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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1232, DIILS ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT LAYS BARE CONGOLESE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1232 2007-10-30 13:10 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO2917
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1232/01 3031310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301310Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7052
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/MELLINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KDEM CG
SUBJECT: DIILS ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT LAYS BARE CONGOLESE 
MILITARY JUSTICE NEEDS, PROPOSES FEASIBLE USG ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 129 
 
     B. KINSHASA 1024 
 
First in a series. 
 
Summary 
--------- 
 
1. A team from the Defense Institute of International Legal 
Studies (DIILS) issued a comprehensive assessment of the 
Congolese military justice sector in September.  Drawing on 
visits during the previous month to facilities in several 
areas of the country and consultations with a wide range of 
officials and experts, the team's assessment defines the 
sector's most critical needs, including personnel, 
infrastructure, education and material support, and presents 
recommendations for possible U.S. assistance.  The team's 
readout is bleak:  military justice in the Congo needs 
assistance at all levels.  Its institutions are hollowed out 
and fragile, and require massive levels of support to perform 
even basic functions.  Septel reviews the report's 
recommendations.  End summary. 
Assessment 
---------- 
 
2.  The Defense Institute for Legal Studies (DIILS) has 
issued a comprehensive assessment of the Congolese military 
justice sector and identified areas for targeted U.S. 
assistance, including personnel, infrastructure, education 
and material support.  The report reflects the conclusions of 
three American military law experts -- Capt. Jonathan 
Edwards, USN (ret.), representing DIILS; Col. David Engel, 
USAF Reserve; and Lt. Col. Amisi "Sam" Mubangu, USA -- who 
visited the DRC for two weeks in early August, engaging 
nearly every level of the military justice sector and 
obtaining unique access to a crumbling system which is 
nevertheless central to the fight against impunity and the 
development of real security for the Congolese people. 
MONUC's Rule of Law Unit (ROLU) provided invaluable 
assistance to the team, including facilitating meetings, 
briefings, and in-country travel. 
 
3.  The team visited prisons, tribunals, and other 
facilities; met with military prosecutors, military 
magistrates, civilian defense attorneys, and law professors; 
consulted with the Attorney General, the Minister of Justice, 
and the Minister of Defense; and discussed with experts from 
NGO rule of law groups.  Their readout, while expected, was 
bleak.  It confirmed what military magistrates have long told 
us:  the system needs significant assistance at every level, 
and material support "from bricks to paper" (ref A).   (Note: 
DIILS has provided copies of the report to the Embassy and 
the Department.  End note.) 
 
Personnel 
--------- 
 
4.  The team observed major staffing deficits at every level, 
from court reporters to judicial police to military judges 
and prosecutors.  One result:  cases can languish for years, 
and often come to trial under-documented and 
under-investigated.  High-profile cases, such as the murder 
of Serge Maheshe, a reporter for MONUC's Radio Okapi, are 
often pushed ahead of others, although swift attention is no 
guarantee of "justice" (ref B).  Lower-profile cases often 
receive only cursory treatment.  At one rape trial the team 
witnessed, testimony literally devolved into a "he said, she 
said" contest.  The case was several years old.  Neither 
prosecution nor defense presented any forensic evidence, and 
there was little sign of any investigation having taken 
place. 
 
5.  Lack of military magistrates also affects the composition 
of courts and quality of judgments.  Panels of judges often 
include civil magistrates or members with no legal 
background.  At the lowest courts, the required panel of five 
judges is made up of two magistrates and three "assistant" 
judges, who often lack any legal training at all.  By law, an 
appeal can only be heard by a panel of five judges including 
three magistrates; in fact, these panels often include only a 
single military magistrate.  The participation of civil 
magistrates is not necessarily negative, as their experience 
in similar cases (e.g. rape, robbery, assault, murder) can 
 
KINSHASA 00001232  002 OF 004 
 
 
help standardize military judgments. 
 
6.  Staffing issues are further exacerbated by looming 
retirement and lack of discipline.  A large number of 
magistrates are potentially eligible to "retire," should 
"retirement" become a feasible option in the future.  In 
addition, magistrates may often simply refuse an appointment 
to a court in the country's interior, where adequate schools, 
medical care, or housing are often lacking.  Military 
authorities rarely take disciplinary action in such cases. 
 
Infrastructure 
-------------- 
 
7.  Facilities and infrastructure observed by the team varied 
from province to province, but the overall condition was 
dismal.  At one extreme is Bunia, the capital of Orientale 
Province's Ituri District.  There, the military tribunal, as 
well as magistrates' offices, are housed in buildings less 
than three years old.  Offices have electricity, plumbing, 
and even sport laptop computers with Internet connections. 
The "cachot," or holding cell, is new and includes windows 
and space for air circulation, although its plumbing is still 
rudimentary, and does not include toilets or running water. 
In Kinshasa, the offices of the Auditorat General (the chief 
military prosecutor and his staff) occupy both a 
semi-renovated building and a half-completed new building. 
The Chief Prosecutor told us that one donor had begun the new 
building but had left when funding ran out.  Even so, the 
mostly-finished offices have electricity, windows, and air 
conditioning.  This compound, too, boasts computers, 
printers, and reasonable equipment. 
 
8.  The offices of the Auditorat in Mbandaka, the capital of 
Equateur Province, illustrate the other end of the spectrum. 
The buildings are circa 1960, and neither time, the tropics, 
nor war have been kind to them.  The offices have doors, but 
there is little equipment and only intermittent electricity. 
Mbandaka lies in the rain forest on the equator, and when it 
rains (and it rains often), staff has to move to furniture 
and files around to prevent water damage from holes in the 
roof.  There are no computers; manual typewriters would be an 
improvement, since many of the complaints, rulings, and 
documentation are written out longhand.  The courtroom itself 
has a desk for the chief magistrate, but no seats or 
furniture for accused, witnesses, or accusers. 
 
9.  The DRC has three military prisons, but none is currently 
in use.  Prisons housing military as well as civilian 
prisoners can best be described as completely inadequate. 
Many lack the most basic requirements, including beds; in 
some prisons, NGOs have provided pieces of foam as 
mattresses, but these are the minority.  Mosquito netting is 
available only if a family provides it.  In many prisons, 
prisoners eat only if a friend or family member provides 
food, and a portion is usually expropriated by guards. 
Overcrowding is endemic.  Makala Prison in Kinshasa is the 
best-maintained in the country.  However, it houses over 
4,000 detainees (including around 1,800 military prisoners) 
in a facility designed for 1,500.  In others, infrastructure 
is literally crumbling, and breakouts are frequent and 
sometimes spectacular.  For example, recently in Uvira, South 
Kivu approximately 140 prisoners broke out after complaining 
that they hadn't eaten in days; the guards were reportedly 
too weak from lack of food themselves to stop the escape. 
 
Education 
--------- 
 
10.  Law professors, constitutional professors, defense 
counsel, and magistrates themselves consistently pointed out 
to the team the continuing need for training and education at 
all levels of military justice.  Magistrates are generally 
hired after completing a bachelor's-equivalent law degree, 
and much of the training that follows is on-the-job. 
Military magistrates we met at locations outside Kinshasa, as 
well as the Minister of Defense, ranked continued legal 
education as one of the highest priorities for improving 
operational capacity.  (Note:  This is consistent with 
previous field visits by Poloff (ref A) and with the 
experience of MONUC's ROLU.  End note.) 
 
11.  Only in Kinshasa, where facilities are relatively 
 
KINSHASA 00001232  003 OF 004 
 
 
high-end, and where the elite of the magistrature have a 
comfortable living, was there any indication that training 
might not be a priority.  In fact, two generals -- the First 
President of the High Military Court, and the Auditor General 
(chief military prosecutor) -- gave us a list that ranked new 
offices, new buildings and new courtrooms, along with a new 
military justice legal training facility, at the top, and 
seminars and courses for specialized legal training at the 
bottom. 
 
12.  In fact, training is needed not only for magistrates, 
but at other levels as well:  for court clerks/reporter, for 
courtroom bailiffs, for judicial police, and for guards of 
military prisoners.  Judicial police, for example, have the 
equivalent of three years' academic training; they have no 
specialized training in interrogation, investigative 
techniques, or forensics.  At the height of the Mobutu era, 
applicants for the judicial police had to complete a two-year 
technical training program at the National Police School. 
Since the school closed around 1990, most judicial police 
receive only the training they get on the job.  Moreover, the 
most experienced are poised to retire and leave the system. 
The situation is similar for clerks and bailiffs. 
 
Material Support 
---------------- 
 
13.  The court system lacks the most basic materials.  While 
the system could clearly use an enormous infusion of 
supplies, ranging from vehicles and fuel to computers and 
generators, there are also significant needs that would be 
almost invisible to a comparable American court.  Manual 
typewriters would be an upgrade for many of the tribunals and 
courts in the interior.  Necessary supplies such as paper, 
pens, file folders, and general office supplies are rare in 
the provinces.  But the most telling lack is the absence of 
updated legal texts, legal reference books, copies of 
Congolese law and decisions offering guidance for 
widely-dispersed practitioners who have no access to law 
libraries or even regular professional contacts. 
 
14.  In a country the size of the United States east of the 
Mississippi, there are around 300 miles of paved road. 
Thirty-six garrison-level courts of first instance are 
required to provide investigatory support and trials, and the 
districts which they cover can be immense.  There are 11 
Military Courts, or courts of appeal, one in each provincial 
capital and one in Kinshasa.  The Military High Court, the 
supreme military court, is also located in Kinshasa.  Each of 
these courts has responsibility for investigating complaints, 
arresting offenders, and transporting detainees over enormous 
distances.  Most have no vehicles, no gasoline, and no means 
of transport other than bicycles, canoes, and their feet. 
The negative impact that this has on investigations, arrests, 
and transport of prisoners is incalculable.  When one member 
of the DIILS team asked the military prosecutor in Bunia if 
motorbikes would be useful, he pointed out the incongruity of 
transporting a prisoner on the back of the bike. 
 
Congolese Response to the Assessment Visit 
------------------------------------------ 
 
15.  Congolese response to the DIILS team's visit was 
overwhelmingly positive.  In almost every case, military 
justice officials gave frank and forthright self-evaluations 
of the system and their perceived needs.  Experts from 
outside the government were helpful and supportive as well. 
Civilian judicial officials provided thoughtful analyses of 
the greatest challenges for their military colleagues and 
proposals for areas in which international assistance would 
be most useful.  With the exception of the most senior 
magistrates in Kinshasa, nearly every Congolese interlocutor 
the team met was enthusiastic about their visit and potential 
partnership with the U.S. 
 
16.  Minister of Defense Chikez Diemu was particularly 
effusive.  In all three meetings he had with the team, he 
cited the presence of Col. Engel, who was locked down under 
fire with a DIILS team in the Foreign Ministry with no food 
and no water during the March 2007 violence as a clear signal 
that "the U.S. is with us in this effort."  The Minister made 
a point of including Congolese colleagues -- Col. Mutombo, 
his legal advisor and General Bivegeti, one of the Vice 
 
KINSHASA 00001232  004 OF 004 
 
 
Presidents of the High Military Court, among them -- who had 
shared the ordeal with Col. Engel and helped ensure that the 
DIILS team was safely extracted from the building. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
 
17.  The DRC has many tools in place to support military 
justice:  organic laws, international conventions, the 
framework of personnel and facilities.  However, the 
institutions of military justice are hollowed out and 
fragile, and will require massive levels of support to 
perform even basic functions.  In addition, until Parliament 
approves organic legislation in line with the new 
constitution to limit military jurisdiction to the army and 
police, current law will continue to subject certain 
civilians to military trial, an inconsistency which raises 
regular complaints by human rights activists.  In the DRC, 
where the "pipeline" is already filled with a plethora of 
cases under military jurisdiction and the vast majority of 
human rights violations are perpetrated by soldiers 
themselves, proper function of the military justice sector is 
vital to ensuring long-term peace and security -- regardless 
of jurisdictional changes in the future.  Septel will review 
the report's recommendations for assistance to this sector. 
End comment. 
BROCK