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Viewing cable 07PARIS4362, YOUR OCTOBER 31 VISIT TO PARIS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARIS4362 2007-10-26 14:02 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Paris
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #4362/01 2991402
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261402Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0935
UNCLAS PARIS 004362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR U/S BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR PARM FR IR IZ AF SR
SUBJECT: YOUR OCTOBER 31 VISIT TO PARIS 
 
REF: PARIS 4357 (SCENESETTER FOR SARKOZY VISIT TO THE 
     U.S.) 
 
1.  (U) This message is Sensitive But Unclassified - not for 
internet distribution. 
 
2.  (SBU) Introduction and Summary:  Your visit comes close 
to six months into Nicolas Sarkozy's five-year term.  Sarkozy 
has made effective use of his policy of inclusiveness 
("ouverture"), bringing in leading figures of the opposition, 
including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister 
Kouchner), the non-Gaullist center-right, and civil society. 
In addition, he shattered the white-male cast of previous 
French governments with his appointments of women and 
minorities to key ministries.  However, the team,s 
cohesiveness has suffered of late from public displays of 
tension between the "hyperactive" president and several 
members of his cabinet (including the Prime Minister).  With 
the opposition Socialist Party demoralized, and being in full 
control of all the levers of power, beginning with the 
Presidency, the Parliament, and the majority party, Sarkozy 
dominates the politics of France.  He has been assertive in 
pushing an ambitious program of reform aimed at revitilizing 
the country and liberating its economic potential.  While 
still enjoying substantial popular support (above 60% in most 
polls), a difficult international economic environment and 
France's budgetary constraints are restricting his room to 
maneuver and a nationwide strike on October 18-19 provided 
the first political challenge to Sarkozy and his team. 
 
3.(SBU) On the foreign policy front, Sarkozy is intent on 
reasserting French leadership in Europe and in making his 
mark on the international scene.  He has moved to improve his 
relations with the U.S., breaking with Chirac's emphasis on 
multi-polarity.  We have seen a dramatic shift in French 
policy on Iraq, public debate over a possible French "return" 
to the integrated military command of NATO, a toughened 
approach to Iran and Russia, and a promised new attitude 
toward Africa.  Sarkozy and Kouchner assign priority also to 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Darfur, as well as to 
climate change.  Despite convergence with the U.S. on key 
issues, Sarkozy has repeatedly emphasized that being "allies" 
does not mean accross-the-board and automatic "alignment" 
with U.S. positions.  He has not hesitated to identify 
specific areas of disagreement with the U.S., including 
admission of Turkey into the EU, climate change and GMOs. 
This message reviews the state of play in a number of issues 
that may come up in the context of your visit.  End Summary. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition to Iran, NATO, Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
the main topics of your meetings with French officials are 
addressed below, along with brief summaries of French 
thinking on other important GOF priorites:   Iraq, 
Russia/Georgia, France-EU relations, Lebanon, Darfur and 
climate change. 
 
5.  (SBU) IRAN:  Both President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner have 
gone on record with public comments about the 
"unacceptability" of a nuclear-armed Iran and the need to 
maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime.  France has 
recently taken the lead on this issue within the EU, with FM 
Kouchner circulating a letter to the EU foreign ministers to 
advocate strengthening European sanctions should the UNSC be 
unable to act.  At the same time, French officials emphasize 
that Paris maintains a "normal" diplomatic relationship with 
Teheran despite sharp disagreements on the nuclear question. 
The recent visit of Israeli PM Olmert to Paris gave Israel an 
opportunity to bolster France,s tough line.  In your 
meetings, your counterparts will be interested in your 
evaluation of the ability of the international community to 
influence Iranian choices and how best to maintain 
international pressure toward that end. 
 
6. (SBU) NATO:  In one of his first acts as President, 
Sarkozy launched a defense "white paper" commission to review 
France,s defense and security priorities (the first since 
1994).  One component of the report (expected in March 2008) 
is a review of France,s relationship with NATO.   The 
defense white paper could set the stage for a possible 
re-integration back into the NATO military command (from 
which the French military withdrew in 1966).  President 
Sarkozy and Defense Minister Morin launched the public debate 
over a deeper French role in the Alliance in September in two 
major foreign policy speeches.  Sarkozy later clarified the 
two conditions for a France rapprochement to NATO in a 
September 24 interview in the New York Times: 1) 
strengthening European defense structures by developing 
Europe,s own capabilities to plan and carry out defense and 
security operations; and 2) seeking French representation in 
the highest "decision making posts of NATO".   Editorials and 
informal newspaper polls have demonstrated that there already 
exists a degree of public support in re-joining NATO, despite 
the long-standing French policy of independence that has been 
supported across the political spectrum.  Those opposed 
frequently raise the previous 1996 failure to reach agreement 
on the modalities for a French return or raise concerns that 
fully joining NATO will merely mean placing French military 
personnel under American control.  Thus far, public 
commentary has been fairly reasoned and many experts point to 
France,s already significant role in the alliance (France is 
the 5th largest contributor to NATO in terms of budget and 
troops).  Your visit offers an opportunity to hear from the 
French where they are in their own policy review and identify 
the common ground for moving forward the dialogue with France 
on NATO and European defense. 
 
7.  (SBU)  KOSOVO:  A French general recently took over the 
command of KFOR troops in Kosovo and the civilian French 
leadership is actively seeking EU consensus on a common 
European approach to the issue of Kosovo,s final status. 
Many European countries are considering the legal basis to 
maintain troop deployments and continue with planning for an 
ESDP mission in Kosovo in the event of a unilateral 
declaration of independence.  The French are eager to work 
closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-December 
10 actions.  They are hoping that combined European and U.S. 
efforts will convince the Kosovars that it is in their best 
interest to be patient.  The French want to avoid any 
deterioration of the security situation on the ground in 
Kosovo, focusing particular on the protection of minorities 
in the days and weeks to come. 
 
8.  (SBU) AFGHANISTAN:  In the first major foreign policy 
speech of his presidency, Sarkozy highlighted the importance 
of French efforts in Afghanistan, primarily in training the 
Afghan National Army.  To this end, France recently stepped 
up military commitments by adding three additional 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and just 
announced this week that it would be sending an additional 
OMLT to assist the Dutch in southern Afghanistan.  France 
participates in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the 
NATO ISAF mission and its troops are deployed largely in and 
around Kabul.   France has taken other decisions to bolster 
its presence in Afghanistan including moving six French 
Mirage planes from Dushanbe to Kandahar in September and the 
September 10 pledge by the French and German heads of state 
to support the German-led EU police training mission in 
Afghanistan (despite delays in getting the mission up and 
running).  We should use the opportunity of your visit to 
persuade the French to broaden and deepen their efforts in 
Afghanistan.  French interlocutors may repeat calls for a 
more coherent  political and military strategy in Afghanistan 
that would integrate military support and civilian 
reconstruction and include a timeline for shifting the burden 
from the international coalition to the Government of 
Afghanistan. 
 
9.  (SBU) RUSSIA:   French President Sarkozy recently made 
his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10.  The 
two leaders discussed a broad range of topics including Iran, 
missile defense, Georgia and Kosovo.  The visit to Moscow 
highlighted a major difference in substance and style from 
Franco-Russian relations in the Chirac era.  Sarkozy did not 
shy away from directly addressing difficult issues, including 
democracy and rule of law problems in Russia, Chechnya and 
energy policies.  He also took the unprecedented step (for a 
French President) of visiting human rights activists while in 
Moscow.  Despite the re-calibration in the relationship, 
energy security issues and trade remain as priorities.  The 
French remind us of Russia's relative proximity and France's 
and Europe's need to deal pragmatically with a newly 
assertive Russia. 
 
10.  (SBU)  GEORGIA:  The Georgian press spokesman recently 
reported that President Sarkozy told Georgian President 
Saakashvili that he supports MAP for Georgia, but the GOF has 
not confirmed this to us statement.  As a general rule, the 
French maintain that NATO membership should not create new 
lines of division and that territorial conflicts should be 
resolved prior to membership.  France is considering whether 
NATO could offer Georgia a different kind of status and a 
different approach to regional security, possibly combined 
with incentives. 
 
11.  (SBU) IRAQ: FM Koucher,s three-day visit to Iraq in 
August launched new dialogue on French engagement in Iraq 
reconstruction efforts, particularly to relieve what they see 
as a harsh humanitarian situation.  Since then, the GOF has 
hosted President Talibani and FM Zebari and they remain 
interested in engaging with local Iraqi officials.  The 
renewed GOF engagement does not include any commitment of 
French troops in Iraq, but Kouchner has pressed the EU to 
become more active in multinational efforts at reconstruction 
(which France would like the UN to head up).  Significantly, 
Kouchner plans to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in 
Istanbul of Iraq,s "neighbors".  We should encourage the 
French to move ahead to implement humanitarian and 
reconstruction programs in Iraq. 
 
12.  (SBU) LEBANON:  FM Kouchner has been closely associated 
with efforts to help Lebanon elect a new president and emerge 
from its present political crisis.  He recently completed a 
trip of EU Foreign Ministers to Lebanon (which included the 
Foreign Ministers of Spain and Italy as well) and will likely 
return there after his visit to Washington.  In addition, 
President Sarkozy authorized announcement of France,s 
tranche of more than $6 million for the Special Tribunal, 
which France had been withholding pending a formal request 
for contributions by the UN Secretary-General.  Our close 
consultations with the French over Lebanon continue, although 
we differ over tactics and the risks associated with election 
of a president via simple majority.  The French emphasize the 
importance of finding a "consensus" candidate acceptable to 
all. 
 
13.  (SBU) Climate Change:  On his election day, Sarkozy 
called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. 
He has created a  mega, environment ministry incorporating 
energy and transportation headed by the third-highest ranking 
Minister in the French Government.  This super ministry has 
conducted a broad based review of environmental issues with 
business, NGOs, academics, and foreign experts in a process 
called  The Grenelle for the Environment."  After the 
President,s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September 
in Washington, French officials offered to host the next 
meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the 
lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. 
reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. 
Areas of potential conflict include concerns that a failure 
for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will 
put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the 
possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on 
imported goods.  The French also criticize what they see as 
U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies 
(carbon capture and storage, second generation bio-fuels, and 
advanced nuclear) to address emissions.   France is skeptical 
that China and India and other major emerging economies will 
take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. 
 
 
14.   (C) FRANCE-EU:  President Sarkozy was instrumental in 
re-activating the moribund political reform process in the 
European Union with the June negotiation for a shortened 
"reform treaty" that will simplify some of the EU,s 
operating procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened 
political integration that doomed the EU constitution in 
2005.  This "reform treaty" was approved by EU leaders in 
Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in December 
with ratification over the course of 2008.  Sarkozy has said 
publicly he wants France to be the first country to ratify 
the simplified treaty; the process of parliamentary 
ratification will begin in December.  The French will also 
take over the rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 
and plan to focus on immigration, energy, the environment and 
European defense during their term.   While Sarkozy remains 
firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey, he has 
effectively sidestepped this issue by supporting continued 
negotiations on the acquis communautaire that do not 
pre-suppose membership.  He also conditioned his position on 
EU support for a "Committee of Wise Men" to reflect "without 
taboos" on the broader questions about the European future: 
ie, what is the European identity, what should the EU,s 
borders be, how to handle common issues, and how deep can 
political integration go. 
 
15.   (SBU)  DARFUR (and Chad, Central African Republic): 
Sarkozy demonstrated an immediate renewed interest in Africa 
upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing 
the June 25 ministerial conference on Darfur, which served to 
refocus international attention on that country.  The French 
followed up with a ministerial meeting on Darfur on the 
margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted 
a broader Security Council session on Africa for 
heads-of-state/government.  France has been instrumental in 
organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN 
peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic 
(MINURCAT).  Paris hopes to deploy this force as soon as 
practicable.  In addition, the French have firmly supported 
the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID). 
French Presidency officials have indicated that the GOF is 
reviewing overall policy towards Africa, with a possible new 
approach to be announced within the coming months 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
Stapleton