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Viewing cable 07ISTANBUL1005, TURKISH SECURITY CHALLENGES: DOMESTIC PRESSURES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ISTANBUL1005 2007-11-23 08:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIT #1005/01 3270842
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230842Z NOV 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7686
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7276
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0042
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ISTANBUL 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH SECURITY CHALLENGES: DOMESTIC PRESSURES 
AND KURDISH AUTONOMY 
 
1.(SBU)  On November 8, ARI Movement -- an independent 
Turkish NGO promoting civil society participation in both 
domestic and international affairs -- held a conference on 
Turkish security challenges: the likelihood of a Turkish 
military incursion into Northern Iraq, the changing domestic 
political balance within Turkey, and the future of regional 
security.  The conference, held at Bilgi University in 
Istanbul, was timed to correspond with the release of the new 
Turkish Policy Quarterly issue concerning the same topics. 
While the speakers were varied and impressive, it was the 
commentary by Turkish media personality Mehmet Ali Birand, 
former Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, and University 
professor Soli Ozel, which best illustrates the complexities 
behind the decision to conduct a cross-border operation (CBO) 
and the ramifications such an operation would have on 
long-term regional security. 
 
2.(SBU)  Mehmet Ali Birand, Turkish media personality and 
regular columnist for the Turkish Daily News, claimed Prime 
Minister Erdogan told him, following the November 5 meeting 
with President Bush, that while he is satisfied with the 
assurances he was given in Washington, he is preoccupied with 
public pressure calling for military action against the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Iraq.  The situation, Birand 
said, is further complicated by a frustrated military; they 
want to show their strength, yet they realize even a 
successful CBO will not live up to public expectations (i.e. 
the end of PKK terrorism).  The only way the military can 
both avoid conducting a CBO and save face is to have the 
administration order them to stand down, according to Birand. 
 This is unlikely to happen when the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) is concerned with the same need to appear strong 
before its grumbling constituents. 
 
3.(SBU)  Hikmet Cetin, former Turkish Foreign Minister and 
former NATO Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan, 
spoke of Turkey's need to move forward on Iraq.  "It is not 
constructive to speak against the United States' presence in 
Iraq; they are there," he said.  Rather, one should talk 
about how Turkey, as a nation and as a NATO member, can help 
to achieve a peaceful outcome.  Cetin noted, "...it is 
evident that a federation, within a unified Iraq, will 
ultimately have to be tolerated."  He added that despite 
short-term animosity towards the idea, Turkey has to plan 
long-term for regional stability.  He suggested that any 
military action should be coupled with social programming in 
the South East, tax incentives for business development, and 
similar actions. 
 
4.(SBU)  Soli Ozel, a professor at Bilgi University, agreed 
with Cetin that an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq was 
inevitable: "It appears that the U.S. will not sell out the 
Kurds this time, so what is left but federalism?"  He went on 
to say that in the end Turkey's decision to either accept or 
to reject the idea of federalism in Iraq would be based on 
Turkish interests -- part of a domestic rebalancing between 
East and West.  As a part of that shift, Turkey is learning 
to depend more on itself and its neighbors in the East, 
rather than on Western powers, said Ozel.  "When the military 
issued its midnight e-posta, there was very little pressure 
on the military from the European Union (EU) and the U.S. was 
nowhere to be found.  It was domestic pressure, in the form 
of overwhelming support for AKP, that made the military back 
down, and it will be domestic pressure that pushes for the 
acceptance of an autonomous region." 
 
5.(SBU)  COMMENT: While participants discussed a variety of 
security issues initially, talk of a CBO soon monopolized the 
conversation.  The discussion regarding domestic stability in 
Turkey was couched in terms of conducting a CBO and whether 
the AKP government and/or military could continue to deny 
popular calls to strike the PKK in Iraq.  The future of 
U.S.-Turkey and E.U.-Turkey relations were also viewed 
through the CBO prism.  Lastly, even Hikmet Cetin -- a 
proponent of long-term planning -- was only willing to 
discuss long-term stabilization of the South East and of 
Northern Iraq in conjunction with, as opposed to apart from, 
military engagement.  In this case, the elite appear to 
reflect the people: their fears, their demands, and perhaps 
their short-sightedness.  END COMMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WIENER