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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW5268, Penza Oblast - Governor Weak Authoritarian

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW5268 2007-11-06 04:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO8657
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #5268/01 3100442
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060442Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5037
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2506
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2824
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4658
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI ECON RS
 
SUBJECT: Penza Oblast - Governor Weak Authoritarian 
 
MOSCOW 00005268  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL: Moscow 03839 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Penza governor Vasiliy Bochkarev at first glance appears 
comfortably ensconced in his power position, enjoying favorable 
ratings from the population, which credits him with improving the 
regional quality of life, and nods of approval from Moscow for his 
energetic support of the National Priority Projects (reftel). 
Bochkarev has largely eliminated any real political challenge from 
within -- a campaign assisted by the fecklessness of his opponents 
-- and has corralled the media in such a way as to limit any 
substantive criticism of his regime.  Nevertheless, Bochkarev 
appears to be politically weak, at risk that his performance in 
office does not meet the full approval of Kremlin.  His 
administration has been rent by arrests and investigations for 
corruption and graft, some of which were connected to finances for 
the National Priority Projects.  The expectation is that Bochkarev 
will seek to strengthen his position vis-a-vis Moscow by boosting 
the fortunes of the President's party, United Russia, in the 
December 2 elections for the Duma.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Penza: Economic Fortunes Rising 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Editor-in-Chief of the local branch of the Ekho Moskvy 
radio station, Semen Vakhshtayn, credits Governor Bochkarev with 
having good instincts for the changing political currents from 
Moscow.  His programs in support of the National Priority Projects 
for health and social welfare -- including the network of sports 
centers and the establishment of a heart center -- have won praise 
from central leaders.  Premier Viktor Zubkov and Deputy Premier 
Zhukov have both made well-publicized trips to the region, with the 
former praising the "energetic" efforts of the government in 
promoting social conditions in Penza oblast   (reftel) 
 
3. (SBU) Penza has enjoyed a rise in living standards under 
Bochkarev's leadership.  Bella Akmaykina of the ROMIR Monitoring 
firm told Embassy that their marketing data and polling shows that 
Penza inhabitants enjoy more disposable income and are spending 
their money on automobiles and other high end consumables. She 
further noted that competition on the regional market had increased 
sufficiently to require the services of her company, which helps 
manufacturers develop marketing strategies.  Many equate Bochkarev 
with this economic dynamism, according to noted regional political 
scientist and publisher Valentin Manuylov.  Across the capital city, 
cranes tower over new building projects and a growing retail sector. 
 The governor's office encourages others to make the link between 
the administration and economic growth; banners herald a major 
project to repair and repave the town's roads as a gift from 
Bochkarev's United Russia. 
 
...With the Politics of Weak Authoritarianism 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Despite those successes, Bochkarev appears politically 
weak.  The YR party leadership chose not to have him head the YR 
party list for Penza Oblast -- a decision that reportedly troubled 
him -- and he is rumored to be up for replacement after the 
elections.  Bochkarev may believe that meeting the Kremlin's goals 
for election results in December could help to strengthen his 
position as governor.  Many in Penza's political elite expect a 
robust use of administrative resources to boost the turnout for 
Putin's United Russia.  Manuylov predicted a maximum vote of 70 
percent for YR, in part driven by the "illusion" that a stronger 
turnout for the party of power will result in increased financial 
support from the center. 
 
5.  (SBU) Penza's other political parties face additional challenges 
that have hampered their Duma campaigns.  The Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (KPRF) continues to have a strong showing, 
especially in rural districts, and is expected to receive 15 to 17 
percent of the vote, according Ekho Moskvy's Vakhshtayn.  However, 
the death of a leading local KPRF figure, Boris Zubov, in September 
has undermined party's competitiveness.  Now, Viktor Ilyukin, a 
sitting Duma deputy who lost the governor's race to Bochkarev in 
2002, heads the party list for Penza, but he does not enjoy the same 
popular support that his predecessor did. 
 
6.  (SBU) A former Bochkarev ally, Lyudmila Lezhikova, who helped 
him to win election in 1998, has lost the confidence of the governor 
and now heads the opposition party "Just Russia."  She and her 
business partners in "Stroidizain-konsalting" -- a local 
construction firm -- enjoyed the benefits of control over a concrete 
fabrication plant that gave them advantages in Penza's building 
boom.  According to Aleksey Panin of "Lyubimaya Gazeta," Lezhikova's 
 
MOSCOW 00005268  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
firm ran into legal problems in September after she publicly 
criticized administration bureaucrats for ineptitude and 
malfeasance.  Other rumors suggest that she refused to pony up for 
administration-sponsored programs, perhaps because she realized that 
the projects would be manipulated to support United Russia's 
political campaign. 
 
7. (SBU) Lezhikova's SR team seems consigned to their fate, with 
only limited access to the media and insufficient financial backing 
for a more robust campaign.  Curiously, the SR officials would not 
themselves broach the issue of YR's use of administrative resources 
until Poloff raised it as a possible concern.  Lezhikova, for her 
part, told Embassy that her party would win up to 15% of the vote -- 
a contention that few other regional experts would support.  She 
steadfastly maintained that Putin's decision to head the YR party 
list had "no real impact" on the chances of her party in the Duma 
election and dodged questions on the possible defection of the 
Pensioners' party from the SR coalition.  Lezhikova's vision for 
Russia, including a paternalistic censorship of the media to protect 
families, a critical view of Western culture in general, and an 
unfavorable view of U.S. foreign policies, differs little from that 
espoused by United Russia. 
 
8. (SBU) Vakhshtayn and Manuylov see the SRs as unlikely to receive 
enough votes to cross the 7 percent threshold for the election. 
Regional polls show the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), 
which enjoys the support of perhaps 9 percent of the voting 
population, as more popular in Penza oblast.  None of the other 
parties of the "liberal right" are registered to run in the Penza 
elections. 
 
Corruption Wave 
--------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The curious case of former First Deputy Governor Aleksandr 
Pashkov may also be a sign of trouble for Bochkarev.  Pashkov had 
responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the National 
Priority Projects in Penza oblast and was tightly connected with the 
region's construction industry, both from his time as the chief of 
the department for construction and highways and from his tenure as 
Mayor of Penza city.  Authorities arrested him in August at Moscow's 
Domodedovo airport as he attempted to flee the country.  At the time 
he was under investigation for misuse of his office to the tune of 
$1.6 million.  Not one Embassy contact in Penza knew Pashkov's 
whereabouts today, nor the proceeding of his case.  According to 
Vakhshtain, the regional branch of the FSB carried out the 
investigation of Pashkov as part of a broader campaign against 
regional leaders.  Young journalists Aleksey Panin and Sergey 
Poplyovin of the local paper "Lyubimaya Gazeta" reported that rumors 
of divisions within the oblast leadership had led to the arrest, 
with Bochkarev tiring of Pashkov's relentless self-promotion as the 
governor's heir apparent. 
 
10. (SBU) The administration has botched its first efforts to 
replace Pashkov.  In early October, the governor's office announced 
that Yuriy Aksenenko, the former Mayor of Saratov, would become the 
new deputy.  However, Aksenenko served for just one day; the 
regional press office denied that he had ever been "officially" 
appointed.  Embassy contacts say that the reasons for his 
"non-appointment" have never been fully explained. 
 
11. (SBU) The case against Pashkov is not the only corruption issue 
in Penza, indeed a wave of arrests and investigations has swept 
through the oblast in recent months.  Vakhshtain reports that 4 of 
the region's district leaders have been investigated, as well as the 
Minister for Finance Olga Atyukov and the head of the regional 
Rossiya Television station.  The oblast court in August sentenced 
the former chief of the Penza division of the Federal Property 
Agency, Vasiliy Petrushin, to 6 years of hard labor for taking a 
bribe for $32,000 in a case initiated by the FSB. 
 
Media Corralled 
--------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Corruption in Penza takes place in part because of a lack 
of free media to expose those crimes.  Bochkarev seems afraid to 
allow any dissent, perhaps a result of his own success in using the 
ballot box to become governor in 1998 and to hold onto power in a 
tough election in 2002 against a popular Communist leader. 
According to regional journalists, he has since turned against the 
businessmen who supported his initial bid for the governor's office 
and his administration has essentially eliminated any independent 
print media.  As in other regions, television remains firmly under 
the administration's control and provides little access for 
opposition parties to air their views, mainly by maintaining high 
costs for political advertising. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00005268  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
13.  (SBU) Aleksandr Yakhontov of the former regional edition of 
Novaya Gazeta claims his newspaper was essentially starved of 
advertising revenue as a result of administration pressure even as 
he fought what he termed a "spurious" legal case for defamation. 
Twelve officials from the Penza administration filed charges against 
Yakhontov and three other editors of local newspapers in response to 
an open letter to Putin that claimed the region was "gradually being 
turned into a private holding controlled by Governor Bochkarev and 
people close to him."  (The Strasbourg court in late July ruled that 
the case against Yakhontov and his co-defendants had no legal 
merit.)  Other editors were more adaptable and have "trimmed" their 
coverage to hew more closely to the demands of the governor's 
office. Even so, Bochkarev continues to monitor the media, going as 
far to call in during an on-air program on inflation in the region 
to argue against official statistics that showed higher prices in 
Penza than in other regions. 
 
14. (SBU) COMMENT: Bochkarev has publicly denied that Penza has any 
problem with corruption, since it remains a poor region without oil 
or valuable mineral resources.  Indeed, without powerful business 
and industrial interests, Bochkarev has been able to exert a level 
of control that governors in other regions, like Nizhniy Novgorod or 
Samara, could only dream of.  Penza like other oblast "boats" is 
rising on the broader tide of national economic growth and has 
enjoyed an infusion of cash from Moscow, in part through the 
National Priority Projects program. The extent to which the center 
will tolerate the corrupt practices of the regional elite remains to 
be seen, particularly if Bochkarev is able to "bring home the bacon" 
in the coming election season. 
 
RUSSELL