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Viewing cable 07KABUL3887, PRIVATIZATION OF AFGHAN TELECOM IMMINENT INCLUDING FIBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL3887 2007-11-21 09:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2291
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3887/01 3250955
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210955Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1501
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA, SCA/A, and EEB/CIP/BA 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: EICN PREL PGOV PBTS ETRD AF
SUBJECT: PRIVATIZATION OF AFGHAN TELECOM IMMINENT INCLUDING FIBER 
OPTIC RING 
 
REF:  KABUL 03542 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) State Department Senior Advisor, Robert Deutsch, met with 
Afghan Minister of Communications, Amir Zia Sangin, on November 17 
and received Afghan support for a conference fostering regional 
telecommunications interconnectivity.  Minister Sangin also shared 
that plans for the privatization of Afghan telecom are well underway 
(due in large measure to extensive and accelerated USAID technical 
assistance).  He said he expects a bid from UAE based Etisalat 
shortly.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Regional Interconnectivity & The Fiber Optic Ring 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2.  (U) Minister Sangin was highly supportive of a proposal by 
Deutsch to host a spring conference on telecommunications 
interconnectivity in Baku, Azerbaijan.  Deutsch outlined that the 
conference would follow recent discussions in Almaty and allow 
Afghanistan and its neighbors to take stock of current 
communications networks and examine the possibilities of and 
hindrances to regional interconnectivity.  The trick, Deutsch noted, 
would be for each country to accurately assess its current fiber 
optic network and development plans.  Prior to the conference, the 
U.S. will provide a paper format so that each country can complete a 
detailed self-assessment. 
 
3.  (U) Sangin said that the conference was needed as Afghanistan 
was making progress on its fiber optic ring.  When completed, the 
3400 km country-wide fiber optic ring would link all provincial 
capitals; key district centers; and infrastructure facilities; in 
Afghanistan.  The challenge remained liking Afghanistan to its 
neighbors and reducing dependence on current, and expensive, 
satellite connections.  Sangin said that ZTE, the Chinese contractor 
completing the project, had laid a good portion of the necessary 
ductwork.  Sangin hoped they would be able to thread cable through 
those ducts in 2008.  Certain quality control problems had been 
addressed, including initial poor backfilling and trenching.  (Note: 
 [0]A verbal status report by the Afghan Telecom Project Manager to 
the Embassy stated 540 Km of duct would be completed by end of 
November, 17% of the project.  Along the 540 Km of duct there is 
still manhole construction and building entrance work to complete. 
End note.)  The areas that had not been trenched were largely in the 
South, where security issues had hindered ZTE subcontractors. 
Sangin expected ZTE to be successful in its search for a new 
subcontractor "that could operate in a Taliban area."  The other 
incomplete stretch of the fiber-optic ring was the critical section 
between Kabul, Jalabad, and the Pakistan border.  ZTE had not yet 
determined how it would run the cable through the mountainous 
terrain in a cost-effective manor.  The link was critical, however, 
as Pakistan's fiber-optic network was near the border and had strong 
cooperative potential. 
 
4.  (U) Sangin offered that the first piece of the network (created 
before ZTE had the contract) was already active, carrying 
communications between Herat and Iran.  However, the line was 
currently used only for voice communications as the IRoA and Iran 
had not yet been able to negotiate an agreement on internet (data) 
interconnectivity.  The regional conference would be all the more 
valuable to smooth the way towards regional data sharing (albeit not 
with Iran).  Sangin felt that by the time of the conference, a 
second piece of the fiber optic ring would be online between Kabul 
and Mazar.  If that were the case, Afghanistan might be able to link 
to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, depending on if those countries had 
the necessary infrastructure in place to do so. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Privatization of Afghan Telecom Imminent 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Sangin said that given the progress on the fiber-optic 
ring, the privatization of Afghan Telecom (the legacy telecom 
provide that controls the ring) was imminent and would include the 
fiber-optic ring to increase the value of the sale.  Sangin expected 
a bid very soon from UAE based Etisalat as they understood the 
Afghan market and had just finished a second round of due diligence 
at the request of the board.  Sangin also shared that a Russian firm 
had expressed "some interest" and just completed its own, albeit 
lesser, due diligence.  Given the likely Etisalat bid, Sangin said 
he understood the importance of a "Swiss challenge" that would well 
advertise the bid and provide "one month" for other investors to put 
together a counter offer.  Deutsch noted that one month might be a 
bit short; Sangin took the point and agreed that the private sector 
was the best judge of asset evaluation and that the IRoA wanted to 
appear transparent and receive the maximum value possible for the 
 
KABUL 00003887  002 OF 002 
 
 
sale.  (Note:  Cabinet approval is needed for the sale and the 
Cabinet previous rejected and offer by Etisalat to purchase Afghan 
Telecom along with IRoA granting Etisalat a GSM license.  The 
Cabinet directed that Etisalat should only be awarded the GSM 
license.  Sangin made reference to this in the conversation and said 
now that Etisalat has its GSM license, it was still interested and 
approval was not problematic.  End note.) 
 
6.  (SBU) Deutsch welcomed the upcoming sale, while cautioning that 
care would need to be taken to ensure that the owner of Afghan 
Telecom would not have a monopoly on long-distance and data 
communications.  The company should ensure everyone has fair access 
and Afghan telecom should not charge competitors much higher 
transport charges than the internal costs incurred by Afghan 
Telecom.  Sangin agreed, but said he was going to hire a consulting 
firm to study the charges that the IRoA should allow on the network. 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Sangin concluded the meeting by noting that the IRoA 
remained committed to linking the Afghan government to its 
population and creating further rural access.  While over 70% of the 
Afghan population now had easy phone access, the other 30% were in 
hard to reach rural areas.  He hoped that Afghan Telecom would 
continue to support the Government Communications Network (GCN), the 
District Communications Network (DCN), and a possible Village 
Communications Network after the sale.  Even if this was not the 
case, he envisioned that the Afghanistan Telecom Development Fund 
(with a balance of $12 million generated from a 2.5% tax on GSM 
provider revenues) would ensure that the programs remained 
operational.  (Note:  Embassy has stressed that care must be taken 
to ensure that the private owner of Afghan Telecom is not the sole 
beneficiary of any subsidiaries from this fund.  End note.) 
 
8.  (U) Senior Advisor Robert Deutsch did not clear this cable 
before leaving post. 
 
WOOD