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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1804, UNAMID PLANNERS RECOMMEND DELAYING DEPLOYMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1804 2007-11-19 12:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9967
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1804/01 3231254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191254Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9221
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID PLANNERS RECOMMEND DELAYING DEPLOYMENT 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In separate conversations with FieldOff on 
November 15 and November 18 in El Fasher, two UN senior military 
transition planners shared the joint recommendation they had made to 
UNAMID Force Commander GEN Agwai that deployment of UNAMID police 
elements be put on hold until the infrastructure necessary to 
sustain them could be put in place.  This recommendation will 
specifically impact the Bangladeshi formed police unit (FPU), which 
is scheduled to arrive in Nyala on November 20.  The planners blamed 
the UN's Department of Mission Support, specifically 
Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Jane Holl Lute, for UNAMID's 
current logistical standstill.  They reported that visiting 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) A/SYG Mulet had 
confirmed neither the Norwegian nor Swedish engineering units would 
deploy following President Bashir's recent remarks to the press. 
The only engineering unit currently slated to arrive is from China, 
and the main body of this company is inexplicably delayed until 
mid-December, consequently delaying deployment of major UNAMID 
elements until January 2008 at the earliest.  The planners requested 
U.S. assistance in forcing some answers from the Department of 
Mission Support; now might be the time to ratchet up the pressure on 
China as well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EL FASHER ULTIMATUM FOR NEW YORK 
-------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) In separate conversations with FieldOff on November 15 and 
November 18 in El Fasher, two UN senior military transition planners 
shared the joint recommendation they had made to UNAMID Force 
Commander GEN Agwai that deployment of UNAMID police elements be put 
on hold until the infrastructure necessary to sustain them could be 
put in place.  The two planners -  one the Chief of the Transition 
Planning Unit, the other the Acting Chief of Integrated Support 
Services -  admitted that this recommendation, formally transmitted 
to Agwai in New York on November 17, would not win them any allies 
in the UN's Department of Mission Support, which the Acting CISS 
head blamed for UNAMID's current logistical standstill. 
 
3. (SBU) The recommendation stipulates that the Force Commander and 
Police Commissioner warn UN Headquarters that deployment of UNAMID 
units must be paused until two main criteria are satisfied: first, 
that mission support contracts (specifically aviation, operating and 
maintenance [O&M], catering and ground fuel) are signed; and second, 
that contractors will have resources, equipment and trained staff in 
place on time.  The recommendation further stipulates that staff 
commence contingency planning to withdraw the force into staging 
areas to ensure adequate support in the event that the criteria 
outlined above are not satisfied.  The planners recommended a 
November 30 deadline for the UN to decide on the critical aviation 
contract, since the Canadian Government will give the AMIS aviation 
support contractor (Skylink PA&E Aviation Inc.) one month's notice 
to close down its Darfur operations. 
 
MISSION SUPPORT OUT OF STEP WITH TROOP DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
4. (SBU) The Acting Head of CISS was emphatic that the contrary 
posturing exhibited by the Department of Mission Support, 
specifically A/SYG Jane Holl Lute, was causing UNAMID deployment to 
falter.  He highlighted Holl Lute's refusal to seek a Letter of 
Assist (LOA) with the Government of Canada to extend Skylink's 
contract for the sake of UNAMID, effectively ruling out the 
possibility of the UN's putting in place an aviation capability by 
Transfer of Authority (TOA) at the end of the year.  The Canadian 
Government has reportedly agreed to extend and fund Skylink's 
contract until March 31 with an option to extend to June 30, but, 
according to the CISS rep, this arrangement must be formalized as 
quickly as possible to give UNAMID the initial capability to sustain 
current forces on the ground. (Note: Our UN contacts in El Fasher 
reported rumors that Skylink is on a UN blacklist for involvement 
with the Fujimori regime in Peru, though this is not confirmed.) 
 
5. (SBU) Similarly, the CISS rep reported that Holl Lute had refused 
to seek an LOA with the USG to extend the O&M and catering and 
ground fuel contracts currently in place to service AMIS troops. 
Lack of clarity on the O&M contract is particularly deleterious, as 
this contract provides support for the incoming police and military 
Heavy Support Package (HSP) units which are now deploying to transit 
staging areas in Nyala, Zam Zam and El Geneina, and its effects can 
be seen in the predicament of the initial cadre of unsupported 
Chinese engineers currently in Nyala.  Given these engineers' 
reliance on makeshift arrangements with PA&E to sustain them, 
arrival of the Chinese engineers company's main body has been 
delayed until mid-December. 
 
6. (SBU) Since these engineers are to prepare the ground for the 
Bangladeshi FPU (set to deploy November 20) to prepare its own camp, 
the planners note that the FPU deployment may now have to be delayed 
until the Chinese arrive and complete their construction.  The CISS 
rep warned that if the FPU deploys on time, it will occupy the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001804  002 OF 002 
 
 
transit accommodation set aside for the Chinese main body, thus 
creating another dilemma once that company ultimately gets on the 
ground.  "The whole sequence of deployment has been interrupted by 
the Chinese delay," he lamented.  The UNAMID Planning Chief added 
that Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions are pushing to deploy but 
would likely suffer the same fate as the Bangladeshi FPU, since the 
camps into which they are supposed to move are as of yet 
non-existent. 
 
7. (SBU) The planners add that the UN also has no contracts in place 
to provide catering and ground fuel services for incoming HSP units 
prior to and after TOA.  The planners accordingly recommend an LOA 
to the USG extending current arrangements under PA&E and it 
sub-contractor for catering, AMZAR, until at least June 30, with an 
option to extend by two three-month blocks. 
 
8. (SBU) Both planners report that in their meetings with visiting 
DPKO A/SYG Mulet, Mulet had a good grasp of both big and small 
picture issues associated with the HSP and Early Effects deployment, 
but that he was in listening, rather than acting, mode only, as this 
was his first visit to Sudan.  The UNAMID Planning Chief noted that 
Mulet seemed "squeezed" by pressure from troop-contributing 
countries (TCCs) on one side to get their assets on the ground and 
by El Fasher UN personnel on the other, who were advocating a more 
go-slow approach, given the logistical constraints of honoring the 
TCCs' wishes.  Mulet had highlighted the difficulties encountered in 
dealing with the Government of Sudan in the wake of President 
Bashir's November 17 press remarks in which he accused the UN of 
trying to infiltrate UNAMID's ranks with CIA and Mossad officers in 
the guise of Norwegian and Swedish engineers.  Mulet told both 
planners that the Nordic units would not/not deploy.  The Planning 
Chief considered this loss a blow to the mission, as he saw the 
Nordic company as stronger than the others earmarked for the same 
job. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: UNAMID planners verged on cynical as they 
discussed the circumstances surrounding UNAMID's deployment 
standstill, speculating on every possible cause, from A/SYG Holl 
Lute's hidden political agenda behind refusing outside assistance on 
UN contracting (one planner sniffed that it would be the 
Secretary-General who would "take the embarrassment" on this), to 
 
SIPDIS 
China's collusion with the GoS that led to its sudden inexplicable 
postponement of engineer deployment.  Whatever the reason, the fact 
remains that UNAMID deployment is being put on hold, and more 
egregiously, by the very organization mandated to effect it.  It 
would seem a good time, less than six weeks away from TOA, to clear 
up any misunderstandings with the Department of Mission Support on 
the LOA issue, as well as to ratchet up the pressure on China, 
which, given its public attempts to do the right thing on Darfur, 
would not want to be seen as the reason things are now falling 
apart.  END COMMENT. 
 
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ