Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07HOCHIMINHCITY1065, GVN SHUTS DOWN ANTI-FRAUD TRIP, INTIMIDATES CONSULATE STAFF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HOCHIMINHCITY1065.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HOCHIMINHCITY1065 2007-10-17 07:09 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO1459
PP RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #1065/01 2900709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170709Z OCT 07
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3239
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 2246
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 3452
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HO CHI MINH CITY 001065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP/MLS AND CA/FPP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CMGT ASEC PREL KFRD VM
SUBJECT: GVN SHUTS DOWN ANTI-FRAUD TRIP, INTIMIDATES CONSULATE STAFF 
 
REF: (A) Hanoi 239, (B) Hanoi 622, (C) Hanoi 997 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001065  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 4, Security officials in An Giang 
province threatened post's acting Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) 
and accompanying locally employed staff (LES) with arrest and 
placed them in harm's way by evicting them from their hotel late 
at night.  The security officials also attempted to force our 
staff to depart the province via dangerous roads after already 
having driven a full day.  These events capped a trip during 
which the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) team were actively 
harassed, surveilled, and otherwise prevented from carrying out 
their work by local Vietnamese foreign affairs and public 
security officials.  Despite post's efforts to comply with GVN 
notification requirements prior to provincial travel, local 
authorities in five of eight provinces visited blocked consulate 
personnel from completing their work.  Local officials also 
questioned and intimidated visa applicants visited by consular 
staff.  In response to official protests, Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi-based GVN officials acknowledged that our personnel should 
not have been removed from the hotel and apologized for that 
aspect of the incident.  While MFA officials probably did not 
intend for security officials to place Consulate personnel at 
risk, most of the interference the FPU team encountered appears 
to have been orchestrated by MFA officials determined to compel 
HCMC-based U.S. personnel to follow notification and approval 
requirements which we find unacceptable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
2. (SBU) Post's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) has a backlog of 
approximately 1,200 immigrant visa cases, out of which 125 have 
already been marked for site verification visits to confirm 
information provided by petitioners and beneficiaries in 
conjunction with beneficiaries' visa applications. 
Approximately thirty of those 125 cases have been pending at 
post since before 2006; 24 of those 30 were selected for site 
visits during the week of 1-5 October 2007.  During site visits, 
HCMC personnel attempt to undertake unannounced interviews of 
residents in the area to determine the bone fides of case.  In 
may past cases, these investigations have uncovered fraud that 
leads to cases being dismissed. 
 
------------------ 
NOTIFYING THE GVN 
------------------ 
3. (SBU) The Government of Vietnam requires that post notify the 
Ho Chi Minh City Office of External Relations (ERO-HCMC) five 
days prior to any official travel outside the HCMC city limits. 
Numerous GVN diplomatic notes (reftels) include a requirement 
that the GVN approve all travel prior to its being undertaken. 
Mission Vietnam has routinely ignored this requirement on the 
grounds that such approvals should not be required.  In 
addition, Mission Vietnam ignores occasional GVN requests to 
provide detailed information on all persons to be met on such 
trips on the principle that it is impossible to know this 
information in advance and giving out such information would 
destroy the effectiveness of the investigation process. 
 
4. (SBU) In the current instance, Post sent a dipnote to 
ERO-HCMC on 24 September 2007, providing the names of ConGen 
staff planning to participate in a routine consular trip 
scheduled to begin on 1 October 2007.  The note listed the names 
of staff participating in the trip as well as the names of eight 
provinces to be visited but did not provide a complete listing 
of the names and contact information for every IV petition 
beneficiary to be contacted during the trip.  On 27 September 
2007, ConGen faxed a copy of that dipnote to the EROs in each 
province to be visited.  That same day, ERO-HCMC informed ConGen 
that its notification was insufficient because it lacked a 
"detailed schedule" of the trip.  Post responded via diplomatic 
note on 28 September 2007 that ConGen staff would be conducting 
routine consular work and that no assistance would be required. 
(Note: The exchange mirrored the exchange that took place in 
connection with every FPU trip in recent years.)  Also on 28 
September, post faxed the province-by-province itinerary for the 
trip (but not the specific people and addresses to be visited) 
to HCMC-ERO. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
TIEN GIANG AND CAN THO: SURVEILLANCE BUT NO INTIMIDATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
5. (SBU) FPU team conducted two successful site visits in Tien 
Giang province.  ConGen staff noticed obvious plainclothes 
surveillance upon departure from the second location, but 
officials following the team did not attempt to communicate with 
ConGen staff or interfere with the site visits.  As the trip 
proceeded, however, problems from the authorities increased in 
frequency and intensity. 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001065  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
6. (SBU) Next, ConGen staff conducted one site visit in Can Tho 
City.  While the FPU Team did not perceive any attempt to 
monitor or interfere with their activities, they later learned 
that plainclothes officials had questioned staff and others in 
the hotel where they had stayed and interviewed one person. 
ConGen staff noticed between four and six plainclothes 
"motorbike drivers" (a common cover for Ministry of Public 
Security--MPS--minders) following them for the duration of their 
stay in the city. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
KIEN GIANG: INTERFERENCE BUT NO INTIMIDATION 
-------------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) The next stop was Kien Giang province, where two 
officials from ERO-Kien Giang and two uniformed immigration 
officials, accompanied by four uniformed police officers, 
stopped FPU team from completing a site visit. The officials 
informed the team that they did not have authority to visit visa 
applicants at their homes, and suggested that FPM interview the 
applicant at the Consulate General.  The Kien Giang officials 
were courteous and professional; they appeared sincerely 
troubled by their lack of authority to find a compromise 
solution that would allow ConGen to continue its activities in 
the province. 
 
--------------------------------- 
BEN TRE, VINH LONG AND SOC TRANG: 
INTIMIDATION AND INTERFERENCE 
--------------------------------- 
8. (SBU) After completing one site visit in Ben Tre province, 
FPU team was stopped outside the applicant's residence by two 
plainclothes officials and two uniformed policemen.  The four 
officials blocked all exits from the house and forced the FPU 
team back inside.  The two uniformed police officers stood 
outside the door while the two plainclothes officials spoke to 
the FPU team. 
 
9. (SBU) One plainclothes official questioned FPU Investigator 
and wrote down FPM's name and GVN ID number.  The official 
informed FPU team that Ben Tre province had not granted them 
permission to operate in the province.  FPM explained the 
notification procedures completed by ConGen HCMC before 
departure (para 3), but the official nonetheless filled out a 
report stating that the team had been caught operating without 
authority in Ben Tre province, and told FPM that they would not 
be allowed to leave until they signed it.  FPM declined to sign 
the report, and the official instructed the two uniformed police 
officers to block the exit and begin videotaping the exchange. 
The plainclothes official then forced the applicant (who had 
been instructed to sit silently throughout the confrontation) to 
sign the report.  The applicant complied. 
 
10. (SBU) In an attempt to diffuse the situation, FPM called 
ERO-HCMC Deputy Head of Consular Affairs Doan Tuan Linh.  Linh 
stated that the FPU team was operating without authority and 
that ERO-HCMC would not notify or grant approval for ConGen's 
activities until ConGen provided full name and address details 
for all persons to be visited.  Linh said that he would not 
assist FPU team in Ben Tre province because ConGen had refused 
to provide information necessary to obtain ERO-HCMC assistance. 
Linh stated that local officials had been advised by ERO HCMC 
that ConGen team would be visiting their provinces without 
proper authority. 
 
11. (SBU) In Vinh Long and Soc Trang provinces, officials 
stopped site visits in-progress.  Officials in both provinces 
remained civil but firm, maintaining that ConGen staff did not 
have authority to operate there.  ConGen staff noticed 
significant plainclothes surveillance in both provinces before 
and after the unsuccessful site visits.  In Soc Trang, 
plainclothes officials were accompanied by uniformed immigration 
authorities and police. 
 
12. (SBU) One visa applicant whose interview was interrupted by 
the unannounced visit by local authorities was so troubled by 
the incident that she delivered a letter of apology to post the 
following day.  In her letter, she wrote: "I apologize to you 
for the unexpected problem; please sympathize with me.  This 
happened beyond my control and I do not know why he did this. 
At that time, I was so confused and surprised that I could not 
even determine if the man was a policeman or not...I am 
contacting the local authorities in order to ask them to provide 
favorable conditions so the consular officer can deal with my 
case." 
 
--------------------------------- 
AN GIANG: HARASSMENT AND EVICTION 
--------------------------------- 
13. (SBU) The FPU Team successfully interviewed three applicants 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001065  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
in the lobby of their hotel in An Giang province.  Shortly 
thereafter, FPU Investigator received a call from an ERO-An 
Giang representative requesting an immediate meeting in the 
hotel lobby.  The ERO-An Giang official arrived in the company 
of two uniformed immigration officials, five uniformed police, 
and several plainclothes "observers."  The ERO official 
reiterated that ConGen staff were acting without authorization 
and that they must cease all work and depart the province.  FPM 
stated that while the ConGen felt it had complied with all of 
ERO-HCMC's requirements, FPU team would nevertheless cease all 
activities in the province at once.  The ERO official continued 
to push the FPU team for an "admission of guilt" and strongly 
intimated that they might be arrested and removed from the 
province.  FPM reiterated that ConGen staff would cease official 
activities, but asked to delay departure until the next morning, 
as ConGen driver had already worked a full shift and nightfall 
was imminent.  (Note: Post policy strongly discourages driving 
after dark in the provinces for safety reasons.)  The ERO 
official agreed that the FPU team could stay overnight and 
depart the following morning for HCMC. 
 
14. (SBU) Upon conclusion of this discussion, the ERO official 
excused himself.  The immigration officer attempted to leave the 
hotel with FPM's passport.  After the FPM confronted him, the 
officer returned the passport to the hotel reception and all of 
the uniformed officers departed.  Fearing that his passport 
would be tampered with or "misplaced," FPM requested that the 
hotel return his passport and instead provided his GVN-issued 
consular identification card.  FPM requested that the hotel 
reception make copies of all necessary documents and return the 
originals.  The hotel receptionist called the police for 
approval, which was apparently granted, and all original 
documents were returned to FPM. 
 
15.  (SBU) Following an informal and unofficial restaurant 
dinner which was closely watched by plainclothes motorbike 
drivers, FPU team returned to the hotel at about 10 PM and were 
notified that they were being evicted and were expected to leave 
the province before midnight.  When FPM asked the hotel 
receptionist why they were being asked to leave, the 
receptionist produced the hotel's registration book, which was 
annotated by the police saying that the team was not authorized 
to stay in the province.  When FPM questioned the receptionist 
further, she immediately made a phone call, resulting in the 
nearly immediate entrance into the lobby of three uniformed 
immigration police.  Between ten and twenty uniformed police, as 
well as several plainclothes motorbike drivers, congregated 
outside the front hotel entrance.  A male member of the hotel 
staff stated that the hotel had been requested to ask FPU team 
to leave immediately, and that failure to comply would "result 
in arrest."  Furthermore, he said, the FPU team had until 
midnight to leave An Giang province. 
 
16.  (SBU) FPU team departed the hotel lobby and loaded luggage 
in the ConGen vehicle.  FPM consulted RSO and CG, who advised 
that it was unsafe to attempt a return to HCMC at night and 
suggested finding a well-lit area and remaining in the vehicle 
overnight.  After driving several blocks, the FPU team realized 
that the only suitably lit area in town was the hotel parking 
lot they had just left.  Returning to the lot, the team remained 
in the vehicle as instructed.  Initially, approximately five 
uniformed police officers were in and around the hotel lobby. 
Approximately ten plainclothes motorbike drivers also remained 
in view of the vehicle.  The hotel's security guard and two 
unidentified plainclothes individuals stood on the front steps 
of the hotel and monitored the ConGen vehicle. 
 
17. (SBU) After approximately two hours, ERO-HCMC Consular 
Deputy  Linh called FPM, stating that the situation had been 
resolved, that there were no longer any police or plainclothes 
monitors threatening the ConGen vehicle, and that the FPU Team 
would be allowed to stay at the hotel.  When FPM questioned 
Linh's assertion that the vehicle was no longer being monitored, 
Linh said that FPM was just "nervous."  (Note: During this 
conversation, three plainclothes officials remained on the hotel 
steps and approximately ten plainclothes motorbike drivers stood 
on the corners near the ConGen vehicle.)  Linh then requested 
that FPU Investigator leave the vehicle and pass her cell phone 
to the motorbike drivers and plainclothes officials so that he 
could ask them to leave.  After consulting with RSO, and in 
light of the repeated threat of arrest both in the meeting with 
ERO earlier in the day and in the exchange with the hotel that 
evening, FPM decided that it would not be prudent to send an LES 
staff member to negotiate with these individuals. 
 
18. (SBU) Approximately fifteen minutes later, a second ERO-HCMC 
official called, asking for details about FPU team's interaction 
with the hotel and the uniformed and plainclothes officials. 
This official said that he was disappointed that provincial 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001065  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
authorities had provided him false information about their 
intentions to let FPU team resume normal freedom of movement. 
This official again asked FPM to send FPU Investigator to talk 
to the plainclothes officials and to attempt to re-register at 
the hotel reception.  On the advice of the Consul General, and 
on the basis of ERO-HCMC's assurances that the officials would 
not attempt to arrest ConGen personnel, FPM approached the hotel 
receptionist.  The receptionist stated that FPU team was still 
not welcome, and that the team had been strictly prohibited from 
staying in the province.  During this conversation, a 
plainclothes official approached the desk and told the 
receptionist that "the conversation was over."  FPM returned to 
the vehicle, but tried again to re-register at the hotel at 
approximately 2:20 AM.  The hotel receptionist continued to 
assert that he was under strict instructions not to allow FPU 
Team to stay at the hotel under any circumstances.  This 
conversation was again monitored by a plainclothes official, but 
the official did not intervene. 
 
19. (SBU) FPU team slept in the ConGen vehicle until 
approximately 4:15 AM and then departed for HCMC.  There was no 
apparent attempt to follow the vehicle out of the province; 
however, two different motorbike drivers were still across from 
the hotel when the vehicle left the parking area. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FOLLOW UP: NOTIFYING GVN OF OUR DISPLEASURE 
------------------------------------------- 
20. (SBU) FPU team returned to HCMC on the morning of 4 October. 
 The Consul General, Deputy Principal Officer and Consular 
Section Chief met with ERO-HCMC Deputy Director Quoc and 
Consular Deputy Linh the same day.  The Consul General strongly 
protested the inappropriate and threatening actions by ERO and 
MPS that had endangered ConGen staff.  He particularly condemned 
official attempts to force the employees to leave An Giang 
province late in the evening, which would have meant travel over 
unsafe provincial roads on the way back to HCMC.  Separately, 
Embassy Hanoi protested to MFA and MPS, including via official 
letter to the MFA. 
 
21. (SBU) During the meeting with CG, ERO Deputy Director Quoc 
professed to having been surprised by the incident in An Giang 
province.  He said there is never any excuse for harassment of 
any foreigner, let alone a diplomat, who is attempting to spend 
the night in a hotel.  That said, Quoc alleged that it was 
impossible to control local officials when the consulate had not 
provided complete information -- including the name, address and 
contact information for every person to be contacted -- to the 
provinces in question regarding planned trips and consular 
activities.  Both Quoc and Linh pointedly mentioned several 
times that the consulate continues to operate "outside its 
consular district" -- i.e., outside Ho Chi Minh City proper. 
According to Quoc, he himself must notify the MFA in Hanoi of 
his own exact plans whenever he goes to Hanoi; similarly, 
consulate staff must provide exact details of its own meetings 
whenever it travels outside the province.  CG countered that the 
issue of the parameters of the consular district are irrelevant 
to the issue of interference with and endangerment of our 
personnel.  MFA and MPS officials in Hanoi took a similar line, 
apologizing for the incident in An Giang, but underscoring the 
GVN view on the need for approvals and detailed information in 
advance of work "out of district." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
22. (SBU) While ERO officials appeared genuinely displeased with 
the actions of regional security officials (evicting the FPU 
team from their hotel and ordering their immediate departure), 
the response of the ERO-HCMC office also makes clear that 
provincial officials preventing the FPU team from carrying out 
their work were acting under general guidance from the ERO-HCMC 
office. 
 
23. (SBU) Since the consulate opened, we have operated under the 
tension of having consular and humanitarian resettlement trips 
periodically disrupted or prevented by confrontations with 
officials in the field.  At the same time, we have also been 
able to accomplish literally hundreds of investigations without 
incident, allowing us to control fraud and achieve our consular 
mission.  The concerns in this case, however, transcend those 
"doing business" issues.  We acknowledge that the GVN does 
arguably have some right under international law to limit or 
restrict our interactions with Vietnamese citizens, though very 
few countries in today's world actually exercise such rights 
(reftels).  The GVN does not, however, have the right to 
interfere with or endanger our personnel. 
 
---------- 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001065  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
24. (SBU) HCMC and Hanoi are currently coordinating next steps 
for pushing forward with necessary anti-fraud trips.  We will 
report the results as they develop. 
 
25. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. 
FAIRFAX