Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07JAKARTA3264, ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S POST-SUMMIT READOUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07JAKARTA3264.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07JAKARTA3264 2007-11-28 06:21 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXYZ0015
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #3264/01 3320621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280621Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7196
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1196
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8251
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1469
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1654
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2080
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS JAKARTA 003264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/RSP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS 
DEPT FOR EB/IFD/OMA 
DEPT ALSO FOR OES/IET AND OES/ETC/TED 
TREASURY FOR IA-SETH SEARLS 
COMMERCE FOR 4430/GOLIKE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PHUM PREL PGOV KDEM ID BM
SUBJECT: ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S POST-SUMMIT READOUT 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  In an ASEAN Summit debrief, Secretariat officials 
stated that the member countries were frustrated that the press 
focused too much on ASEAN's handling of Burma, taking attention away 
from the historic importance of the Charter signing.  Dhannan 
Sunoto, Director of the Secretariat's Bureau of External Affairs, 
maintained however that the member countries acted appropriately in 
letting Burma participate in the Summit and sign the Charter, and 
that they were maintaining pressure on their fellow member while 
keeping it engaged.  Sunoto continued to predict that not all member 
countries would ratify the Charter by next year's Summit deadline, 
and worried that member country governments would "play politics" 
over issues such as Burma, using the Charter as a bargaining chip. 
He did not worry, though, that the situation in Burma would impede 
economic integration efforts or trade negotiations with dialogue 
partners because of ASEAN's ability to negotiate deals among and as 
a sub-group of its members ("ASEAN Minus X").  In a brief readout of 
the ASEAN-EU Summit, which followed the ASEAN Summit itself, Sunoto 
expressed some frustration that the EU did not send appropriate 
representation.  End Summary. 
 
BURMA SITUATION OVERSHADOWS IMPORTANT MILESTONE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) Sunoto expressed frustration on behalf of the Secretariat 
and member countries that the media focused more on ASEAN's handling 
of Burma rather than the historic importance of the charter signing. 
 He said the coverage of the Summit was especially disappointing for 
Singapore, who, as the host, wanted to highlight the Charter and the 
planned ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
 
3. (SBU) Sunoto continued that ASEAN acted appropriately in allowing 
Burma to sign the Charter.  Burma had to be included in order to 
maintain a sense of solidarity with ASEAN.  The reason that ASEAN 
even exists, he explained, is that it maintains a core principle of 
non-interference in member countries' domestic affairs.  Sunoto 
acknowledged that in order for the organization to implement the 
Charter principles, this policy would have to change, but that this 
would have to happen gradually. 
 
4.  (SBU) Sunoto pointed out that member countries were already 
starting to slowly move away from the non-interference principle, 
citing their public condemnation of the Burmese government's actions 
to date.  He also felt that the junta's current cooperation with the 
UN was partly the result of ASEAN pressure.  Member countries have 
started to realize that, although they do not want to interfere in 
Burma's domestic affairs, Burma's domestic affairs are starting to 
interfere with ASEAN, and the organization needs to address that 
fact. 
 
ASEAN CHARTER FACES A ROUGH RATIFICATION PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Sunoto continued to predict that not all member countries 
will be able to ratify the Charter by next year's Summit.  He said 
that member countries that have separate executive and legislative 
branches, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, could have a more 
difficult time ratifying the Charter, as these legislatures have not 
had as much input into its contents as parliamentary governments in 
countries such as Thailand.  Sunoto also expressed disappointment in 
Philippine President Arroyo, who recently said that her country 
would not ratify the Charter unless Burma demonstrates concrete 
steps towards democracy.  He felt that she, and potentially other 
member country leaders, would "play politics" using the Charter as a 
bargaining chip to keep their constituents happy. 
 
ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WILL PROCEED 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Sunoto did not worry that the situation in Burma or the 
economic disparity of ASEAN's members would hinder the group's 
efforts towards economic integration or complicate its ability to 
negotiate trade agreements with dialogue partners.  He said that 
ASEAN can negotiate deals among or as a sub-group of its members 
("ASEAN Minus X").  ASEAN can exclude countries such as Burma from 
agreements with outside entities who may object to its inclusion, 
such as the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) with the European 
Union.  Similarly, ASEAN can take steps towards economic integration 
among the six or seven countries that are able to proceed 
immediately.  Poorer members, such as Burma and Cambodia, can 
integrate later when they are ready.  Once these excluded countries 
see the benefits that the more advanced members derive from economic 
integration or FTAs with dialogue partners, Sunoto explained, they 
will likely want to speed up reforms so that they too can 
participate and benefit. 
 
ASEAN-EU SUMMIT: REPRESENTATIONAL ISSUES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In a brief readout of the ASEAN-EU Summit, which followed 
the ASEAN Summit itself, Sunoto expressed some frustration that the 
EU did not send appropriate representation. As an example he pointed 
out that an appropriate representative of the next EU Presidency, 
Slovenia, did not attend the Summit as expected.  Sunoto said that 
this is a common occurrence, where ASEAN frequently sends higher 
level representatives to meetings with dialogue partners, but that 
the partners do not reciprocate.  Member countries place a high 
importance on protocol and are insulted when they perceive that 
partners do not show the same regard for interactions with ASEAN. 
 
 
 
HUME