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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK865, UNGA: MOROCCO AND ALGERIA AGREE ON CONSENSUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK865 2007-10-15 20:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0865/01 2882000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 152000Z OCT 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2784
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1409
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6262
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0091
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 1025
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0492
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA WI MO
SUBJECT: UNGA: MOROCCO AND ALGERIA AGREE ON CONSENSUS 
WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTION 
 
 
1. Summary. The UNGA Fourth Committee adopted its resolution 
on the Western Sahara by consensus October 15 following 
Moroccan-Algerian agreement on its text, which showcases 
support for the negotiating process launched in April, 
features constructive ambiguity on self-determination, and 
eschews any characterization of the Moroccan autonomy plan 
(see para 9).  The emergence of a consensus resolution is a 
surprising, but welcome, development that contrasts with the 
hard-line positions that both parties had expressed in their 
position papers and opening statements.  Despite this 
development, we doubt that either side has abandoned the core 
of its position; more likely, neither wants to complicate the 
next MINURSO renewal and both may find it convenient to kick 
the overall issue down the road.  End Summary. 
 
2. The UNGA Fourth Committee adopted an Algerian draft 
resolution on the Question of Western Sahara by consensus 
October 15 (text in para 6).  The agreement on the text, 
reached by Morocco and Algeria on October 11, the eve of Eid 
al-Fitr, surprised most delegations, given the positions of 
Algeria and Morocco only three days earlier at the beginning 
of a five-day debate on the Western Sahara.  In position 
papers handed out prior to the start of the debate and in 
their opening statements, both Morocco and Algeria had 
established firm and opposing positions on what would 
constitute an acceptable text. 
 
3. In its October 8 intervention, Morocco had insisted that 
any acceptable resolution must reflect recent developments, 
especially its submission of an autonomy proposal in April, 
that it avoid jeopardizing the current dynamics or altering 
the terms of reference of the ongoing negotiations, that it 
be in compliance with the terms and spirit of UNSCR 1754 
(that it recognize its preference for the Moroccan proposal 
as a basis for negotiations); and that it avoid legitimizing 
rigid positions and consecrating outdated proposals (that it 
drop references to the Baker Plan).  Algeria, in its October 
8 intervention, had stressed its continuing support for the 
Baker Plan approved by UNSCR 1495, underscored the principle 
of self-determination as the ultimate essential purpose of 
UNSCR 1754, which launched Western Sahara negotiations in 
April, and declared that the unconditional negotiations 
called for by UNSCR 1754 had negated any claim of the parties 
to predetermine the basis of the negotiations. 
 
4. Two lively rounds of rights of replies following opening 
statements seemed to deepen the potential divide between the 
Morocco and Algerian positions.  In its right of reply, 
Morocco accused Algeria of "not evolving" with the times, 
instead continuing to impede solutions, asserted that the 
Polisario Front has never been the sole voice of the Sahrawis 
and that most Sahrawi do not live in camps but in "Southern 
Morocco," and insisted that its autonomy proposal was the 
legitimate proposal within the "hierarchy of proposals" 
accepted by UNSCR 1754.  Algeria, in turn, characterized 
Morocco's claim for its proposal as "a very selective 
reading," insisted that UNSCR 1754 takes into account both 
the Moroccan and the Polisario proposals on a basis of 
equality, noted that the Polisario is the representative of 
the Western Sahara, and suggested that Morocco fears a 
referendum -- this being the only reason Morocco would not 
support a true exercise of self-determination. 
 
5. Despite these publicly proclaimed differences, Algerian 
and Moroccan negotiating teams took up an initial Algerian 
draft and hammered out an agreed text over three days of 
negotiations.  The final text satisfies the Moroccan 
preference that the reference to the Baker Plan (UNSCR 1495) 
in last year's resolution be removed from the operative 
paragraphs and replaced with reference to UNSCR 1754, as well 
as its preference that characterization of UNSCR 1495 in the 
preambular section of last year's resolution ("...1495 (2003) 
of 31 July 2003, in which the Council expressed its support 
of the peace plan for self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara as an optimum political solution on the basis 
of agreement between the two parties...") be deleted.  For 
its part, Algeria was satisfied that Morocco did not insist 
on including references to the UNSCR 1754 language that 
termed the Moroccan proposal to be "serious and credible." 
 
6. Apparently the key to the agreement was the preambular 
language offered by Morocco: "Recognizing that all available 
options for self-determination of the Territories are valid 
as long as they are in accordance with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned and in conformity with the 
clearly defined principles contained in General Assembly 
 
 
resolutions 1524 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1541 (XV) of 15 
December 1960 and other resolutions of the General 
Assembly...."  This language would seem to provide Morocco 
support for its insistence that its autonomy plan provides 
the exercise of self-determination required by UN 
resolutions.  At the same time, the language provides 
Polisario negotiators support for their insistence that 
Morocco agree to discuss their proposal in future 
negotiations. 
 
7. Some 47 petitioners and ten countries addressed the Fourth 
Committee on the Western Sahara during the five days of 
debate, none breaking any new ground.  Of the 47 petitioners, 
36 spoke in support of the Polisario position of 
self-determination and a referendum with independence as an 
option.  Many referred to Morocco as an "occupying power" and 
called upon the Fourth Committee to act to halt "human rights 
violations" in the Western Sahara.  Petitioners speaking on 
behalf of the Moroccan position focused on the suffering and 
mistreatment of Polisario refugees in camps in Algeria and 
questioned the extent to which the Polisario really 
represents the Sahrawis, the majority of whom still live in 
the Western Sahara. 
 
8. Comment:  We will be seeking out the Moroccan and Algerian 
delegations and the Polisario representatives in New York to 
determine what lay behind the ability of the Moroccans and 
Algerians to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable positions in 
agreeing on a consensus text.  Both delegations decided to 
keep the focus on the ongoing negotiating process instead of 
trying to score points against each other, but we doubt that 
either side has abandoned the core of its position as 
expressed at the beginning of the debate.  It is more likely 
that Morocco and Algeria did not want to complicate the next 
MINURSO renewal, but that, as the negotiations move toward a 
third round, Morocco and the Polisario, with Algeria behind 
it, will interpret the present resolution in their own favor. 
 Many observers view the current posture of the parties as 
one of kicking the issues down the road, permitting the 
Moroccans to create more facts on the ground while allowing 
the Polisario and Algeria to await a shift in the politics 
that surround these issues. 
 
9. Consensus text of "Question of Western Sahara" follows. 
Begin Text: 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara, 
 
Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to 
self-determination and independence, in accordance with the 
principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and 
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
 
Recognizing that all available options for self-determination 
of the Territories are valid as long as they are in 
accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people 
concerned and in conformity with the clearly defined 
principles contained in General Assembly resolutions 1524 
(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 
and other resolutions of the General Assembly, 
 
Recalling its resolution 60/114 of 8 December 2005, 
 
Recalling also all resolutions of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council on the question of Western Sahara, 
 
Recalling further Security Council resolutions 658 (1990) of 
27 June 1990, 690 (1991) of 29 April 1991, 1359 (2001) of 29 
June 2001, 1429 (2002) of 30 July 2002, 1495 (2003) of 31 
July 2003, 1541 (2004) of 29 April 2004, 1570 (2004) of 28 
October 2004, 1598 (2005) of 28 April 2005, 1634 (2005) of 28 
October 2005, 1675 (2006) of 28 April 2006 and 1720 (2006) of 
31 October 2006, 
 
Welcoming the adoption of Security Council resolution 1754 
(2007) on 30 April 2007, 
 
Expressing its satisfaction that the parties have met on 18 
and 19 June and on 10 and 11 August 2007 under the auspices 
of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and in the 
presence of the neighboring countries and that they have 
agreed to continue the negotiations, 
 
 
 
Calling upon all the parties and the States of the region to 
cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Personal 
Envoy and with each other, 
 
Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations towards 
the people of Western Sahara, 
 
Welcoming in this regard the efforts of the Secretary-General 
and his Personal Envoy in search of a mutually acceptable 
political solution to the dispute, which will provide for the 
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, 
 
Having examined the relevant chapter of the report of the 
Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
 
Having also examined the report of the Secretary-General 
 
1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General, 
 
2. Supports strongly Security Council resolution 1754 (2007), 
by which the Council called upon the parties to enter into 
negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into 
account the developments of the last months, with a view to 
achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political 
solution, which will provide for the self-determination of 
the people of Western Sahara; 
 
3. Welcomes the ongoing negotiations between the parties held 
on 18 and 19 June and on 10 and 11 August 2007 in the 
presence of the neighboring countries under the auspices of 
the United Nations; 
 
4. Commends the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General 
and his Personal Envoy for the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 1754 (2007) and encourages the parties to 
continue to show political will and a spirit of cooperation 
in supporting those efforts and to create a propitious 
atmosphere for dialogue and the success of the negotiations; 
 
5. Calls upon the parties to cooperate with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and calls upon them to abide by 
their obligations under international humanitarian law; 
 
6. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to 
continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara and to 
report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-third 
session; 
 
7. Invites the Secretary-General to submit to the General 
Assembly at its sixty-third session a report on the 
implementation of the present resolution. 
End Text. 
KHALILZAD