Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1554, SPLM TELLS S/E NATSIOS NCP IMMUNE TO PRESSURE, IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM1554.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1554 2007-10-06 13:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9418
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1554/01 2791307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061307Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8708
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001554 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SPLM TELLS S/E NATSIOS NCP IMMUNE TO PRESSURE, IN 
FIRM CONTROL 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01479 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1,. (SBU) Immune to pressure from the international 
community, the National Congress Party (NCP) remains in firm 
control of Sudan, is not interested in resolving the Darfur 
conflict prior to elections, and is stalling implementation 
of the CPA, five senior leaders of the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) told S/E Natsios in Khartoum. 
They said that the NCP is operating from a position of 
relative strength with no widespread violence outside Darfur 
and has launched an offensive against the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).  In the absence of a holistic, consistent, 
and coordinated international strategy for the transformation 
of Sudan, the SPLM will concentrate on building the party and 
military.  S/E Natsios noted recent international efforts to 
re-focus attention on the CPA and provide incentives for the 
NCP's cooperation.  While characterizing the NCP as unstable, 
CDA Fernandez said that any improvement in U.S.-Sudan 
relations could only be tied to concrete steps and that the 
U.S. maintained the ability to exert pressure on the regime. 
End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NCP "Immune" to Western Pressure 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In an October 3 meeting with S/E Natsios, Minister 
of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, Minister of Humanitarian 
Affairs Kosti Manibe, Minister of Transport, Roads, and 
Bridges Kuol Maniang Jak, SPLM Deputy Secretary General for 
the Northern Sector Yassir Arman, and Blue Nile State 
Governor Malik Agar said that the NCP is now immune to 
pressure from the international community.  The regime 
remains in firm control of Sudan, is not interested in 
resolving the Darfur conflict prior to elections in 2009, and 
is stalling implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).  "We have reached a point where we have to 
make some tough decisions," said Alor on the eve of an SPLM 
Politburo meeting in Juba scheduled to begin October 4.  He 
added that the SPLM needs to consider what pressure it could 
bring to bear on the regime.  Arman noted the lack of a 
"holistic, coordinated approach (by the international 
community) to bring an endgame to the transformation of 
Sudan." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
CPA Caused Crack but Regime Remains Strong 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Playing the "devil's advocate," Arman argued that 
the NCP was in a better position than before signing the CPA 
because of the absence of fighting in Southern Sudan, the 
Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan.  He said that 
it is important to "take the NCP as they are, without 
exaggerating their strengths or weaknesses."  While the CPA 
had made a crack in the essentially totalitarian nature of 
the regime, the NCP is benefiting from an internal situation 
where no alternative to its rule existed.  Oil is flowing 
northward, the NCP maintains "strategic pockets" in Southern 
Sudan, and Khartoum is "making a full offensive against the 
CPA," said Arman.  As examples of the NCP's bold action, he 
cited the break-down of the Assessment and Evaluation 
Commission (AEC), the slow pace of civil service integration, 
and the NCP's refusal to allow First Vice President Kiir to 
reshuffle the cabinet ministers in posts designated to the 
SPLM (reftel).  "These are not indications of weaknesses," 
said Arman.  "To me, these are indications of strength." 
 
--------------------------- 
Strategy to Break Sanctions 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Maniang said the NCP strategy to break free of 
sanctions had been to turn East to China, Malaysia and other 
Asian countries for economic access and then to show the West 
that it is missing important commercial opportunities in 
Sudan.  President Omar Al Bashir's recent trip to Rome, "the 
center of Christendom," was the opening salvo of this 
conscious strategy--an attempt to create a domino effect by 
luring Italian, and then more European, investment to Sudan. 
"If the Italians come, that will be a dismantling of the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001554  002 OF 003 
 
 
sanctions," said Maniang, who claimed that NCP officials had 
described this tactic to him when he was previously scheduled 
to accompany Bashir.  The SPLM had attempted to cooperate 
with the NCP in the last few months, explained Maniang, but 
the regime had exploited it.  Concurring with Alor, Maniang 
said that the SPLM Politburo would now discuss how the party 
could go on the "offensive." 
 
----------------------------------- 
International Pressure Inconsistent 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Inconsistent relations between the international 
community, including the U.S., and Khartoum exacerbated the 
problem, complained Agar.  "During the war in the South, the 
international community came up with carrots and sticks," he 
said.  "That stick never falls on any heads and then it turns 
into a carrot.  And then, when it's frustrated again, it goes 
back into a stick.  You never know what it really is." 
Khartoum was "not interested" in resolving the Darfur 
conflict or implementing the CPA because it knew the 
international community would "never tighten the bolt."  "We 
thought the bolt had tightened," said Agar, alluding to U.S. 
sanctions in May, "but now the international community 
already changed its tune." 
 
6. (SBU) Arman emphasized that the NCP was "not stupid" and 
closely followed international events, such as the war in 
Iraq, the looming conflict between the West and Iran, and the 
2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah as "part of the 
equation"--all of which they believed had seriously weakened 
the U.S.  If the NCP was panicking, it would strive for good 
relations with the SPLM and the U.S., but "I don't believe 
this is the situation," said Arman.  The SPLM's response 
would be to build the party and the military, regardless of 
the international community's actions.  He urged the U.S. to 
keep one eye on Darfur and one eye on the CPA because they 
were intrinsically linked.  "There will be no election 
without Darfur," said Arman. 
 
-------------------------- 
West Re-Focusing on CPA... 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) S/E Natsios explained that the international 
community is broadening its focus from Darfur to Southern 
Sudan, and, during a ministerial-level meeting in New York on 
September 21, "the Western democracies had set up a process 
to mobilize on the CPA."  He characterized the NCP as "losing 
control," saying that on his recent trip to Darfur he had 
seen that Khartoum's support among its core "constituents," 
such as the Northern Rizeigat, had eroded.  The Misseriya had 
begun to fight the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and nations 
such as China and Saudi Arabia were ambivalent and pressing 
Sudan to fulfill its international commitments.  As the NCP's 
position weakened, it had become a "bully," said S/E Natsios, 
remarking that weaker governments tended to become more 
aggressive.  He maintained that while the NCP did want to 
hold elections and "win," it was limiting implementation of 
the CPA "to make its election strategy easier." 
 
------------------------------------ 
...And Willing to Provide Incentives 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) The NCP sought an improved relationship with the 
U.S., said S/E Natsios, and after using pressure to achieve 
the USG's aims on Darfur, the U.S. was prepared to provide 
incentives for NCP cooperation on CPA implementation.  The 
U.S. remains skeptical about the NCP's intentions, and he 
admitted that such incentives could fall on deaf ears among 
the regime's hard-liners.  The NCP had "seriously" 
miscalculated in believing that outreach to Italy would 
change its international standing, noting that Italy had no 
influence on Sudan policy or sanctions.  CDA Fernandez said 
that while the U.S. had told the NCP that the possibility of 
improved relations existed, it was tied to concrete issues 
such as a resolution to the Abyei dispute and the rapid and 
full deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  He 
underscored that despite U.S. obligations in other parts of 
the world, the USG could take actions to chasten the Sudanese 
Government.  He encouraged the SPLM to forge greater party 
unity, political and military discipline and alliances with 
like-minded groups outside of Southern Sudan. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001554  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) The grim tone and defiance of these senior SPLM 
leaders underscores the mood of the movement's leadership in 
the run-up to the SPLM Politburo meeting in Juba.  They are 
deeply concerned that the CPA, the cornerstone of a 
transformed and better Sudan, has succumbed to the NCP's 
favorite political game: the triumph of form and "process" 
over substance and reality.  Dismissive of some very real 
progress in CPA implementation, the SPLM's fears about the 
future now outweigh their hopes about the CPA.  End comment. 
 
10. (U) S/E Natsios cleared this message. 
FERNANDEZ