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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1288, INCREASING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE DRC: NEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1288 2007-11-19 13:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0028
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #1288/01 3231323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191323Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AFRICOM FOR GEN WARD 
OSD FOR TWHALEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: APER MASS MOPS PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT: : INCREASING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE DRC:  NEW 
GOALS, NEW DEMANDS AND REQUEST FOR ODC PRESENCE IN KINSHASA 
 
REF: A. A. KINSHASA 1248 
 
     B. B. KINSHASA 1232 
     C. C. KINSHASA 1247 
     D. D. USEUCOM LETTER DATED 26 MAR 2007 FROM GEN WARD 
     E. TO AMB ROGER MEECE 
 
KINSHASA 00001288  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 5. 
 
2.  (U) Summary.  While military assistance to the GDRC has 
grown over the past several years, staffing levels have not 
kept pace with resulting demands on the Mission.  If newly 
proposed engagement materializes, all military assistance, 
including current programs, is expected to top USD 15 million 
per year in the near future.  Post urges the Departments of 
State 
and Defense to approve this request for additional personnel 
resources -- the standing up of an ODC presence in Kinshasa 
plus 
TDY support as needed -- to more effectively manage the 
Mission's 
broad range of military assistance projects.  End summary. 
 
3. (U) Significant increases in military assistance 
programs in recent months to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo recognizes the need for additional security 
cooperation and the importance of our growing 
military-to-military relationship.  They also highlight the 
need for additional qualified personnel to manage USG 
resources for continued operational improvements within the 
DRC's military.  In addition to the money currently managed 
by the DAO (USD 694k in FMF funds, USD 500k in IMET funds, 
and USD 800k in HIV/AIDS funds for FY 08), recent increases 
in FY 08 will add an expected USD 5.5 million in FY 08 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to the current FY 07 
total of USD 5 million in military program funds. 
Continued oversight of the Tripartite Fusion Cell (TFC) in 
Kisangani, and proposed observer status in the bilateral 
Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) at the DRC/Rwanda border 
are additional opportunities for military assistance. 
Further funding increases have been requested and are 
envisioned through FY 09 funds, and the total of military 
assistance could conceivably rise beyond USD 15 million per 
year in FY-09. 
 
4. (U) The relevance of these programs is great.  In 
addition to ongoing training of brigade and battalion level 
staff officers of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), Post 
is sponsoring general officer training seminars, managing 
assistance programs for military justice, and supervising 
improvements to the FARDC's staff college training center. 
Additional programs envision training and equipping a rapid 
response unit, expanding training for the crucial 
non-commissioned officer corps, and increasing training and 
infrastructure support within the military justice sector. 
Each of these individual projects and proposals will have a 
positive impact on the operational capacity of the FARDC; 
combined, they offer the opportunity for the USG to play a 
significant role in supporting the modernization and 
professionalization of the DRC's military, thereby 
contributing to the overall security of the central African 
region. 
 
5. (U)  In order to better carry out these current and 
future projects, Post requests the designation of an Office 
of Defense Cooperation (ODC) presence in Kinshasa.  Such a 
move has long been discussed (ref D); further discussion, 
in our view, is a luxury we cannot afford.  In the interim, 
between approval of an ODC office and the arrival of the 
appropriate personnel, Post also requests immediate TDY 
support in order to foster positive relationships with the 
DRC's military and manage the numerous and diverse programs 
in country. 
 
6. (U)  The best officer(s) for this position would be a 
graduate of the DSCA's DISAM security management course. 
He or she should also possess experience in African 
affairs, perhaps with previous military experience at an 
African post, experience in managing security assistance 
programs, and a high level of fluency -- written and spoken 
-- in French. 
 
7. (U)  Comment:  The recent increase in U.S.-DRC military 
cooperation is a logical outcome of recent political 
 
KINSHASA 00001288  002 OF 002 
 
 
developments -- the creation of new democratic institutions 
and free and fair elections -- in this nation of vital 
strategic interest to the United States.  A democratic RDC 
is destined to play a critical role in contributing to 
peace and stability is the entire Central Africa region. 
The projects noted in this cable are either in progress or 
will begin shortly.  U.S. interests would be best served by 
routing all assistance through one central office staffed 
by personnel with specialized experience.  Qualified staff 
to administer military assistance programs is a sine qua 
non if U.S. military assistance is to succeed in this, 
perhaps Africa's most important source of strategic 
minerals and one of the world's most bio-diverse nations. 
End comment. 
 
BROCK