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Viewing cable 07TOKYO4703, MIXED PRESS REACTIONS TO LATEST SIX-PARTY AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO4703 2007-10-06 02:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #4703 2790237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060237Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8327
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 9377
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1921
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5430
UNCLAS TOKYO 004703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EAP/J, EAP/PD, EAP/K, EAP FOR DAS - ARVIZU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER OIIP KPAO KMDR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: MIXED PRESS REACTIONS TO LATEST SIX-PARTY AGREEMENT 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Official comments on the six-party accord and 
the accompanying abduction issue have been generally 
favorable, with Japan being satisfied that its views were 
reflected in the final document, namely, that delisting would 
be considerably difficult unless the nuclear and humanitarian 
issues are resolved.  However, the print media has been 
lukewarm at best and sharply skeptical at worst, with some 
dailies seeing the fate of the abduction issue in the 
Six-Party Talks as a test of trust between Washington and 
Tokyo.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  According to a Mainichi report (10/5), Prime Minister 
Fukuda believes that the USG's delisting of North Korea as a 
terrorist-supporting state is premised on a resolution of the 
abduction issue.  In commenting on the six-party agreement, 
Fukuda is quoted as saying:  "There is no mention of a date 
for the U.S. to delist North Korea.  It says (the U.S.) will 
make a decision upon taking everything into consideration. 
The nuclear and humanitarian issues, for instance, must be 
considered.  (Delisting) would be considerably difficult 
unless such issues are resolved." 
 
3.  Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura (Asahi, 10/4) hailed 
the six-party accord for requiring North Korea to declare all 
its nuclear programs by year's end, but a senior unnamed MOFA 
official, commenting on the document's portion on "beginning 
the process" of delisting, confided:  "We have the impression 
that the delisting process has moved a half-step forward." 
 
4.  Most press reports on Japanese reactions to the latest 
six-party accord show a sense of caution or skepticism about 
the DPRK's nuclear commitments and deep concern about the 
fate of the abduction issue.  A Mainichi article (10/4) 
reported that the GOJ has favorably accepted the agreement, 
with CCS Machimura quoted as saying, "An accord satisfactory 
to Japan was worked out in the final stage."  But on the 
delisting issue, though no clear-cut date for delisting was 
mentioned, the Mainichi, echoing unnamed official sources, 
was worried:  "Concern persists that if the second phase of 
the denuclearization process moved forward, the U.S. might 
delist the North, putting the abduction issue on the 
backburner."  Editorials and commentaries in the major 
dailies, conservative and liberal alike, all had similar 
reservations about the U.S.' intention to consider seriously 
the abduction issue when deciding to delist the DPRK. 
 
5.  An editorial writer's article in the conservative Yomiuri 
(10/4), titled "Six-nation accord a bitter pill for Japan," 
noted that the absence of a deadline for removal of Pyongyang 
from its pariah list reflected Japanese insistence, but then 
continued:  "Japan remained dissatisfied on many points, but 
only approved the document out of consideration for the U.S., 
South Korea, and the other participants in the talks."  A 
MOFA source was quoted as saying, "We fear the U.S. and North 
Korea might have made a tacit agreement that the pariah 
designation will be lifted by the end of the year."  The 
commentary was sour on the nuclear deal as well, concluding, 
"The impression cannot be denied that Hill lowered the 
hurdles for North Korea's abandonment of nuclear weapons and 
put off awkward tasks because he was in too much of a hurry 
to get results." 
 
6.  In its October 4 editorial, Tokyo Shimbun warned that the 
DPRK might back away from the ultimate goal of 
denuclearization if the U.S. decided to delist North Korea as 
a sponsor of terrorism.  "The delisting must be based on 
nuclear abandonment and the elimination of charges of 
supporting terrorism, such as by repatriating Japanese 
abductees."  In a Beijing dispatch (10/1), a Nikkei 
correspondent, in reporting on the six-party agreement, was 
mildly optimistic about a perceived change in the DPRK's 
hostile stance toward Japan, predicting that persistent U.S. 
efforts may have paved the way for an actual improvement in 
Japan-DPRK ties.  But this all could be lost, the reporter 
stated, if the U.S., in the rush for achievements, 
prematurely removed North Korea from the list of states 
sponsoring terrorism later this year.  Such a move, he 
warned, "could create strains in Japan-U.S. relations." 
DONOVAN