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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1278, Special Advisor Shortley's November 13 conversation with

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1278 2007-11-14 15:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO6078
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1278/01 3181519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141519Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7130
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KWMN PINS PREF MOPS CG
SUBJECT:  Special Advisor Shortley's November 13 conversation with 
Presidential Chief of Staff Tshibanda 
 
REF:  Kinshasa 1267 
 
1.  (SBU) Tim Shortley, in Kampala, spoke at length with Raymond 
Tshibanda, DRC President Joseph Kabila's chief of staff on November 
 
SIPDIS 
13.  Shortley urged Tshibanda to press Congolese officials to move 
quickly on implementation of the recent DRC-Rwanda communique 
(reftel) on negative forces.  Shortley also pressed the COS to 
develop plans to win the "hearts and minds" of the population of 
North Kivu to deprive Nkunda of his raison d'etre.  Tshibanda 
expressed concern over a recent attack on an IDP camp, allegedly by 
dissident General Laurent Nkunda, and asked Shortley to call Nkunda 
to pressure him to end his insurgency; Shortley agreed to call 
Nkunda.  Tshibanda also praised Shortley and USG efforts to end the 
conflict in the Kivus, asking emphatically that the U.S. remain in 
the driver's seat through the coming months as the Nairobi agreement 
is implemented.  Shortley agreed to update Tshibanda on latest 
developments on Saturday, after the contact group meeting and 
meeting with Assistant Secretary Frazer.  End summary. 
 
Nairobi agreement:  a great success 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) AF Special Advisor Tim Shortley and Raymond Tshibanda 
spoke by phone for 45 minutes on November 13.  Also participating 
was Kinshasa charge Sam Brock.  Tshibanda had requested the call to 
get Shortley's observations on the Nairobi meeting at which a 
ground-breaking communique on a joint approach to fighting negative 
forces in the east of the DRC was issued on November 10 by 
representatives of the DRC and Rwanda.  Shortley called the meeting 
a great success with great conclusions, and which met all sides' 
requirements.  The U.S., he said, looks forward to a rapid 
implementation of the agreement and in that connection urged 
Tshibanda to complete the plan on the FDLR, due on December 1 as 
 
SIPDIS 
agreed in the communique, as soon as possible.  Tshibanda also 
agreed that rapid implementation is necessary. 
 
3.  (SBU) Tshibanda registered the GDRC's "strong concern" over an 
incident earlier in the day in which Nkunda's men allegedly attacked 
a camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) in Mugunga. 
Tshibanda noted that Nairobi had not sent the right message if 
 
SIPDIS 
Nkunda goes out and attacks innocent people in an IDP camp.  He 
added:  "We need to be harder with Nkunda."  Shortley promised to 
look into reports on Mugunga and expressed uncertainty as to whether 
Nkunda had actually carried out the attack as he, Shortley, had 
heard that Nkunda might be away from the area.  If so, Shortley 
stated, Bosco was in charge and would have attacked the IDP camp. 
(Note:  MONUC has not confirmed Nkunda's involvement; some reports 
state that the FARDC attacked the camp.   End note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) Tshibanda asked Shortley to call Nkunda to warn him, with 
"very strong words," to stop.  Tshibanda repeated this request later 
in the conversation.  He also reiterated several lines about the 
possibility of hundreds of innocent people getting killed if Nkunda 
is not removed quickly and the possibility of all the progress made 
in Nairobi being undone because of one man.  Shortley promised to 
talk with Nkunda. 
 
Depriving Nkunda of his raison d'etre 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU Shortley then stressed need to start moving on a parallel 
track designed to undermine Nkunda's grievances and arguments, i.e., 
the issue of protection, meeting needs of vulnerable groups, etc. 
Undermining Nkunda's arguments and winning hearts and minds program 
for North Kivu, Shortley stressed, could help to meet needs of 
vulnerable groups, provide protection, government services and goods 
to the people of North Kivu.  He added that based on this approach 
Kabila could also win hearts and minds for the coming local 
elections in May 2008. 
 
6.  (SBU) Shortley then referred to UN efforts to better protect 
people and provide services and asked Tshibanda if he would like 
hear about this from the UN.  Tshibanda expressed interest; Brock 
was tasked with setting up a briefing in the coming days.  Shortley 
continued that a three-track approach was needed for North Kivu: 
(1) dealing politically, diplomatically and militarily with Nkunda; 
(2) winning hearts and minds through a UN/DRC plan to provide 
services and protection; and (3) quick action against the FDLR. 
Tshibanda agreed that a quick attack on FDLR positions was needed to 
 
SIPDIS 
show that the GDCR was serious when it said it wanted to remove the 
FDLR as a negative force. 
 
7.  (SBU) Tshibanda ended the conversation with unqualified praise 
for Shortley and the U.S., saying that "never has such progress been 
made in ending the conflict in the east as had been achieved in the 
last three months when the GDCR began to work closely with the U.S." 
 
KINSHASA 00001278  002 OF 002 
 
 
 Without saying so explicitly, he was clearly referring to the many 
recent signs of U.S. engagement (meetings with the Secretary and the 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in New York, the White House 
visit, intensified engagement between his staff and the U.S. 
Embassy, frequent calls between the Assistant Secretary, the 
Tripartite Plus process, etc.).  Tshibanda welcomed continued 
involvement from the UN and other international partners but made 
clear that the U.S. must provide leadership and be completely 
involved. 
 
8.  (SBU) Tshibanda ended the call asking Shortley to update him by 
phone shortly after his return to the U.S. later in the week. 
Shortly agreed to call him Saturday after the contact group meeting, 
and after meeting with A/S Frazer. 
 
9.  (U) Special Advisor Shortley has/has cleared this message. 
 
Brock