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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1886, NYALA MAQDUM DENIES JANJAWEED TURNCOAT TREND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1886 2007-11-30 11:08 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2372
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1886/01 3341108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301108Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9382
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001886 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NYALA MAQDUM DENIES JANJAWEED TURNCOAT TREND 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1845 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a November 29 meeting with FieldOff, the 
Maqdum (traditional viceroy of the Fur) of Nyala, Ahmed Rajal, 
denied reports that members of the janjaweed in Darfur were 
deserting their traditional benefactor, the Government of Sudan 
(GoS), in favor of rebel movements, as reported reftel.  The Maqdum, 
himself a Fur, was unrelenting in his criticism of the GoS in all 
aspects of its Darfur agenda, from using the United Nations Security 
Council as its proxy, to undermining traditional mechanisms aimed at 
tribal reconciliation, to its plan to divide Kalma IDPs against 
themselves.  The Maqdum insisted that the venue for future peace 
talks be changed and that the UN and African Union make a greater 
effort to reach out to the disparate rebel groups and factions.  On 
the idea of one political figure emerging to bring peace to Darfur, 
the Maqdum declared that the IDPs "do not care who it is, just as 
long as he brings peace."  END SUMMARY. 
 
"REAL JANJAWEED WILL NEVER LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT" 
---------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) In a November 29 meeting with FieldOff, the Nyala Maqdum, 
accompanied by his General-Secretary and Legal Advisor, flatly 
denied rumors currently circulating around Darfur of defections by 
the janjaweed from their GoS supply source to rebel movement ranks, 
as reported reftel.  Instead, the Maqdum attributed the reported 
trend to GoS conspiracy, stating that the GoS was laboring to split 
its janjaweed element in two: those Arabs who could infiltrate the 
rebel groups as "spies" pretending to be rebels, and those Arab 
tribes who would remain loyal to the GoS to do its dirty work in 
destabilizing Darfur.  "All Arab tribes," the very suspicious and 
embittered Maqdum declared, "want to destabilize Darfur." 
 
3. (SBU) The Maqdum and his advisors considered that the GoS was 
doing the same thing in trying to divide and conquer the IDPs, using 
recent events in Kalma as an example.  "Arms in Kalma aren't the 
issue," the Maqdum said, "it's the IDPs themselves and what they 
represent that are the biggest problem for the Government."  He 
blamed the recent escalation in carjackings and attacks on INGOs on 
the GoS, which he claimed was flooding Nyala Town with its vehicles 
at night to terrorize aid organizations in a concerted attempt to 
cut off provision of assistance to the IDPs. 
 
4. (SBU) The Maqdum went on to talk about a similar GoS strategy 
with regard to "resolving" the traditional tribal clashes over land 
that continued to plague South Darfur, including those between the 
Arab Habaniya and Salamat tribes.  He explained that in such cases 
here again the GoS was working to undermine established mechanisms 
historically tasked to reconcile such disputes.  He cited as an 
example the GoS' creation "in name only" of a consultative body that 
was intended to usurp conflict resolution responsibilities from the 
Darfur Council, which typically handles these types of disputes, on 
issues between the Zaghawa, Miseriya and Berti tribes. 
 
DARFUR NEEDS PEACE, NOT PERSONALITY 
----------------------------------- 
5. (SBU) The Maqdum and his advisors made clear that so profound was 
the "disappointment" among Darfur populations on the ground over 
rounds of failed efforts to effect a tangible peace in Darfur that 
the IDPs no longer looked to any one person to do what now seems the 
impossible.  "The IDPs don't care who it is who brings peace and 
stability," the Maqdum explained, "whether it's Abdelwahid or Khalil 
Ibrahim or Abdelshafie, just as long as he actually brings it 
[peace]." (Note: Though the Magdoum may downplay Abdulwahid's 
influence, his comments may be wishful thinking.  The vast majority 
of independent sources indicate that Abdulwahid continues to loom 
large, framing the debate on both the peacekeeping force and the 
political process, particularly among Fur IDPs.) 
 
6. (SBU) On the Darfur peace process, the Maqdum and his advisors 
described their stay in Juba while factions of the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had united 
from 17 factions into two, according to the Maqdum.  He added that 
he had consulted with six of SLA leader Abdelwahid's advisors in 
Nairobi (as well as with one of Abdelwhaid's wives) at the same 
time, with those reps dismissing Juba prospects, as they considered 
the factions present there as unrepresentative of the movements. 
The Maqdum disagreed, saying that the Juba participants command 
significant forces on the ground in Darfur, which affords them 
credibility in Juba.  (Note: Credible UN/AU and USG reporting 
indicate that with the exception of the JEM/Collective Leadership, 
none of the groups that participated in the Juba unification 
meetings maintain a significant military presence on the ground.) 
 
7. (SBU) As for Abdelwahid himself, the Maqdum said that he had 
refused to see the Maqdum and his delegation when they tried to 
visit him in France in September.  The Maqdum called Abdelwahid 
"strange" for his contradictory rhetoric on one hand about respect 
for a Darfur ceasefire and his refusal to take such rhetoric to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001886  002 OF 002 
 
 
peace talks on the other.  This discrepancy, the Maqdum (like other 
Fur leaders lately) noted, was not lost on the IDPs: although 
Abdelwahid was in daily phone contact with IDP leaders in Kalma 
promising to personally deliver the international forces that would 
secure their safety, the IDPs no longer believed him. 
 
IDPs DISAPPOINTED IN UN AS WELL 
------------------------------- 
8. (SBU) Abdelwahid was not the only source of IDP disillusionment, 
according to the Maqdum.  He and his advisors looked to the UN as 
the silver bullet solution to Darfur troubles and lamented the 
inability of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to make good on its 
resolutions on Darfur (they cited UNSCR 1706 in particular).  While 
the Maqdum and his advisors were sensitive to the UNSC dynamics 
dictating policymaking on Darfur, they nonetheless advised that the 
UN, the Secretary-General in particular, start to "make decisions as 
the UN, not as the Sudanese Government's proxy."  The Maqdum added 
that the UN should also be prepared to assume responsibility for the 
influx of non-Sudanese Arab tribes steadily settling in West Darfur, 
which he noted again was part of the GoS' Darfur agenda. 
 
9. (SBU) Like other groups on the ground in Darfur, the Maqdum was 
losing faith in the ability of the AU-UN mediation team to deliver 
viable peace negotiations on Darfur (reftel) and was now regarding 
the team as a pawn of the GoS.  He cited the same reasons as have 
other groups on the ground for this failure: refusal by the AU-UN 
mediation to deal with any side other than the GoS and the team's 
refusal to change venue for peace talks (the Maqdum recommended 
South Africa or Holland). 
 
10. (SBU) COMMENT. The Maqdum's theories reflected the same paranoia 
expressed by other rebel movements on the ground about the GoS' 
ulterior motives with regard to destabilizing Darfur in the run-up 
to deployment of international forces under UNAMID.  However, 
instead of attempting to support UNAMID as an antidote to what he 
perceived as a not-so-hidden GoS agenda, the Maqdum seemed to be 
further stoking existing IDP disillusionment and in fact setting the 
peacekeeping operation up for failure by touting it and subsequent 
UNSC action as the only ways to counter the GoS and bring peace to 
Darfur.  He did not seem swayed by arguments that a solution for 
Darfur must come from a variety of sources, not least from the 
groups and tribes on the ground which he represents, and further 
targeted UN/AU outreach, especially in Nyala, in this regard is 
clearly necessary.  END COMMENT. 
 
11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ