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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1532, HAC: MORE DEVELOPMENT, LESS FOOD AID

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1532 2007-10-01 13:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3325
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1532/01 2741340
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011340Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8675
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO PHUM AU EAID UN US SU
SUBJECT:  HAC: MORE DEVELOPMENT, LESS FOOD AID 
 
REF: A: Khartoum 01469, B: 01472 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a lengthy September 26 meeting with CDA 
Fernandez, deputy head of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
Hassabo Abdelrahman praised the U.S. role in humanitarian relief 
operations in Sudan, but maintained that the focus should shift to 
early recovery and development. There was too much food aid, he 
claimed, which was flooding the local economy. On the issue of WFP's 
shipment of U.S. donated corn-soya blend (CSB) currently blocked at 
Port Sudan, Hassabo said that it should be tested by an 
international survey team for GMO content. While the past six months 
since the expiration of the GMO waiver policy have been a period of 
uncertainty for US and other donors' shipments of humanitarian 
cereals and other commodities, Sudan is allowing the import of the 
majority of food aid donated by the international community, despite 
its stated economic concerns.  CDA urged Hassabo to cooperate with 
the U.S. and the international community in a transparent manner on 
these and other issues, citing a lack of trust and dialogue at the 
heart of many of the bilateral concerns. End summary. 
 
-------------- 
TOO MUCH FOOD... 
-------------- 
 
2. (SBU) While recognizing U.S. humanitarian contributions to Sudan 
over the past twenty years, and noting that one quarter of all NGOs 
operating in Sudan were U.S.-based, Hassabo lamented that the huge 
quantities of grain and other food products being sent to Sudan - 
750,000 metric tons in 2006 according to him - were driving down 
prices of locally produced food.  (Note: WFP imported approximately 
490,000 MT of humanitarian food aid in 2006 and 306,000 MT to date 
in 2007. This year alone, WFP has utilized cash resources from 
donors to purchase nearly 110,000 MT of food produced in Sudan in 
the past year. End note.) There was simply too much food aid, he 
said, and the vast majority was going to Darfur at the expense of 
other regions of the country. (Note: It is true that 70 percent of 
WFP's emergency operation is in Darfur; however, nearly half the 
total beneficiaries of emergency food assistance are in Darfur, with 
ration levels at 100 percent for those IDPs living in camps.  In 
more stable regions of Sudan, food insecurity is less acute, 
therefore less need for food aid. End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) The massive quantities of sorghum and wheat were negatively 
affecting the traditional farming sector, he said, in places like 
Sennar and Gezira. While there were many truly needy among the 2.7 
million people in Darfur receiving humanitarian food assistance, the 
modalities of delivering food were flawed. More food should be 
bought in other parts of Sudan.  Hassabo advocated programs such as 
food for work, or food for agriculture rather than "free" food. 
(Note: Nearly 2 million beneficiaries of food aid are living in 
large, crowded IDP camps and settlements, where these types of 
activities would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement.  End 
note.) He also noted that Darfuris preferred millet and sesame oil 
to either sorghum or wheat (or lentils or vegetable oil), and that 
as a result large quantities of food aid were actually being sold in 
Kordofan (Note: WFP has routinely conducts market studies to look 
into this issue; while food aid is definitely monetized to some 
extent, in the majority of cases it is not above 'normal' levels 
where people sell or trade some food aid to buy other household 
items and pay for milling of the cereals.  End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) Hassabo also blamed excessive food aid in the IDP camps for 
limiting the number of people returning to their homes in Darfur. He 
suggested large numbers were returning to their lands of origin, 
such as the Zaghawa in North Darfur. Tribal reconciliation efforts 
were working, he said. There were more than 200,000 voluntary 
returnees in Jebel Marra, he claimed, but no humanitarian agencies 
there to assist them (only the Sudanese government); there were no 
tangible returns for peace, he said. Returnees complained, he 
alleged, that only IDPs get international assistance.  In a recent 
trip with the wali of North Darfur and several Arab ambassadors, he 
said, he himself had seen successful reconciliation efforts between 
Abala, Turjum, Berti and Zaghawa in villages near Kutum. 
 
--------------------------- 
...AND NOT ENOUGH DEVELOPMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) What Sudan needed were real international development 
efforts, Hassabo argued. The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) process 
in the south was not working well, and returnees were not seeing the 
results they'd expected to accompany the end of violence. 
Southerners were not moving back to stay when they saw the lack of 
basic services and resources.  He also faulted the World Bank for 
being too slow on the ground; the Bank had said it would take 32 
million USD and 18 months to demine the railway between Bab al Musa 
and Wau, so the Sudanese government took SAF and SPLA troops, mainly 
engineers, re-trained them and built more than 600 kilometers of 
track for less than 1 million USD. "We need quick impact projects," 
he said, or there would be no progress to show before next year's 
 
KHARTOUM 00001532  002 OF 003 
 
 
census and the 2009 elections. Hassabo also urged the resumption of 
the Darfur JAM. "Documentation doesn't equal implementation," he 
argued. The U.S. provided one billion USD in aid to Sudan yearly, he 
acknowledged, but "people still remember roads." He also requested 
technical support and training along the lines of DFID programs. 
 
6. (SBU) CDA agreed that there was real need to move from 
humanitarian work to early recovery and development, and briefed 
Hassabo on recent DJAM discussions (Ref. A). He also reminded 
Hassabo that the U.S. would be funding twenty-six percent of the 
costs of the hybrid force. Peace in Darfur had three components, he 
said: the hybrid, the political process and development. This past 
year, however, the international community had expended incredible 
efforts in getting acceptance from the Sudanese for the first 
component, delaying the second two. "There is no real difference 
between the Sudanese and U.S. agendas in Darfur," CDA said, if the 
Sudanese Government really believes in its public statements. 
 
-------------------------------- 
BLOCKED SHIPMENT OF WFP FOOD AID 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) CDA also urged greater dialogue between Sudan and the 
international community: "There is a political issue here, a lack of 
trust." Raising the issue of the 4,000 metric tons of WFP corn-soya 
blend (CSB) being blocked due to GMO concerns, CDA said he'd sent 
dip notes, letters, and demarched "everyone," including MFA Lam Akol 
(Ref. B). This could have a negative impact on the Sudanese, CDA 
warned, if the international community equated the blocking of 
life-saving nutritional supplements with a concerted effort on the 
part of the Sudanese government to deprive people in Darfur of food. 
This is even worse, if WFP has to cut rations in October, during 
Ramadan and before the peace talks. 
 
8. (SBU) In his lengthy rejoinder, Hassabo indicated that if an 
international survey group would produce a certificate saying the 
CSB was safe for consumption, there would be no problem. "We've only 
stopped 4,000 metric tons of food, which had no labels, and released 
more than 700,000 metric tons," he said, which demonstrated the 
Sudanese government's good intentions. European markets would never 
purchase Sudanese products if they contained GMO, Hassabo added. 
Hassabo also informed CDA that for any questions on humanitarian 
issues, including food aid, one should go directly to him for real 
answers not other government ministries. (Comment: USAID has been in 
direct dialogue with Hassabo on a multitude of food aid issues over 
the past several months, with few positive results thus far.  End 
comment.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
USAID'S EFFORTS TO CONTINUE FLOW 
OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  USAID/Sudan has an extensive history of working with HAC, and 
Hassabo in particular, in an effort to address GNU reported concerns 
related to food aid impact on the market and concerns over 
commodities containing GMO. Since January of this year, when the 
government stopped issuing its standard GMO-waivers without notice, 
USAID has been working with HAC and WFP principally, as well as with 
the Sudanese Standards and Metrology (SSMO) to come to agreement on 
the protocols for import of humanitarian food assistance.  With more 
than 70 percent of WFP food aid imports being distributed to nearly 
3 million displaced and conflict-affected in Darfur, and as the 
largest donor to WFP (70 percent of food aid received by WFP in 
Sudan is provided by USAID), the USG clearly has demonstrated its 
commitment to ensuring this assistance continues to reach those in 
critical need. USAID has met with Hassabo on a number of occasions 
regarding these general food aid issues as well as specifically on 
GMO, and continues to strive  toward a positive outcome.  A detailed 
account on these issues and efforts to date will be provided via 
septel. 
 
---------------------------- 
SMALL WINDOW FOR IMPROVEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Hassabo also drew a line between politically motivated 
activities and humanitarian ones. A "high-level" official from the 
Clinton years had told him that the U.S. had significant "interests" 
in Sudan - in its land, oil and status on the African continent. CDA 
agreed that humanitarian work was sensitive, but cautioned Hassabo 
that actions such as the expulsion of the CARE director carried a 
heavy political price. (Note: Hassabo also accused OTI contractor 
DAI of trying to "influence" the upcoming Sudanese elections. End 
note.) 
 
11. (SBU) The next six months provide an opportunity to improve 
U.S.-Sudan relations, CDA said, but the status quo would have to 
change. He pointed out a recent attempt by USAID to travel to 
Kassala, which had been denied. Hassabo explained that this was an 
 
KHARTOUM 00001532  003 OF 003 
 
 
example of poor coordination between various Sudanese agencies, 
resulting in misunderstandings. Let's solve these things, CDA said, 
and better to do it through dialogue than in the media. 
 
12. (SBU) Comment: Hassabo is obviously a very well-informed 
government official on a wide range of issues -more so than many 
other interlocutors (this is perhaps not surprising given his prior 
work as an intelligence officer in Darfur). Hassabo mentioned 
several times his desire to have a better relationship with USAID, 
which would be welcome. He also noted that DFID had provided 
training and technical support for the HAC, hinting that greater 
U.S. engagement with them would lead to greater cooperation.  While 
his claims of hundreds of thousands of voluntary returnees in Darfur 
is the usual government rhetoric, it is important to continue the 
dialogue with him on these critical issues while realizing that the 
Sudanese regime loves to wage low-level, grinding bureaucratic 
battles of this sort. 
 
13. (SBU) Comment continued: CDA and USAID Director Fleuret will 
pursue this in an upcoming meeting with Hassabo.  We are also 
sending a reclama in Arabic to him on the points he raised and S/E 
Natsios will raise the issue with senior Sudanese officials.  End 
comment.