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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1248, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY JUSTICE ASSISTANCE TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1248 2007-11-02 11:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO6445
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1248/01 3061130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021130Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7078
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OSD FOR MELLINGTON 
STATE FOR G/IWI (OBLUM) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KDEM KWMN PREL PHUM CG
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY JUSTICE ASSISTANCE TO 
THE DRC 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1232 
 
Second in a series. 
 
1.  Summary.  The Defense Institute for International Legal 
Studies (DIILS) has prioritized a set of recommendations for 
U.S. assistance to the Congolese military justice sector.  It 
recommends immediate implementation of training for military 
magistrates, to give priority focus to the investigation and 
prosecution of sex crimes, an area where many soldiers have 
been implicated.  Military justice can contribute 
significantly to a decrease in violence against women in the 
DRC and is a critical area for long-term security in the DRC. 
 USG involvement can make a positive contribution, although 
DIILS' mission and capabilities is limited in scope. 
Additional funding and partners should be identified soon and 
committed to the program.  End summary. 
 
2.  DILLS' groundbreaking assessment of the Congolese 
military justice sector prioritized a series of short, 
medium, and long-term recommendations for U.S. assistance, 
from infrastructure to expertise (reftel).  The 
recommendations are listed in paragraph 5 below. 
 
3.  In the short term, the report recommends an initial 
program of training seminars for military magistrates, to be 
set up immediately.  Subsequent discussion between the 
Embassy and DIILS have concluded that these seminars should 
focus on the prosecution and investigation of sex crimes, an 
area in which many government and irregular soldiers have 
been implicated.  We have also discussed a prospective 
calendar for these seminars with MONUC's Rule of Law Unit 
(ROLU), which is eager to work closely with the USG in the 
sector (septel). 
 
4.  The report indicates that the time frames for its 
recommendations are notional, and proposes that assistance be 
routed through the Embassy for vetting in regard to policy 
priorities.  It further notes that, due to the nature of 
DIILS' mission and capabilities, its potential participation 
is limited to training seminars, mobile training teams, CONUS 
visits, and DIILS resident courses.  DIILS' regional program 
director, however, has told us that related material support 
(texts, references, limited amounts of hardware, etc.) could 
be routed through DIILS' stewardship. 
 
5.  In their report, the DIILS team first addressed general 
considerations in section A.  The remaining points are 
summarized below according to the numbering of the actual 
report. 
 
Begin summary of recommendations: 
 
B. Immediate Impact (six months) 
 
1.  Manual typewriters and office supplies 
2.  Combined mobile training seminar:  sex crimes 
investigations (one week seminars in all 11 provinces) 
3.  Combined mobile training:  military justice workshop 
 
C.  Near-Term Impact (six months to one year) 
 
1.  Military prison equipment (non-lethal equipment for 
guards, upgrades, etc.) 
2.  Combined mobile training seminar:  DRC military trial 
procedures and penal code (one week seminars in all 11 
provinces) 
3.  CONUS Visit:  U.S. military justice visit (for selected 
groups of military justice practitioners) 
4.  Rehabilitate existing investigators/prosecutors' offices 
and military trial courts 
5.  Transportation:  SUVs for investigators/prosecutors' 
offices 
 
D.  Mid-Term Impact (One year to 18 months) 
 
1.  Build new investigators/prosecutors' offices and military 
trial courts 
2.  Rebuild Ndolo Military Prison (Note:  The Government of 
the Netherlands has already committed approximately $1.5 
million to this priority.  End note.) 
3.  Combined mobile training seminar:  brigade and regional 
 
KINSHASA 00001248  002 OF 002 
 
 
commanders 
4.  CONUS Visit:  Military investigator training schools 
5.  Provide office equipment to existing 
investigators/prosecutors' offices and military trial courts 
 
E.  Longer-Term Impact (18 months to two years) 
 
1.  Rebuild Angenga Prison (Equateur Province) 
2.  Provide computers to military prosecutors' offices and 
military court offices 
3.  Combined mobile training seminar:  investigator training 
4.  CONUS military justice courses 
 
End summary of recommendations. 
 
6.  Decreasing the incidence of sexual violence against women 
is one of the highest priorities of the U.S. Mission in 
Kinshasa.  The DRC is widely believed to be among the worst 
(if not the worst) countries in the world for gender-based 
violence (per Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
other NGO's) and the Mission has created a task force, with 
USAID, CDC, DOD, and DOS participation, to coordinate its 
efforts.  Mission, therefore, strongly supports immediate 
deployment of the first series of seminars, and urges 
financial support of the seminars throughout the medium term. 
 As soldiers are among the worst perpetrators of violence 
against women, a functioning military justice system is 
critical for any meaningful decrease in the incidence of this 
phenomenon.  We would also note that the GDRC has expressed a 
desire for greater U.S. engagement in this area, a sign that 
it too acknowledges the problem and wants help to deal with 
it.  Reforms to the military justice system will produce 
other beneficial effects:  it will not only improve the armed 
forces' overall performance, but also directly address the 
long-running problem of military impunity. 
 
7.  Comment, continued.  The report's findings are 
comprehensive, but specific USG engagement should not be 
limited by what DIILS itself can provide -- training forms 
just one facet of potential engagement.  Months of Embassy 
consultations with Congolese and international experts have 
identified numerous additional opportunities which could be 
pursued through other partners, including:  providing 
judicial advisors for short periods to specific courts; 
creating regional legal resource centers (with texts, 
resources, and materials accessible to both military and 
civilian justice practitioners); or assisting with the 
development of a permanent training center in the Congo for 
personnel at any level in the system.  Infrastructure support 
and provision of routine training for other elements of the 
military justice network, including judicial investigators 
and other courtroom personnel, with or without DIILS' direct 
participation, is feasible and urgent.  Additional funding 
and partners should be identified quickly and committed to 
the program.  End comment. 
BROCK