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Viewing cable 07SEOUL3355, 2007-2008 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL3355 2007-11-21 00:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3355/01 3250019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210019Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7399
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3417
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8568
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3550
UNCLAS SEOUL 003355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/K AND INL (JOHN LYLE) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KS KN
SUBJECT: 2007-2008 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 136782 
 
1. (U) Per reftel, Embassy Seoul's submission for the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) portion of the 2007-2008 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is provided 
at para 2.  Input for the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) portion of the INCSR is provided at para 3 
with the understanding that information on the DPRK's 
narcotics-related activities is very limited. 
 
2. (SBU) 2007-2008 INCSR input for the ROK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
Narcotics production or abuse is not a major problem in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK).  However, reports continue to 
indicate that an undetermined quantity of narcotics is 
smuggled through South Korea en route to the United States 
and other countries.  South Korea has become a 
transshipment location for drug traffickers due to the 
country's reputation for not having a drug abuse problem. 
This combined with the fact that the South Korean port of 
Pusan is one of the region's largest ports makes South 
Korea an attractive location for illegal shipments coming 
from countries which are more likely to attract a 
contraband inspection upon arrival.  The ROK is a party to 
the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Drugs available in the ROK include methamphetamine, heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana, and club drugs such as LSD and 
Ecstasy.  Methamphetamine continues to be the most widely 
abused drug, while marijuana remains popular as well. 
Heroin and cocaine are only sporadically seen in the ROK. 
Club drugs such as Ecstasy and LSD continue to be popular 
among college students.  In early 2007, ROK authorities 
discovered a mobile clandestine lab in South Korea that two 
individuals had been using to produce small amounts of 
methamphetamine from legally-obtained cold medicines.  In 
response, the South Korean government implemented stricter 
controls on the purchase of over-the-counter medicines 
containing ephedrine and psuedoephedrine, requiring 
customer registration for quantities greater than 720 mg (a 
three-day standard dose). 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs 2007 
 
Policy Initiatives.  In 2007, the Korean Food and Drug 
Administration (KFDA) continued to implement stronger 
precursor chemical controls under amended legislation 
approved in 2005.  The KFDA continued its efforts to 
educate companies and train its regulatory investigators on 
the enhanced regulations and procedures for monitoring the 
precursor chemical program.  The KFDA also implemented in 
2007 new regulatory oversight procedures to track and 
address diversion of narcotics and psychotropic substances 
from medical facilities and emerging patterns of abuse in 
South Korea of additional substances, including gamma 
butyrolactone (GBL), psychotropic-containing appetite 
suppressants, and the veterinary anesthesia ketamine. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  In the first nine months of 2007, 
South Korean authorities arrested 878 persons for narcotics 
use, 6,041 persons for psychotropic substance use, and 591 
persons for marijuana use.  ROK authorities seized 18 kg of 
methamphetamine.  Ecstasy seizures increased to 18,151 
tablets from 319, approaching previous levels before 2004 
(20,385 tablets).  South Korean authorities seized 19.6 kg 
of marijuana. (NOTE: All figures provided are from the 
first nine months of the year. Total figures for 2007 are 
not available.)  South Koreans generally do not use heroin; 
and cocaine is used only sporadically, with no indication 
of its use increasing. 
 
Corruption.  There were no reports of corruption involving 
narcotics law enforcement in the ROK in 2007.  As a matter 
of government policy, the ROK does not encourage or 
facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic 
or psychotropic or other controlled substances, or the 
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  South Korea has extradition 
treaties with 23 countries and mutual legal assistance 
treaties in force with 18 countries, including the United 
States. South Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
 
Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended 
by its 1972 Protocol.  South Korea has signed, but has not 
yet ratified, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption.  Korean 
authorities exchange information with international counter 
narcotics agencies such as the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL), and have placed Korean 
National Police and/or Korea Customs Service attachQs in 
Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, China, and the United States. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  Legal marijuana and hemp growth is 
licensed by local Health Departments.  The hemp is used to 
produce fiber for traditional hand-made ceremonial funeral 
clothing.  Every year, each District Prosecutor's Office, 
in conjunction with local governments, conducts 
surveillance into suspected illicit marijuana growing areas 
during planting or harvesting time periods to limit 
possible illicit diversion.  In the first six months of 
2007, local authorities seized 274 marijuana plants, down 
sinificantly from 3,783 in the first nine months of 2006. 
Opium poppy production is illegal in South Korea, although 
poppy continues to be grown in Kyonggi Province where 
farmers have traditionally used the harvested plants as a 
folk medicine to treat sick pigs and cows.  Opium is not 
normally processed from these plants for human 
consumption.  Korean authorities continue surveillance of 
opium poppy-growing areas and seized 13,927 poppy plants in 
the first six months of 2007. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Few narcotic drugs originate in South 
Korea.  The exportation of narcotic substances is illegal 
under South Korean law, and none are known to be exported. 
However, the ROK does produce and export the precursor 
chemicals acetone, toluene, and sulfuric acid. 
Transshipment through South Korea's ports remains a serious 
problem.  ROK authorities recognize South Korea's 
vulnerability as a transshipment nexus and have undertaken 
greater efforts to educate shipping companies of the risk. 
ROK authorities? ability to directly intercept the 
suspected transshipment of narcotics and precursor 
chemicals has been limited by the fact that the vast 
majority of the shipping containers never enter ROK 
territory.  Nonetheless, the ROK continued its 
international cooperation efforts to monitor and 
investigate transshipment cases.  In the previous year, ROK 
authorities and the Seoul DEA Country Office completed a 
modified controlled delivery of crystal methamphetamine 
originally intended for transshipment through South Korea 
from China to Guam, resulting in the dismantling of an 
international crystal methamphetamine organization in the 
U.S. and South Korea.  Redoubled efforts by the Korean 
Customs Service (KCS) have resulted in increased seizures 
of methamphetamine and marijuana (12.4 kg and 7.7 kg 
respectively in the first 6 months of 2007) transported by 
arriving passengers and through postal services at South 
Korea's ports of entry.  Most methamphetamine smuggled into 
South Korea comes from China.  A majority of the LSD and 
Ecstasy used in South Korea has been identified as coming 
from North America or Europe.  People living in 
metropolitan areas are known to use marijuana originating 
in South Africa and Nigeria, whereas those living in rural 
areas appear to obtain their marijuana from locally 
produced crops.  ROK authorities also report increased 
instances of marijuana use among the foreign population in 
South Korea in recent years, a trend that is most likely 
the result of increased law enforcement efforts targeting 
this segment of the population. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives and Programs.  The U.S. Embassy's Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Seoul Country Office and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials 
work closely with ROK narcotics law enforcement 
authorities, and the DEA considers this working 
relationship to be excellent. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation. The DEA Seoul Country Office has 
focused its 2007 efforts on international drug 
interdiction, seizures of funds and assets related to 
illicit narcotics trafficking, and the diversion of 
precursor chemicals in South Korea and in the Far East 
region.  In 2007, the DEA Seoul Country Office organized, 
coordinated, and hosted a one-week training seminar on 
International Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering 
Investigations.  This training was co-hosted by the Korean 
 
Supreme Prosecutors Office (KSPO) with 50 prosecutors, 
investigators, and analysts from the Korea Financial 
Intelligence Unit, KSPO, KCS, Korean National Intelligence 
Service (KNIS), and the Korean National Police Agency 
(KNPA) in attendance.  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
continues to share intelligence regarding the importation 
of precursor chemicals into South Korea from the United 
States and other Asian countries with the KFDA, KCS, KSPO, 
and KNIS.  DEA also works closely with the KSPO and KCS in 
their activities to monitor airport and drug transshipment 
methods and trends, including the use of international mail 
by drug traffickers. 
 
The Road Ahead.  ROK authorities have expressed concern 
that the popularity of South Korea as a transshipment nexus 
may lead to greater volume of drugs entering Korean 
markets.  Korean authorities fear increased accessibility 
and lower prices could stimulate domestic drug use in the 
future.  South Korean authorities also indicate a growing 
concern about the importation of narcotics, psychotropic 
drugs, and illegal medicines purchased via the internet, 
predominately from web sites maintained in the United 
States.  In the first nine months of 2007, South Korean 
authorities intercepted 341 internet-based drug purchases. 
In response, Korean authorities established Memorandum of 
Understanding with a number of Korean internet portal sites 
to allow the KNPA to track and intercept such purchases. 
The South Korean government is currently seeking further 
international cooperation to better navigate the legal 
complexities surrounding the prosecution of transnational 
cyber crimes.  The DEA Seoul Country Office will continue 
its extensive training, mentoring, and operational 
cooperation with ROK authorities. 
 
3. (SBU) 2007-2008 INCSR input for the DPRK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
For decades, North Koreans have been arrested for 
trafficking in narcotics and engaging in other criminal 
behavior and illicit activity, including passing 
counterfeit U.S. currency and trading in copyrighted 
products. There were no confirmed instances of drug 
trafficking involving North Korea or its nationals during 
2007.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that trafficking and 
drug abuse in the DPRK and along its border with China 
continues.  There also continued to be press, industry and 
law enforcement reporting of DPRK links to counterfeit 
cigarette trafficking and counterfeit U.S. currency.  The 
Department is of the view that it is likely, but not 
certain, that the North Korean government has sponsored 
criminal activities in the past, including narcotics 
production and trafficking, but notes that there is no 
evidence for several years that it continues to traffic in 
narcotics.  The DPRK is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
During 2007, there were numerous reports in the Japanese 
media of drug trafficking along the DPRK/Chinese border. 
According to these reports, Japanese criminal figures were 
traveling to the DPRK-PRC border area to purchase 
methamphetamine for smuggling back to Japan.  The 
Department is unable to confirm the accuracy of these 
reports, and if true, the reports seem to involve 
small-scale trafficking by individuals, not large-scale 
organized trafficking managed by the state.  There are 
indications that drug use in the DPRK may be increasing. In 
March 2006, the DPRK published a decree which warns 
citizens, state factories and groups in the DPRK to "not 
sell, buy, or use drugs illegally."  According to the 
decree, "Organizations, factories and groups should not 
illegally produce or export drugs."  Punishment is severe, 
up to death, and the family members and shop mates of 
offenders face collective responsibility and punishment 
with the perpetrator.  The DPRK also has an existing 
antinarcotics law.  The appearance of this new decree, its 
draconian penalties, and the fact that it is signed by the 
DPRK's National Security Council suggest that drug use and 
trafficking within the DPRK itself has come to the 
attention of authorities, and is viewed as a problem 
requiring a serious response. 
 
The "Pong-Su" incident in Australia in April 2003 renewed 
worldwide attention to the possibility of DPRK 
state-sponsorship of drug trafficking.  The "Pong-Su", a 
 
sea-going cargo vessel owned by a North Korean state 
enterprise, was seized after delivering a large quantity of 
pure heroin to accomplices on shore.  The trial of the 
"Pong-Su" captain and other senior officers, including a 
DPRK Korean Workers' Party Political Secretary, concluded 
in March 2006 with the captain and the others found not 
guilty by an Australian jury.  Four other defendants 
associated with the incident pled guilty, and are serving 
long prison sentences in Australia.  These defendants 
included three individuals who were apprehended in 
possession of heroin brought to Australia aboard the 
"Pong-Su", and another individual who came to Australia 
aboard the "Pong-Su", and was apprehended on the same beach 
where some of the heroin was found.  The "Pong-Su" itself 
was destroyed by Australian military aircraft, as property 
forfeited to Australia because of its involvement in 
narcotics trafficking. 
 
In May 2006, Japanese prosecutors charged Woo Sii Yun, an 
ethnic Korean and long-term resident of Japan, and 
Katsuhiko Miyata, reputedly a Japanese gang member, with 
involvement in several 2002 methamphetamine drug smuggling 
incidents.  The 2002 smuggling incidents involved several 
instances of DPRK vessels leaving hundreds of kg of 
methamphetamine drugs to float offshore for pick-up by 
criminals in Japan.  The police were led to Yun by the 
discovery of his phone number stored in the memory of a 
cell phone found aboard a DPRK patrol boat that sunk after 
a gun battle with the Japanese Coast Guard in late 2001. 
Alerted to Yun's possible involvement in narcotics 
trafficking with DPRK accomplices, Japanese police 
investigated his financial records and found several large 
payments from criminal elements in Japan.  Japanese 
officials suspect these payments were for drugs from North 
Korea. Japanese authorities also suspect the sunken DPRK 
patrol boat of involvement in earlier instances of 
methamphetamine trafficking to Japan.  The charges against 
Yun connect the DPRK more closely to methamphetamine 
smuggling to Japan, as key lead information -- Yun's phone 
number -- was found aboard a North Korean patrol vessel. 
 
Department has no evidence to support a finding that drug 
trafficking has stopped.  It is also certainly possible 
that DPRK entities previously involved in narcotics 
trafficking recently have adopted a lower profile or better 
operational security. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2007 
 
DPRK officials have ascribed past instances of misconduct 
by North Korean officials to the individuals involved, and 
stated that these individuals would be punished in the DPRK 
for their crimes.  A 2004 edition of the North Korean Book 
of Law contains the DPRK's Narcotics Control Law, and the 
DPRK government in 2007 re-affirmed its intent to punish 
drug traffickers severely, including with the death 
penalty, by issuing a new special decree in March 2006, 
signed by the DPRK's National Security Council.  There is 
no information available to the Department concerning 
enforcement of these laws or other legal actions taken 
against North Korean officials and citizens involved in 
drug trafficking in DPRK, or upon the return of North Korea 
citizens to the DPRK. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
The United States has made it clear to the DPRK that it has 
concerns about the DPRK's involvement in a range of 
criminal and illicit activities, including narcotics 
trafficking, and that these activities must stop.  The 
United States thoroughly investigates all allegations of 
criminal behavior impacting the United States by DPRK 
citizens and entities, prosecutes cases under U.S. 
jurisdiction to the fullest extent of the law, and urges 
other countries to do the same. 
 
VERSHBOW