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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2402, REGIONAL PARTNERS SHARE CONCERNS ABOUT DIRECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA2402 2007-10-30 21:57 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2402/01 3032157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 302157Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1590
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHMU/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0076
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0475
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0214
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0089
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0102
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017 
TAGS: EAID BR CI CO ECON JA MX NU PREL XM
SUBJECT: REGIONAL PARTNERS SHARE CONCERNS ABOUT DIRECTION 
OF ORTEGA GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2384 
     B. MANAGUA 2008 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, 1.4, (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
 
1. (C) Ambassadors from Spain, Japan, Chile, Colombia, 
Brazil, and Mexico share similar concerns about the direction 
of Nicaragua under the Ortega Government.  They are 
frustrated by the GON's lack of professionalism, transparency 
and accountability, and have a low level of confidence in the 
government's ability to successfully carry out economic or 
development programs.  At the same time, they have found the 
government to be pragmatic on some economic and investment 
issues and many are seeking ways to continue to cooperate on 
the humanitarian front. All share grave doubts about the 
candidacy of former Catholic priest and ex-Foreign Minister 
Miguel D'Escoto for the UNGA Presidency, but are not aware of 
an alternative candidate.  Ortega's continued overtures to 
North Korea are threatening to damage relations with Japan, 
including a cut in humanitarian assistance.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On October 24, Ambassador held a breakfast with 
Brazilian Ambassador Vitoria Cleaver, Chilean Ambassador 
Natacha Molina, Colombian Charge Andres Gafaro, Mexico 
Ambassador Raul Lopez Lira and Spanish Ambassador Jaime 
Lacadena to review bilateral cooperation with the Ortega 
administration and exchange views on recent trends. 
Ambassador attended a dinner the same day with the Japanese 
Ambassador Saito and members of his mission staff on similar 
issues.  All of these countries share a common interest in 
guiding and directing the GON along the right path. 
 
Humanitarian Cooperation 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Most of the Ambassadors had attended the October 23 
meeting with President Ortega (ref a) to hear his request for 
additional aid to the victims of Hurricane Felix and the 
recent flooding in northern and central Nicaragua.  Brazilian 
Ambassador Cleaver commented that he was more diplomatic than 
in recent meetings; toned down his rhetoric but also demanded 
that aid be given "without strings" to that it could be used 
more flexibly.  All the Ambassadors noted that Ortega and 
others in his administration do not understand how other 
governments, and particularly their humanitarian assistance 
programs work; i.e., donor countries could not, and would 
not, hand over cash.  Spanish Ambassador Lacadena echoed the 
concerns of his colleagues that his mission holds very low 
confidence in the professionalism of the Ortega 
administration to carry out programs, and sees little or no 
accountability for the programs the administration does have. 
 Nonetheless, the Spanish government is seeking new ways to 
cooperate on the humanitarian front to address real and 
pervasive problems facing the country. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassadors lamented that the Ortega 
administration has yet to draft an effective plan for 
long-term recovery and development in the RAAN after 
Hurricane Felix.  Mexican Ambassador Lopez Lira noted, "we 
want aid to go to real development, like roads and 
infrastructure that will bring about permanent changes in the 
region."  All Ambassadors expressed concern that 
disorganization, a lack of planning, and the apparent 
arbitrary distribution of aid unfortunately "will ensure" 
that the precarious situation on the Atlantic Coast remains 
the same and that donors will be facing the same problems 
when the next hurricane or disaster strikes the region. 
 
Internal and Economic Situation 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Lacadena noted the continued contradiction between 
what Ortega says in public to appeal to his base and what the 
government, in general, has done in practice.  While 
maintaining serious concerns about long-term economic 
prospects, he felt that the government has generally been 
pragmatic in its approach to the economy.  Investment is 
welcomed, he commented, when the government can attract it 
and take the credit.  However, most foreign investment isn't 
from multi-nationals but rather from smaller firms whose 
presence do not result in significant social investment or 
broader economic development.  The Ambassador lamented the 
overall lack of social responsibility among the private 
sector and that the few who do something don't publicize it 
to generate more attention.  Others expressed similar concern 
for long-term economic development and doubted whether the 
pragmatic course would continue, noting the increasingly 
populist rhetoric and actions, such as the UNGA speech and 
the temporary seizure of ExxonMobil assets at Corinto. 
 
6. (C) On the political front, Brazilian Ambassador Cleaver 
commented that many of the NGOs with whom they maintain 
contact are worried about trends and are experiencing serious 
difficulties with the current government.  They note an 
increasing climate of secrecy, and term dialogue with the 
administration on political matters difficult.  Both the 
Brazilian and the Chilean Ambassadors observed that their 
countries have strong democratic and private sector 
institutions to see them through difficult periods; Nicaragua 
unfortunately lacks these institutions, raising doubts about 
the durability of democracy.  Chilean Ambassador Molina 
commented that Ortega is another caudillo (strongman) who 
wants to be able to tell people what to do without regard to 
what they think or want.  Mexican Ambassador Lopez Lira noted 
Ortega's comments at the October 23 meeting with donors and 
expressed the view that Ortega seems primarily interested in 
pursing deeper bilateral relations with Cuba, Iran, 
Venezuela, Libya and Taiwan without regard to the concerns of 
others. 
 
D'Escoto Candidacy for UNGA Presidency 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Ambassador questioned his counterparts on the 
candidacy of former Catholic priest and ex-FSLN Foreign 
Ministry Miguel D'Escoto Brockman for the Presidency of the 
UNGA (ref b).  All Ambassadors expressed surprise that the 
GON nominated D'Escoto for the job and noted that the GON has 
been pushing hard for their votes.  Chilean Ambassador Molina 
noted that Chile has orally pledged to support D'Escoto but 
that support was not firm.  She and the others all expressed 
their own deep personal misgivings about the nomination and 
noted that he was unfit for the job.  Brazilian Ambassador 
Cleaver commented that the position required flexibility and 
negotiation skills -- which D'Escoto clearly lacks and that 
his candidacy would therefore be difficult.  Mexican 
Ambassador Lopez Lira was not sure of his government's 
position for the candidacy but shared doubts about D'Escoto. 
Colombian Charge Gaforo expressed concern that D'Escoto would 
use the position to press Nicaragua's maritime boundary 
claims against Colombia over the waters near San Andreas 
island.  None of the Ambassadors were aware of a possible 
candidate from the Dominican Republic, though they thought it 
would be a good idea.  All noted the need for a consensus 
candidate and that D'Escoto wouldn't likely produce such a 
consensus. 
 
North Korea damaging Nicaragua-Japan Relations 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8. (C) In a subsequent dinner with Japanese Ambassador Saito 
and his senior staff, the Japanese expressed similar 
frustration with the Ortega administration, especially in 
regard to humanitarian assistance.  Ambassador Saito said 
that although Japan has an image of being a country that 
offers "aid without ties" he asserted that Japanese aid is 
"always conditional."  For Japan, there are two main 
conditions for aid - there must be a strong bilateral 
relationship between the GOJ and the country receiving aid 
and there must be "general agreement" on major foreign policy 
issues.  According to Saito, Nicaragua is in danger of 
failing on this second condition because of its statements in 
sympathy with North Korea.  Saito was alarmed that Ortega, 
during a recent conversation, demonstrated a lack of 
knowledge about the North Korea/Japanese abduction issue or 
even basic facts about the nuclear situation in North Korea. 
He was particularly disappointed that Ortega could make 
sweeping remarks about the rights of countries to obtain 
nuclear technology with such little knowledge of the actual 
geopolitical situation. Saito explained that Tokyo does not 
understand that Ortega is speaking without real understanding 
and views Ortega's comments and actions with deep concern. 
He also noted that Japan already was cutting its aid budget 
significantly across the board and that Nicaragua would see a 
serious drop. 
 
 
9. (C) On Taiwan, Saito reported that he heard the Ortega 
administration had actually gone to the PRC to offer a switch 
of diplomatic recognition -- which was promptly turned down 
by the Chinese.  Ambassador suggested that this was perhaps 
due to the visit of Taiwanese President Chen; Saito nodded 
his agreement with this analysis.  Saito opined that Taiwan 
should be able to maintain diplomatic relations with 
Nicaragua for the next four to five years.  Saito also 
commented that the Ortega administration is planning to 
launch a "development plan" to attract more foreign 
investment and had come to the Japanese for advice.  The 
consensus among the Japanese participants was that this plan 
was unlikely to succeed and that the administration's recent 
actions and rhetoric had only served to frighten off foreign 
investment. 
 
Comment 
------ 
 
10. (C) Despite the range of foreign assistance and economic 
engagement among our diplomatic counterparts, we are struck 
by the similarity of views.  All share a growing concern 
about the lack of professionalism, transparency, and 
accountability of the Ortega administration.  Nonetheless 
they are seeking to continue, in some manner, humanitarian 
assistance to respond to real needs among the Nicaragua 
people and to expand opportunities for economic investment. 
It is not clear that the Ortega administration places the 
same value on that cooperation or that it understands the 
impact that its increasingly erratic and worrisome internal 
political and economic policies may eventually have on 
assistance levels. 
 
 
TRIVELLI