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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1871, FEAR OF LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY MAY KEEP JEM ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1871 2007-11-29 09:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8646
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1871/01 3330949
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290949Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9344
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: FEAR OF LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY MAY KEEP JEM ON 
COURSE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1859 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a November 27 meeting with FieldOff, the 
Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) representative in El Fasher 
admitted that despite the movement's unhappiness with the United 
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), JEM would not 
carry out the threats its leadership has been lately publicizing 
against the force, in particular staging attacks against 
newly-arrived Chinese engineers.  The El Fasher JEM representative 
enumerated conditions necessary to guarantee the movement's 
participation in eventual peace negotiations and appealed for an 
audience for JEM leadership with the UN Security Council to 
compensate for what it considers neglect by the UN/AU Joint 
Mediation Support Team.  The El Fasher rep demurred on questions 
about the movement's strategy for negotiations in response to rebel 
coalitions currently under construction in Juba, while another JEM 
rep in Nyala mentioned the possibility of an alliance in the works 
between JEM/Khalil Ibrahim and Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA)/Abdelwahid.  Nevertheless, the El Fasher JEM rep took note of 
arguments that the international community's patience was not 
limitless toward those who remained outside the peace process and 
that it would accordingly be in the movement's best interest to take 
advantage of this current window of opportunity to come under the 
UN-AU umbrella. END SUMMARY. 
 
EMPTY THREATS ON CHINESE ENGINEERS 
---------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) The JEM representative to the non-signatory chamber of the 
Ceasefire Commission in El Fasher opened a November 27 meeting with 
FieldOff by declaring JEM's displeasure with the current UNAMID 
deployment and by reiterating comments made to the Sudan Tribune on 
November 24 by JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, in which Khalil voiced his 
opposition to the arrival of a Chinese engineering unit as part of 
the Heavy Support Package (HSP) of assistance to the AU Mission in 
the Sudan (AMIS).  The JEM rep, having made these points to FieldOff 
on several previous occasions, accused China of perpetuating the 
Darfur crisis by providing weapons to both Chad and Sudan, 
supporting the Government of Sudan (GoS) and "stealing" Sudan's oil. 
 He warned that JEM would not facilitate movement of the Chinese 
engineers in JEM-controlled Darfur territory and suggested that the 
international community intervene to prevent the full deployment of 
these units. 
 
3. (SBU) The JEM rep however, was receptive to arguments that UNAMID 
peacekeepers, regardless of nationality, were mandated by the 
international community to come to Darfur.  He acknowledged that JEM 
ultimately considered UNAMID forces to be a stabilizing force both 
for Darfur peace and for the success of eventual peace negotiations. 
 He characterized Khalil's statements to the press as nothing more 
than JEM's way of sending a message to the Chinese, but warned that 
the international community should remain vigilant about the Chinese 
influence in both Sudan and Chad. 
 
JEM WORRIED ABOUT PEACE PROCESS 
------------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Both the JEM reps in El Fasher and Nyala aver that JEM is 
the rebel movement most prepared for and committed to pursuing peace 
for Darfur; however, both also attach conditions to the movement's 
participation.  The El Fasher rep stressed the need to establish 
early on the participants in the negotiations, explaining that if 
there are too many factions present, particularly those without 
credible forces on the ground to back them up, then JEM would not 
attend.  The El Fasher rep also expressed concern that certain 
groups who planned to sit at the negotiating table with the GoS were 
in fact complicit with the GoS, calling them National Intelligence 
and Security Service spies. 
 
5. (SBU) Despite this tough talk, JEM is acutely aware of and 
sensitive to the importance attached by the international community 
to the talks and, by extension, the alienation it will face from the 
same international community if it opts against active participation 
in the negotiations.  The El Fasher rep reiterated a request for an 
audience with the UN Security Council to express its views.  He 
further recommended that the AU/UN mediation team take more time 
coordinating with the movements on the ground in their respective 
areas of control to avoid "friction" with the groups and to better 
facilitate consolidation of rebel positions.  Regarding rebel 
alliances, the JEM rep in El Fasher would not comment on the 
possible emergence of an alliance between JEM and SLA/Abdelwahid 
ahead of negotiations, but the Nyala rep said such a bond was in the 
process of forming, facilitated by the creation of a coordination 
body comprised of both JEM and SLA reps to concentrate on bridging 
differences between the sides and to work toward a united front. 
The Nyala rep also disputed the claim that Abdelwahid was losing 
popular support on the ground to Abdullah Abdelshafie (reftel). 
 
6. (SBU) Both reps discussed the November 28 incident in Jebel Marra 
of the GoS bombing by Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunship of JEM 
 
KHARTOUM 00001871  002 OF 002 
 
 
locations.  Both said the incident was isolated and did not result 
in injury to Khalil, as initially reported.  When asked about 
possible JEM reprisals, neither rep was committal, stressing that 
the attack had been arbitrary. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT. While the El Fasher rep enjoys close ties with 
Khalil Ibrahim (he received a phone call from Khalil directly during 
the meeting to update him on the situation in Jebel Marra), the 
Nyala rep, imprisoned by the GoS for the better part of the past 
year, may be more disconnected from the realities on the ground. 
This disconnect could call into question the validity of the theory 
that JEM and SLA/Abdelwahid are uniting to the extent described in 
Nyala and the assertion that Abdelwahid still enjoys overwhelming 
IDP support in the camps.  In any event, it is clear from these 
discussions that despite JEM's stated intention to participate in 
the peace process and to respect UNAMID, the movement still needs 
some pushing.  For the time being, the realization that the 
international community's patience is short with regard to those who 
stay outside the peace process -- and the fear of the possible 
resultant loss of international credibility for failing to comply -- 
seem to resonate as incentives.  END COMMENT. 
 
7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ