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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA7951, SCENESETTER FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR JOHN WALTERS AND DEA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BOGOTA7951 2007-11-06 22:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #7951/01 3102216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 062216Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5583
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9996
INFO RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5//
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL
UNCLAS BOGOTA 007951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP SNAR ETRD ELAB PGOV PREL CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR JOHN WALTERS AND DEA 
ADMINISTRATOR TANDY'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA, NOVEMBER 7-9, 2007 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) You are visiting a Colombia far safer, economically 
stronger, better governed and more democratic than it has been in 
decades.  Many Colombians say conditions today have improved to a 
level better than any other time in their lives or those of their 
parents.  Murder rates declined 40 percent since 2002.  Murders of 
union members dropped even faster - 70 percent during the same 
period.  Kidnapping rates plummeted 76 percent.  The Government 
maintains a presence in all municipalities for the first time in 
memory.  Our anti-drug assistance remains critical to making all of 
this possible, as Plan Colombia has lifted Colombia from 
quasi-narcostate status to its current situation.  Increased 
security has led to an economic boom, registering 7.5 percent growth 
in the first half of 2007 after reaching 6.8 percent in 2006.  The 
economic expansion has reduced poverty 20 percent since 2002. 
Regional elections October 28, the fourth under the Uribe 
Administration, went smoothly with limited violence and fraud.  More 
than 40,000 combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their 
arms.  Despite the progress, the Uribe Administration recognizes the 
need to reduce human rights violations further by beefing up the 
judiciary, speeding up the judicial process and protecting more 
at-risk union members, journalists and human rights workers.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and interdiction of 
cocaine and heroin reached record levels in 2006, and political 
support for manual and aerial eradication continues to grow in 
Colombia.  President Uribe understands that manual eradication 
cannot replace aerial eradication without a sharp increase in 
expenditures, and he seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  The National Police and military forces seized over 203 
metric tons of cocaine and coca base in 2006, a near-record 
quantity, and destroyed 200 cocaine laboratories, also a record.  We 
continue to work with the GOC to refine our eradication strategy and 
determine how best to transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. 
 
3.  (SBU) Our assistance to the GOC in improving its eradication 
performance remains a key element of a nation-wide improvement in 
security, as noted above.  U.S. anti-narcotics assistance - 
particularly through the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program, aka the 
COLAR aviation program - enabled the GOC to project power throughout 
the country, move to reassert the state's authority, and bring 
security to areas where it had become entirely absent during the 
decades of narcoterrorist dominance. 
 
------------ 
Extradition 
------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) President Uribe remains a strong supporter of the 
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship.  Since taking office he has 
approved over 550 extraditions to the United States, including 
almost 100 cases so far in 2007. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of $78 
billion between 2007 and 2013.  The proposal contains a heightened 
emphasis on social development, assigning new resources to 
consolidate governance, human rights, displaced people, and 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate 42,000 demobilized ex-combatants and deserters and to 
promote Colombia's competitiveness and licit exports.  The GOC seeks 
funding from the United States and European countries, but also 
brings substantial resources of its own to the table.  USG security 
assistance combats drug trafficking and terrorism and includes 
training, material aid, and technical assistance to security forces 
and other institutions.  It also provides support for GOC aviation, 
essential for all programs - civilian or military - outside 
Colombia's major cities. 
 
6.  (U) The USAID Mission in Colombia funds $139 million of programs 
in four key strategic sectors:  alternative development and economic 
policy reform; justice reform, human rights, and strengthening 
 
governance; demobilization and reintegration of illegal armed 
groups; assistance to internally displaced persons (Colombia has 
between 2 and 3 million displaced persons), Afro-Colombians and 
other vulnerable populations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Democratic Security Fosters Successful Elections 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7.  (U) The establishment of greater GOC territorial control and the 
paramilitary demobilization allowed civil society and political 
parties to operate more openly than ever before.  In May 2006, the 
leftist Polo Democratico candidate for president received 2.5 
million votes, the highest level ever for a leftist candidate. 
Colombia's October 28 local elections occurred without significant 
violence or problems, according to the OAS, Embassy observers, and 
local press.  The GOC deployed 167,000 police and military to voting 
sites, and electoral officials appeared well-organized overall.  The 
GOC and local officials quickly deployed security and investigative 
officials to the few areas where allegations of fraud - or localized 
violence - occurred.  Elections centered on local issues and 
alliances, and results did not represent a referendum on President 
Uribe or other national politicians - though the Uribe coalition 
fared well.  Samuel Moreno of the Polo Democratico Party won the key 
Bogota mayoral race.  Observers told us candidates and parties 
associated with the para-political scandal fared poorly overall - 
though a few questionable candidates did win.  Fighting between 
security forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) forced the postponement of voting in the small town of 
Argelia, Cauca; though voting proceeded normally in the remainder of 
the department. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized since 
2002, and a further 11,000 deserted from all illegal armed groups 
(about one-half from the FARC).  FARC desertions increased 
significantly in 2007, and this has resulted in the largest 
reintegration program ever attempted and operates while the GOC 
continues to battle the FARC and the Army of National Liberation 
(ELN).  A small percentage of renegade former-United Self-defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary members have joined new 
criminal groups.  Job creation remains a priority, but many of the 
recently demobilized have few employable skills and need intense 
psycho-social and vocational training before they can enter the 
labor force.  The GOC's reintegration program has significantly 
increased the number of former combatants now employed or in 
training.  The GOC has identified increased investment in small and 
medium enterprise development as a priority for promoting job 
creation for demobilized ex-combatants. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Army of National Liberation (ELN) has negotiated with 
the GOC for well over a year, so far without success and prospects 
remain doubtful.  Although the ELN retains hostages, their military 
capability continues to decline.  The FARC has refused to engage in 
any meaningful peace talks, and recently killed eleven state 
legislators they had held hostage.  At the end of August, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez visited Colombia to offer his assistance in 
facilitating peace talks between the GOC and the FARC and ELN.  He 
will reportedly meet with FARC leadership this week in Venezuela. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Military Justice and Improved Human Rights Record 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
10.  (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress on 
human rights cases involving military abuse or collaboration with 
paramilitaries.  All members of the military and police receive 
mandatory human rights training.  Minister of Defense (MOD) Santos 
identified military justice reform as a top priority; last month, he 
named the first civilian - and the first woman - as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  The UN Human Rights Commission 
and private human rights groups all play active roles here. 
Progress on certain high profile human rights cases against the 
public security forces has gone agonizingly slow and injured the 
GOC's reputation in the international community. 
 
------------------------- 
Positive Economic Outlook 
------------------------- 
 
11.  (U) Significant gains in security have boosted the Colombian 
 
economy.  GDP growth in 2006 hit 6.8 percent, while 2007 first 
semester growth reached 7.5 percent.  Both exports and imports grew 
more than 20 percent in 2006.  The U.S. remains Colombia's largest 
trade partner (approximately 40 percent of exports and 26 percent in 
imports).  Colombian exports to the U.S. have grown USD 1 billion 
per year since the Andean Trade Preferences Act's (ATPA) renewal and 
the expansion in late 2002, while U.S exports to Colombia increased 
approximately USD 2 billion.  The largest U.S. investors - Drummond 
(coal), ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil - plan considerable expansion 
due to the improved investment climate and security situation. 
Investors from around the world continue investing or considering 
investing in Colombia in large part because of the possibility of 
unfettered access to the U.S. market provided under the Free Trade 
Agreement (CTPA).  In 2006, Foreign Direct Investment increased to 
USD 8.9 billion, quadruple the 2002 level. 
 
12.  (SBU) The CTPA remains the GOC's highest economic priority. 
The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in June and the 
supplementary protocol on labor and environment in November, both 
votes by substantial margins.  The U.S. Congress has extended trade 
preferences for Colombian exporters under the ATPA through February 
2008.  The Uribe Administration has redoubled efforts to win U.S. 
Congressional support for CTPA approval.  Visits in 2007 by 
high-level USG officials, including President Bush, Secretary of 
Defense Gates, Deputy Secretary Negroponte, USTR Schwab, OPIC CEO 
Mosbacher, U/S Jeffery, and Commerce Secretary Gutierrez have 
reassured them of the Administration's commitment, but the GOC 
remains cognizant of the daunting political challenges ahead. 
 
----- 
Labor 
----- 
 
13.  (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns in 
Colombia.  In June 2006, the GOC, trade confederations and business 
representatives signed a Tripartite Accord at the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) in Geneva, removing Colombia from 
discussion in the ILO's Committee for Application of Standards for 
the first time in 21 years.  A resident ILO representative arrived 
in Colombia in January 2007 to implement the agreement committing 
the government to financing the ILO Special Technical Cooperation 
program and allocating USD 1.5 million annually to the Fiscalia to 
prosecute cases of violence against trade unionists.  The GOC has 
assigned nearly 100 prosecutors and investigators to this task. 
Labor leaders and the UNHCR's local representative praise the 
initiative. 
 
14.  (U) Although trade unionists continue to fall victim to 
violence for both political reasons and common crime, the GOC 
remains determined to protect labor leaders.  In 2006, the GOC's 
Protection Program assisted over 1,500 trade unionists and 10,000 
human rights activists, journalists, politicians, witnesses and 
other individuals under threat.  As a result, the murder rate for 
trade unionists has dipped below that for the general population. 
The GOC expects to spend some $34 million on protection in 2007. 
Attorney General Mario Iguaran reaffirmed in August that his office 
is committed to prosecuting cases of violence against labor.  Under 
his leadership the Attorney General's office focused resources for 
the human rights office's sub-unit concentrating on prosecuting 352 
priority labor violence cases.  In those cases, the GOC has already 
scored 12 convictions. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
15.  (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 remain the longest held U.S. hostages in the world. 
Their safe release continues as our top priority.  The Colombians 
provide full assistance, and President Uribe has assured us that any 
humanitarian exchange will include the U.S. hostages. 
 
BROWNFIELD