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Viewing cable 07TRIPOLI912, A SUCCESS?: ENI'S DEAL WITH LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TRIPOLI912 2007-10-26 16:32 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO0686
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0912/01 2991632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 261632Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2778
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0495
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0546
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0332
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0888
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0318
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0213
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3191
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BTIO ECON EINV EPET ENRG PREL LY
SUBJECT: A SUCCESS?: ENI'S DEAL WITH LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL 
CORPORATION 
 
1.  Summary:  Italian energy firm Eni has struck a major deal 
with Libya's National Oil Corporation that will significantly 
extend its concession contracts and launch an ambitious series 
of exploration and development activities.  While trumpeted by 
Eni as a success, the deal carries serious negatives for the 
company, and may pave the way for the imposition of similar, not 
altogether positive arrangements with other foreign oil and gas 
concession holders.  End Summary. 
 
2.  Leading Italian energy firm Eni announced a 25-year 
extension to its oil and gas contracts with Libya's National Oil 
Corporation (NOC) October 16.  Press reports indicate that some 
of Eni's most important oil and gas concessions were to expire 
over the next two years; the new agreement extends all of its 
concessions until 2042 and 2047, respectively.  Eni will invest 
$14 billion in related infrastructure (a total matched by the 
NOC for a total of $28 billion).  Eni will also expend at least 
$800 million for additional exploration activities, a sum 
approaching the mammoth $900 million exploration plan unveiled 
following British Petroleum's May 2007 deal with the NOC.  Eni 
and NOC will also reportedly embark on a limited program of 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) in some of Eni's existing fields. 
 
3.  The new deal paves the way for a potential doubling of 
Libya's gas exporting capacity to 16 billion cubic meters (BCM). 
 Eni is Libya's partner for the "Greenstream" gas pipeline, 
which runs from the Libyan coast to Sicily and which handles its 
extant gas export capacity.  The new contract envisages 
expanding Greenstream's capacity to 11 billion BCM and 
constructing a new liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) plant at the 
Mellita gas export hub with a capacity of BCM a year. 
 
STEEP HIDDEN COSTS 
 
4.  While cast in most press accounts as a triumph for the 
Italian firm, the deal also carries substantial costs.  Eni 
officials are reportedly far from enthralled with the new 
arrangements.  The terms of the new agreement take Eni out of a 
true concession agreement, under which they derived a relatively 
healthy margin on the product that they lifted (exported) from 
Libya, and into a production sharing agreement.  Under its 
previous terms, Eni was responsible for tax and royalties on 
lifted product, but was compensated by the NOC for substantial 
portions of its exploration and development costs, including 
well-drilling.  Under the new arrangements, which are governed 
by the general terms of the current round of Exploration and 
Production Sharing (EPSA IV) agreements, Eni is responsible for 
all of these costs.  Eni thus has a lower cost recovery factor 
in line with recent concession "winners" (who have won with bids 
as low as 7%).  The result is that the NOC takes a larger cut of 
produced oil and Eni books a lower quantity of reserves, 
negatively affecting the company's share price.  On top of this, 
Eni will reportedly pay a $1 billion bonus to NOC as part of the 
deal, and has agreed to retire an outstanding $500 million debt 
to the NOC by year's end. 
 
A WORRYING SIGN OF THINGS TO COME? 
 
5.  Representatives of international oil companies (IOCs) 
operating in Libya have expressed grave doubts about the Eni 
deal.  One executive described it as "scary," adding that it 
raised serious questions about NOC adherence to the sanctity of 
existing contracts.  Post has learned that the NOC has 
approached several IOCs, including TOTAL (France), Wintershall 
(German) and Repsol (Spain), to explore renegotiating the terms 
of their current operations.  There is widespread worry among 
the IOCs that the NOC may expand this effort and open 
discussions with other concession holders in an effort to 
extract more favorable terms.  The use of the EPSA IV bidding 
round model of production sharing agreements would most damage 
companies operating under concession agreements, such as 
Wintershall.  Those agreements were concluded during the 
sanctions period, when low spot market prices and Libya's 
limited options resulted in the granting of more favorable 
terms.  The IOCs that have been approached about renegotiating 
are irked that the NOC is coming after them now, particularly 
since their companies took substantial risks to do business in 
Libya when UN sanctions were in place. 
 
6.  Comment: Post's contacts have expressed acute annoyance with 
Eni for conceding to the NOC's initiative, particularly given 
the company's past record of similar behavior.  Contacts point 
to Eni's agreement on a $150 million "social development 
 
TRIPOLI 00000912  002 OF 002 
 
 
package" with the NOC in September 2006 as another example of 
the firm's having given in to pressure from the NOC.  With Eni's 
new deal on the books, the NOC will now have greater leverage to 
force other companies to conclude similar agreements.  At the 
same time, the quality of parcels offered under the auspices of 
Libya's latest EPSA rounds has been increasingly marginal in 
economic terms.  The confluence of increasingly difficult 
hydrocarbon reservoirs and an increasingly avaricious NOC could 
curb further interest by major IOCs in new EPSA agreements, 
leading to greater participation by smaller, less capable 
operators in Libya's oil and gas sector.  End comment. 
MILAM