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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV3316, AMBASSADOR HOSTS ROUNDTABLE ON "TOWARDS ANNAPOLIS AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TELAVIV3316 2007-11-20 17:26 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXRO1410
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #3316/01 3241726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201726Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4250
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL KWBG IS SA IR SY
 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HOSTS ROUNDTABLE ON "TOWARDS ANNAPOLIS AND 
BEYOND" WITH MAJOR ISRAELI ACADEMICS AND THINK TANKS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 14th Ambassador Jones held a 
round-table discussion with leading Israeli academics and think tank 
representatives to discuss the upcoming Annapolis conference. 
Opinions varied as to the possible outcomes of the conference, but 
there was general agreement that planning for the twelve months 
"after Annapolis" would be critical and that even small achievements 
from negotiations would constitute progress in ending the protracted 
Israeli-Arab conflict.  Attendees attached significance to Saudi 
Arabia participation, encouraged inclusion of Syria, and suggested 
finding a role for Russia.  Lastly, most participants felt that 
progress on the Palestinian issue would make it easier for key 
regional countries to work with the U.S. to find a solution to the 
regional challenge posed by Iran.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) On November 14th at the Sheraton Hotel in Tel Aviv, 
Ambassador Jones hosted a roundtable discussion with leading Israeli 
academics and think tank representatives, including:  Mr. Yossi 
Alpher, Political Security Domain; Prof. Amatzia Baram, Director, 
Ezri Center for Gulf Studies, U. of Haifa; Prof. Ofra Bengio, Iraq 
Desk, Dayan Center for M.E. Studies, Tel Aviv University (TAU); Dr. 
Boaz Ganor, Director, Inst. for Counterterrorism, IDC Herzliya; 
Efraim Halevy, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Hebrew U.; 
Prof. Yair Hirschfeld, Dept. of M.E. Studies, U. of Haifa; Director, 
ECF;  Dr. Emily Laudau, Arms Control and Regional Security Project, 
INNS (TAU); Prof. Elie Podeh, Chair, M.E. & Islamic Studies Dept., 
Hebrew U.; Prof. Barry Rubin, Director, GLORIA Center, IDC Herzliya; 
Dr. Dan Schueftan, Acting Dir., Nat. Security Studies Cent., U. of 
Haifa; Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Director, Inst. for Adv. Energy Studies, 
U. of Haifa; Prof. Shimon Shamir, Emeritus Prof., M.E. History 
Dept., TAU; Prof. Gerald Steinberg, Chair, Political Science Dept., 
Bar-Ilan U. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Skepticism about Palestinian & Israeli Leaders 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) Many of the experts expressed concern over the relative 
political weakness of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and 
Palestinian President Abbas.  Yossi Alpher argued that that the 
Fatah Party has yet to be reformed, and, consequently, President 
Abbas lacks the "political infrastructure in the West Bank to 
sustain a process."  Efraim Halevy, too, said he could not envision 
an optimistic outcome without doing something about the West 
Bank/Gaza split.  Elie Podeh argued that the Palestinian track was 
deadlocked, and Abbas needed to overcome the schism in Palestinian 
politics before coming to the negotiating table.  "You cannot ignore 
Gaza," Halevy added, warning that a split in Hamas could leave Gaza 
"a no-man's land ruled by warlords."  Dealing with the "lesser 
Devil" (i.e., Hamas) might be preferable to confronting Al-Qaeda in 
Gaza if the situation becomes anarchic, in his view. 
 
4.  (SBU) As for Olmert, some expressed concern that his coalition 
government lacks sufficient stability to survive Annapolis.  Boaz 
Ganor claimed "there is no popular support to promote or implement 
whatever is agreed at Annapolis."  Others worried that politicians 
both inside and outside the coalition would move to dissolve the 
government and call for early elections in 2008.  Yossi Alpher said 
that the Israeli system of governance is structurally incompatible 
with the needs of peacemaking between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
 
 
------------------------- 
Expectations of Annapolis 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Ephraim Halevy argued that Annapolis will be a success 
because all who are going have decided that it will be so.   Elie 
Podeh countered that success was in the eye of the beholder, and 
Hamas was waiting to pounce on the failure they anticipate.  Dan 
Schueftan, an inveterate skeptic, commented that Annapolis would 
create "false hope (on the Israeli-Palestinian track,)" but this 
would still be useful as it would help galvanize a coalition against 
Iran, and enable Israel to return to unilateralism under the 
"charade of agreement" and the "pretense of responsibility from 
President Abbas."  Schueftan specified that Israel had an overriding 
interest in removing settlements from the West Bank as soon as 
possible, while retaining the IDF presence until security improved. 
 
--------------- 
After Annapolis 
--------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Several participants felt that developing the West Bank's 
economy and economic infrastructure should be the first priority 
after Annapolis.  Ambassador Jones noted that economic development 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace and that the 
Palestinians need a political horizon for a two-state solution. 
Boaz Ganor argued that the West Bank should be transformed into a 
sort of "Hong Kong" to contrast with the "hell in Gaza."  Others 
 
TEL AVIV 00003316  002 OF 002 
 
 
disagreed with the analogy, noting that the West Bank is landlocked, 
economic prosperity is impossible to create in only twelve months 
and that political stability must precede private investment. 
 
7.  (SBU) Professor Shamir emphasized the importance of starting a 
process that continues after Annapolis leading to changes on the 
ground.  Recalling the failures of Oslo and Camp David (2000), 
Shamir assessed that gaps between the parties had narrowed on a 
number of issues:  A two-state solution is acceptable to most 
Israelis and Palestinians.   "Israelis are more flexible on 
Jerusalem, and Palestinians are more practical on the 'Right of 
Return.'"  Moreover, Shamir remarked that there are now many 
resources and plans that the parties are able to draw from as they 
move head.  He compared the protracted Middle East conflict to 
Northern Ireland, and stressed that even if Annapolis yields just 
small improvements, it will have been worthwhile.  Gerald Steinberg 
concurred that "with so many obstacles, small steps are necessary." 
 
 
----- 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
8.  (SBU) Yossi Alpher argued that Syria offered "a better option" 
and recommended using Annapolis to launch negotiations with Syria. 
Elie Podeh agreed that it was a mistake to concentrate solely on the 
Palestinian track, but Amatzia Baram countered that Israel simply 
could not negotiate two tracks simultaneously. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Creating Coalition of "Core States" 
----------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Several participants noted that progress between Israelis 
and Palestinians would make it easier for key regional players to 
cooperate with the U.S. on Iran policy (notably, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia).  Steinberg argued that Saudi participation in Annapolis 
would signify (the possibility of) the end of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Another participant said that 
Palestinian President Abbas is a partner for building a regional 
coalition, albeit a "difficult, bumpy and complicated coalition." 
Podeh cautioned against using the term "moderate leaders," a term 
that plays to radicals and fundamentalists, and suggested an 
alternative nomenclature: "Core State Coalition Alliance."  Finally, 
a number of participants agreed that Russia should be given a role 
in the  Annapolis meeting and follow-up before "it found a role for 
itself." 
 
JONES