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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA8135, COLOMBIA'S RESPONSE TO UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BOGOTA8135 2007-11-20 15:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0027
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #8135/01 3241531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201531Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0179
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 7877
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 9561
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 9075
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 5653
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0845
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 6315
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE 4179
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1517
RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1870
UNCLAS BOGOTA 008135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA/AND AND DRL/MLGA AND IO/RHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL KTIA UN CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S RESPONSE TO UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE 
COUNTRY RESOLUTIONS DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 157026 
     B. SECSTATE 145641 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) On November 17 and 18, the Ambassador spoke to 
President Uribe and Foreign Minister Araujo, in President 
Uribe's presence, to press for GOC support on 
country-specific human rights resolutions on Iran, North 
Korea, Belarus, and Burma (reftels). The GOC appears 
committed to its global policy to abstain on country-specific 
resolutions, though Araujo told the Ambassador he would 
review the GOC position. Araujo agreed to consider abstention 
with explanation, not to change positions.  Vice FM Mejia 
told us the GOC feels "burned" by the GOC experience on UNSCR 
1612 on Children in Conflict, and "saw a risk" from the HR 
resolutions.  Araujo told the Ambassador that he would 
welcome a call from senior USG officials, but their position 
was necessary to defeat future Colombia-specific resolutions. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
AMBASSADOR REACHES OUT 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Brownfield spoke to Araujo on Friday, 
November 16 and Sunday, November 18, the latter in front of 
President Uribe on a bus, to push the GOC to support the USG 
on the Iran, Belarus, Burma, and North Korea country-specific 
human rights resolutions. These conversations followed an 
original pitch by the Ambassador in September and three 
additional contacts by Embassy. The Ambassador encouraged the 
GOC to rethink its standard abstention policy on 
country-specific resolutions in these cases. In light of the 
concrete reality these resolutions represent to the Third 
Committee, he argued Colombia ought take a position and not 
protect these abusive regimes.  The Ambassador asked Araujo 
"Does the GOC really want to stand on the sidelines on 
resolutions against these oppressive regimes?"  He suggested 
that Araujo, a hostage himself for six years, should see the 
imperative of taking a stand. 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOC WARY OF IMPLICATIONS TO COLOMBIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Araujo told the Ambassador that the GOC would 
continue its general policy to abstain on country-specific 
resolutions--possibly with "explanation" in these cases. 
Mejia--who Araujo said manages the UN account in the 
MFA--confirmed to A/Polcouns that the GOC prefers that the UN 
Human Rights Council handle these cases, citing the Council's 
"consistent mechanism" to address human rights issues. 
Araujo and Mejia expressed disappointment with the results of 
UNSCR 1612 on Children in Conflict, noting that they 
unsuccessfully sought USG assistance in keeping Colombia out 
of the resolution and annexes.  The Ambassador reminded 
Araujo of USG assistance in changing the implementation of 
the Children in Conflict resolution in the face of member 
state resistance.  Mejia told us the GOC "saw a risk in the 
HR resolutions for the Colombia situation," for UNGA HR 
resolutions that were "more condemnation and less 
cooperation." 
 
4. (SBU) Araujo and Mejia said the MFA had thoroughly 
analyzed the policy, which was approved at "high levels." 
Araujo promised to review the decision, but noted that 
President Alvaro Uribe did not intervene on this level of UN 
issues. Looking somewhat pensive, the FM told us a call from 
Washington would not change the GOC position. 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador raised the issue again with Araujo on 
November 18 while sitting on a CODEL bus next to Uribe.  The 
Ambassador suggested it was pointless to argue against 
country-specific resolutions in principle or for Human Rights 
Council jurisdiction, because the resolutions would come 
before the Third Committee and Colombia would have to vote. 
Araujo said Colombia would abstain, but was willing to issue 
 
an explanation of vote if we thought it helpful.  He said 
that the GOC concluded from their child soldiers resolution 
experience that the only way to avoid Colombia-specific 
resolutions in the future was to join states that opposed 
country-specific resolutions. 
Brownfield