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Viewing cable 07DHAKA1836, FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION: PLANNING FOR THE NEXT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DHAKA1836 2007-11-24 15:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO4520
OO RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #1836/01 3281551
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
O 241551Z NOV 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5630
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8264
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1902
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9374
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0303
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0402
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1015
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0033
RHHEAAA/13AF INTEL ANDERSEN AFB GU
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0583
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
DCHA/OFDA FOR ROBERT THAYER 
AID/W FOR AA MARK WARD AND ANE ANNE DIX 
DCHA/FFP FOR MATTHEW NIMS AND PAUL NOVICK 
ROME FOR FODAG 
BANGKOK FOR RDM/A TOM DOLAN, BOB BARTON 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID OFDA BILL BERGER AND SUE MCINTYRE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BG EAID MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION:  PLANNING FOR THE NEXT 
PHASE OF U.S. CYCLONE SIDR RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 1830 
 
     B. DHAKA 1796 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In only a week's time, the United States 
has been able to develop and implement an impressive 
humanitarian response to the devastation caused by Cyclone 
Sidr, which laid waste to large stretches of Bangladesh's 
southwestern coastal region when it made landfall on November 
15. This timely and robust response has been warmly received 
by the Bangladeshi people and has been welcomed by the 
Caretaker Government and Bangladesh military.  The USG team 
on the ground is building momentum, completing its initial 
assessment of the needs of those affected and is coordinating 
with other donors and the GOB to deliver assistance where 
needed.  Even before the emergency relief phase kicks into 
high gear, we are planning for the medium term relief and 
longer term reconstruction of this moderate Muslim nation 
with its vulnerable population. We must ensure a smooth 
transition from relief to recovery to avoid any delays in the 
CTG's electoral and reform roadoaps.  The investments that 
the USG makes at this time will pay dividends in the future, 
both here and beyond the region.  End Summary. 
 
Helping a Friend in Need 
 
2.  (SBU)  Even before Cyclone Sidr came ashore with 
devastating impact on November 15, the USG was busy 
mobilizing its disaster response capabilities.  Just as the 
USG-funded disaster preparedness work helped save countless 
lives in the coastal areas, our internal USG planning in 
Dhaka, Washington, and Honolulu positioned us to respond 
immediately to the crisis.  Since the disaster declaration 
was issued on November 16, the USG has mobilized an OFDA/DART 
team, deployed a Humanitarian ASsistance Survey Team, and 
integrated these elements into an interagency response under 
the direction of the COM.  Within days, we were able to 
organize visits by Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID 
Administrator Henrietta Fore and Commander United States 
Pacific Command Admiral Timothy Keating.  Combined, this 
inter-agencyresponse signaled the importance that the United 
 States placed on helping a long-term friend during its hour 
of need. 
 
Return of the Angels from the Sea 
 
3.  (SBU)  While USAID/OFDA funding began to flow immediately 
following the disaster declaration, and additional assistance 
arrived soon thereafter, the main story this week has been 
the return of the "Sea Angels," as the U.S.S. Kearsarge and 
other DOD assets arrived in Bangladesh to add the US 
Military's unique capabilities to our coordinated disaster 
response.  In meetings with Director Fore and with Admiral 
Keating, Bangladesh's senior civilian and military leadership 
has welcomed U.S. assistance, recalling the vital role that 
the USG played in responding to the devastating 1991 cyclone 
during Operation Sea Angel (Note:  By coincidence, one of the 
vessels steaming towards Bangladesh to assist in relief 
operations is the U.S.S. Tarawa, which was the flagship of 
the 1991 effort). Initially, the Caretaker Government 
appeared divided regarding the need to accept foreign 
assistance in the relief operations, for domestic political 
reasons.  This attitude turned around when the scope of the 
challenge facing the government became apparent and as those 
involved in the 1991 operations realized the need to again 
reach out for help. From the beginning, there has been an 
outpouring of appreciation from the Bangladeshi public and a 
 
DHAKA 00001836  002 OF 003 
 
 
great deal of interest in the press about the US response. 
Even the Saudi Government's offer of USD 100 million has been 
overshadowed by the high level U.S. visits and the 
expectation regarding the Kearsarge's arrival.  Across the 
board, political parties have welcomed the U.S. assistance, 
and efforts by some to stir up local opposition to a U.S. 
role have fallen flat. 
 
The Three "D's" in Action 
 
4.  (SBU)  Since their arrival, the USAID/DART and DOD HAST 
teams have been working closely with the country team, the 
GOB's civilian and military agencies, and our international 
and local partners to carry out thorough assessments of the 
needs in the response, relief, and rehabilitation phases. 
These teams are currently assembling detailed needs analyses 
which will form the basis for recommendations for future 
resource requirements.  On November 24, the Government's 
disaster coordinator, Adviser M.A. Matin, and senior 
Bangladeshi military officers flew to the U.S.S. Kearsarge 
for a briefing on the MEU's capabilities and for discussions 
of possible ways in which the USG can provide assistance.  As 
noted in other messages, we see crucial needs in the areas of 
potable water, distribution, and medical assistance in the 
short term. Medium term needs include shelter and food 
security, with longer term reconstruction of infrastructure 
clearly needed. Our strategy is to employ all instruments of 
national power, focused on the need to employ our diplomatic, 
defense, and development resources in the most effective 
manner. We have been able to steadily build momentum and are 
poised for the initiation of relief operations this week. 
 
U.S. Staying Until the Job is Done 
 
5.  (SBU)  While it is still too early to estimate the 
precise duration of the emergency response phase, our 
consistent message (underscored by our senior visitors) has 
been that we will be involved in this efgort for as long as 
it takes.  At present, we are focused on the emergency relief 
phase.  Even as we address immediate needs, we are also 
actively planning for medium and longer term responses to the 
relief and reconstruction challenges.  Thus, our civil and 
military assessment teams are also looking at how we can 
employ future resources most effectively and identifying 
potential opportunities should additional funding become 
available.  We understand that similar discussions are also 
underway in Washington, and we welcome the opportunity to 
contribute to the planning process.  Our goal is to avoid any 
impression that the U.S. will "cut and run" before the job is 
complete. 
 
Saving for a Rainy Day 
 
6.  (SBU)  While it is correct to focus on the humanitarian 
needs of the affected population, we cannot afford to forget 
the importance of supporting the Caretaker Government as it 
works to implement the electoral roadmap and implement 
reforms prior to holding elections before the end of 2008. 
Even before the cyclone hit, there were concerns in some 
quarters that preparations for elections were stalling.  At 
the same time, the Caretaker Government was struggling with 
how to respond to rising inflation and threats of an economic 
slowdown (see septel on the CDA a.i.'s pre-cyclone meeting 
with Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed).  The investments we 
make now in shoring up the government and freeing up 
resources to focus on longer-term reform and election 
 
DHAKA 00001836  003 OF 003 
 
 
preparations are important to ensuring that the government 
succeeds.  Stronger military-military ties, and an enhanced 
image for the United States will also stand us in good stead. 
 We may have to mak% withdrawals from our "good will" fund in 
order to ensure that all involved keep to their commitments. 
 
Comment 
 
7.  (SBU)  The USG is uniquely positioned to lead 
international efforts to respond to the cyclone.  Those 
living in southeastern Bangladesh in 1991 will never forget 
Operation Sea Angel, just as the victims of the Southeast 
Asian Tsunami or the Pakistan earthquake will never forget 
the role that the United States played in their hours of 
need.  We have a unique opportunity to again remind 
Bangladeshis and the larger international community of the 
positive role that the United States plays in the world.  In 
order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must continue 
to employ all instruments of national power--diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic--in a coherent manner. 
We need to commit the resources needed to ensure that we will 
remain engaged "until the job is completed." 
Pasi