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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW5345, CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE NORTH CAUCASUS: NO NEWS IS NOT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW5345 2007-11-09 08:26 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5345/01 3130826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090826Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5165
UNCLAS MOSCOW 005345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE NORTH CAUCASUS:  NO NEWS IS NOT 
NECESSARILY GOOD NEWS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In a recent roundtable discussion, Russian civil 
society leaders expressed uniform pessimism on prospects for 
democratic development in the North Caucasus - despite relative calm 
and improved infrastructure in Chechnya.  Our interlocutors predict 
continuing political violence and an increase in popular alienation 
from the Russian mainstream.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) In an October 6 lunch roundtable, political prospects for the 
North Caucasus were debated by Deputy Chief of Mission from the 
Danish Embassy Soren Liborius (in his role as liaison to a major 
regional provider of humanitarian assistance, the Danish Refugee 
Council), Demos Center Chair Tanya Lokshina, Russian Justice 
Initiative Executive Director Ole Solvang, Human Rights Watch Moscow 
Deputy Director Sasha Petrov, and Professor Sergey Arutyunov (Chief 
of the Caucasus Section of the Institute of Ethnology of the Russian 
Academy of Science). 
 
-------------- 
Power Politics 
-------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Lokshina, who last visited the region in October 2007, 
acknowledged that Russia's policy of "Chechenization" of the 
conflict in the North Caucasus has worked in so far as political 
violence has decreased in the Chechen Republic.  There were no 
abductions in Chechnya in April 2007 and about 10 over the 
succeeding summer, with "only" two abductees disappearing entirely. 
Lokshina argued that the new relative security of Chechnya's 
residents is thanks to an order conveyed by Chechen President Ramzan 
Kadyrov.  It is also possible, Lokshina stressed, that family 
members are at present too frightened of retaliation to report their 
relatives' abductions. 
 
4. (SBU) Lokshina called Kadyrov's Chechnya a well-organized 
totalitarian society.  Kadyrov has stationed all media and NGOs in 
one building in Grozny, the better to monitor them, she said. 
Kadyrov's and his father Ahmad Kadyrov's portraits are everywhere in 
Grozny - not just in public spaces where the government posts them 
but in private homes and shops, seemingly as a talisman against 
state-sponsored violence.  Although Kadyrov has done a lot to 
rebuild Chechnya, especially Grozny, Lokshina said it seemed to her 
that reconstruction had actually stalled recently.  Either money 
from the federal budget has dried up, Lokshina concluded, or Kadyrov 
is using a greater portion of it to enrich himself and his cronies. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Arutyunov differed with Lokshina on this score, arguing 
that Kadyrov (unlike more rapacious counterparts in neighboring 
republics) continued to parcel out monies in a manner that ensured 
continued economic growth and regeneration.  Taking a longer view, 
Arutyunov compared Chechnya under the Kadyrovs to Haiti under the 
Duvalier regime. Kadyrov's short-term success, he argued, was due to 
the relative homogeneity of Chechnya (compared to Dagestan), which 
meant that Kadyrov had a ruling clan clique with its equivalent of a 
Tonton Macoute-type army.  However, Arutyunov said that no amount of 
security can protect Kadyrov from his many enemies, and he predicted 
he would be assassinated like his father. 
 
6. (SBU) Solvang agreed with Lokshina that any reduction in 
disappearances is thanks to a political order from above and not to 
the development of indigenous legal institutions.  He noted that 
there has been only one conviction in a disappearance case in 
Chechnya since 1999. No new prosecutions have been brought in recent 
times, and those that have been reopened involve federal troops, not 
the vigilante "Kadyrovtsy," as defendants. Liborius, who regularly 
travels to the North Caucasus to monitor Danish-sponsored aid 
projects there, remarked that attempts by international NGOs to 
create relevant institutions in the Chechen government had been 
unsuccessful so far and raised questions about the sustainability of 
these international programs. 
 
--------------- 
Cultural Divide 
--------------- 
 
7. (U) Meanwhile, Lokshina added, due to ethnic Russians' flight 
during the first and second Chechen wars and the deep alienation of 
Chechen society from the center, rural Chechen children cannot read 
or write Russian and are ill-prepared for the education on offer, as 
textbooks are in Russian only. These circumstances bode ill for 
their longer-term integration in Russian society, Lokshina stated. 
(Comment:  PRM has been funding Russian-language preschool programs 
for Chechen refugee children in Ingushetia.  Lokshina's observation 
may argue for expansion of such programming to Chechnya in the 
interest of peacebuilding.  End Comment.) 
 
8. (SBU) More worrying still, the lunch guests agreed, moderate 
Chechen nationalism was being replaced among the economically and 
politically disenfranchised by militant pan-Islamism that, thanks to 
the Chechen diaspora, is spreading to other North Caucasus 
republics.  There, cumulative local grievances over lack of 
employment, ethnic discrimination, and political repression 
 
generated greater support for violence.  The short-sighted GOR 
response has been to follow its management model from the Chechen 
conflict:  prop up weak (with the possible exception of Kadyrov) 
governors who are loyal to the center, and crack down on any 
dissent, including by restricting reporting from the region. 
Arutyunov noted that the growing alienation in the region existed 
despite the fact that the current rulers (put in place under Dmitry 
Kozak's watch as PolPred) were all arguably "better" than their 
predecessors, with the notable exception of Ingushetia President 
Zyazikov. 
 
9. (SBU) Our interlocutors concluded that popular frustration, 
particularly in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan, may rise, with 
a commensurate increase in terrorist bombings. Arutyunov spoke of a 
"vicious circle" in which arbitrary and abusive police conduct 
provokes popular protests exacerbated by ethnic divisions.  The 
resulting instability makes Sharia law attractive, and a widespread 
turn to Islam makes Moscow nervous and inclined toward greater 
repression.  Police and judicial reform are the only solution, he 
said, evoking laughter from a group of people convinced that these 
are exactly what is required -- and difficult to achieve -- 
nationwide. 
 
BURNS