remains well short of even 
the most optimistic estimates of the numbers in Laos addicted 
to methamphetamine or other illegal drugs.  Available 
evidence suggests that many untreated addicts turn to other 
crime as a means to support their addiction.  Most existing 
treatment facilities are notably deficient in staff 
proficiency and effective vocational training.  The national 
treatment center at Somsagna has reported guardedly hopeful 
results, but limited marketable post-release skills have left 
many addicts treated at other facilities vulnerable to 
recidivism.  The U.S. is providing assistance to treatment 
facilities throughout Laos to enhance their capabilities to 
offer effective post-release vocational preparation.  In 
 
2008, the GOL will undertake a new nationwide drug awareness 
program and media campaign with U.S. support. 
 
Estimates by the GOL in 2007 indicate that the number of 
remaining opium addicts has stabilized at approximately 8000, 
after years of steady decline.  However, many opium addicts 
may remain unreported, either because they reside in 
extremely remote areas, or because they wish to conceal their 
addiction, or both.  Significant impediments to the effective 
treatment of all opium addicts include the ill health of many 
elderly opium users, the isolated location of some addict 
populations, and the lack of sufficient rural health care 
infrastructure to displace traditional medicinal use of 
illegal opium, which often serves as the entrance to 
addiction.  Detoxification of opium addicts will probably 
become increasingly difficult as their numbers diminish, 
since those remaining are likely to be the most resistant to 
treatment.  There are currently no verifiable statistics on 
post-detoxification recidivism, and follow-on rehabilitation 
is scanty.  Moreover, during 2007 a disturbing new 
development became visible as a significant number of former 
opium users among ethnic minorities living on the border with 
Vietnam reported having turned from opium to abuse of 
injected heroin.  The GOL hopes to ultimately treat all 
remaining opium addicts, since ending opium addiction and 
thus eliminating the market for domestic consumption of opium 
is critical to complete and sustainable elimination of 
cultivation of opium poppy. 
 
IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives.  The United States continues to be a 
substantial, albeit diminished, donor of drug control 
assistance to Laos, although other donors (primarily European 
but now including some other Asian countries as well) have 
become the largest remaining contributors to alternative 
development programs for opium poppy crop reduction.  The 
Lao-American Opium Crop Control Projects in Phongsaly and 
Luang Prabang Provinces, which delivered integrated rural 
development assistance to reduce poppy cultivation, were 
dissolved in December 2007.  The limited remaining assistance 
in the USG Crop Control project will in 2008 be delivered to 
more direct and limited village-based alternative livelihood 
programs, designed to provide assistance to hundreds of 
former opium growing communities that have not yet received 
such assistance.  The U.S. cooperates closely with 
international organizations such as UNODC and the World Food 
Program in areas where serious economic distress in farming 
communities makes resumption of opium cultivation a 
continuing significant possibility. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation.  Since U.S. drug control assistance to 
Laos began in 1990, the U.S. has provided somewhat over 
$38-million, which has been employed primarily to support the 
successful, multi-year effort that has reduced poppy 
cultivation in Laos to a historically low level.  During 
2007, with the established Lao-American Projects at a reduced 
level of activity, the NAS in Vientiane cooperated closely in 
Crop Control and Demand Reduction projects with the Programme 
Facilitation Unit (PFU), an element of the Lao National 
Commission on Drug Control and Supervision primarily 
responsible for implementing alternative development and 
opium addict detoxification.  U.S. funds for drug demand 
reduction activities support enhancements to methamphetamine 
abuse treatment centers including vocational training, and a 
variety of national drug awareness and prevention programs. 
Limited U.S. law enforcement assistance funds support very 
limited operational costs, training and equipment for Counter 
Narcotics Units (CNU's) and the Lao Customs Department. 
These limited funds are complemented by continuing regular 
Lao participation in regional training opportunities offered 
by the U.S. and Thailand at the International Law Enforcement 
Academy in Bangkok.  Bilateral cooperation in drug law 
enforcement improved somewhat in 2007, with DEA receiving 
drug samples from the GOL for the first time since 2005. 
 
The Road Ahead.  Laos' two-decade effort to sustainably 
eliminate opium poppy cultivation has reached an advanced 
stage, but as noted by GOL, UNODC and third country officials 
-- and large numbers of Lao farmers -- it is by no means 
over.  If significant near-term emergency food security 
support, and medium- to long-term assistance to establish 
viable alternative livelihoods, is not delivered in 2008 and 
the coming few years, it is very probable that the decline in 
poppy cultivation observed in 2007 will be the last for many 
years.  If former poppy growers revert to opium cultivation, 
persuading them a second time to stop will be far more 
difficult. 
 
Laos does not have the law enforcement and criminal justice 
 
capabilities and resources necessary to prevent large-scale 
trafficking of methamphetamine and other illicit drugs and 
contraband through Laos, nor the distribution, sale and abuse 
of illegal drugs among the Lao people.  For this reason, the 
GOL will be compelled to rely for its immediate future on 
drug demand reduction measures for drug abuse prevention and 
treatment to respond to its epidemic of illegal drug abuse. 
Existing programs to educate youth and other vulnerable 
groups on the dangers of addiction must be enlarged and 
reinforced, and drug abuse treatment availability must be 
greatly further enhanced.  Better Lao integration in regional 
anti-trafficking initiatives, and a substantially enhanced 
investment in law enforcement and criminal justice 
institutions, are essential for Laos to respond effectively 
to regional and international trafficking and organized crime. 
 
V.  Statistical Tables 
 
(As noted above, post will provide best available information 
to update statistical tables for Laos as soon as possible 
after the end of 2007, and in any case before the INL 
deadline of February 1, 2008.) 
 
VI.  Chemical Control Issues 
 
As party to the 1988 UN Convention, Laos is obliged to 
establish controls on the 23 precursor and essential 
chemicals identified under Article 12 of that Convention.  In 
practice, Laos' laws to implement this obligation are weak, 
and the institutional capability of its government to 
implement those laws is highly limited.  Responsibility for 
regulating precursor and essential chemicals lies with the 
Food and Drug Administration of the Ministry of Public 
Health.  In January 2005, that agency issued a decree 
imposing legal controls on 35 chemicals, including all of 
those which the 1988 Convention requries be subject to 
regulation.  The Health Ministry is also responsible to issue 
licenses for the legal importation of very limited quantities 
of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine which are used (by 
government-owned pharmaceutical plants) for preparation of 
cold medications, which are available for sale in pharmacies 
without prescription.  (The Ministry is currently 
considering, but has not yet approved, one application for 
importation of 25 kilograms of pseudoephedrine by a GOL-owned 
pharmaceutical plant.)  Iniitally, officials of the Food and 
Drug office were assigned at major international entry points 
to Laos, but due to shortage of personnel and conflicting 
requirements, the Health Ministry withdrew these staff 
members and now conducts inspections of imported chemicals 
only upon rquest to visit an importer's warehouse or storage 
facility.  The Ministry is not known to conduct any end-use 
inspection of any licensed imports or uses.  There are no 
other known significant licit imports of precursor chemicals, 
and no known domestic manufacturing capacity for them in Laos. 
 
Responsibility for enforcement of laws that prohibit the 
unlicensed importation, sale or use of controlled chemicals 
rests formally with the Lao Customs Service and the national 
police.  As a practical matter, there appears to be 
relatively little communication between these law enforcement 
agencies and the Health Ministry office responsible for 
regulation.  There have been occasional seizures in Laos of 
controlled chemicals, most frequently ephedrine or 
pseudoephedrine, but also less frequently of heroin 
processing chemicals.  For the most part, such seized 
chemicals have been thought to be in transit between China 
and Burma or Thailand.  There has been no recent evidence of 
any significant manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants in 
Laos, and no recent evidence of heroin processing in the 
country. 
 
Laos, along with Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand and 
Vietnam, has for several years participated in a regional 
project and action plan sponsored by the UNODC Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific, one of whose goals is to 
enhance the effectiveness of controls on precursor and 
essential chemicals.  Most activities under this project have 
concentrated on training for law enforcement, border and 
regulatory officials in the recognition and management of 
controlled chemicals, and on providing UNODC advice and 
assistance to improve participating nations' chemical control 
laws.  Since 2004, Laos has participated with Thailand in an 
arrangement for periodic joint patrolling of one part of the 
countries' Mekong River border, one of whose stated goals is 
to deter smuggling of controlled chemicals.  It is not known 
whether these activities have had any positive results. 
 
end text. 
 
HUSO