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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI753, FINLAND, SWEDEN AND NORWAY EXPLORE A "NORDIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI753 2007-10-04 13:00 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0753/01 2771300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041300Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3809
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0063
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0007
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0015
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV NATO AF SU CD FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND, SWEDEN AND NORWAY EXPLORE A "NORDIC 
APPROACH" TO AFGHANISTAN, CHAD AND THE NRF 
 
REF: HELSINKI 715 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOF has begun a series of 
discussions with Norway and Sweden aimed at developing 
a "Nordic approach" to security policy that could 
result in new NATO Response Force (NRF) commitments 
2008; in more Nordic-led OMLTs; and in a long-term 
commitment to staffing the Mazar-al-Shariff ISAF PRT 
under alternating Finnish-Swedish leadership.  In 
addition, GOF sources say the "Nordic approach" will 
make it easier to sell difficult operations like 
Afghanistan to increasingly skeptical public opinion. 
Downsides may include slower decision making, however, 
and numerous difficult details remain to be addressed 
regarding the Mazar PRT.  Meanwhile, the Finns are 
pessimistic about the proposed ESDP Mission to Chad, 
saying that an EU decision not to deploy a Battle Group 
will dramatically limit Nordic troop contributions and 
could jeopardize the whole mission.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Finland and Sweden have opened discussions 
aimed at developing a bilateral approach to the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) membership and a "Nordic approach" 
(along with Norway) to crisis management (CM) 
operations in Afghanistan and Africa.  As part of what 
will likely develop into a series of diplomatic and 
military conversations, MFA State Secretary Pertti 
Torstila traveled to Stockholm for discussions with his 
counterparts Sept. 23 and the Swedish and Finnish MODs 
met as part of an unofficial meeting of EU Defense 
Ministers in Portugal Sept. 28-29.  This cable is based 
on informal read-outs from MFA and MOD contacts on 
those meetings.  We understand discussion will expand 
to include Norway at an Oct. 9 meeting in Oslo. 
 
Nordic Cooperation 
------------------ 
3. (C) In an era when expensive and difficult 
operations like Afghanistan are increasingly a 
priority, the "Nordic approach" concept is emerging as 
the key to maximizing scarce CM resources, Finnish 
contacts say.  As important, they add, is the fact that 
a Nordic approach makes it easier for all three 
governments to sell the tough mission in Afghanistan 
(and politically sensitive endeavors like joining the 
NRF) to an increasingly skeptical public.  As one 
official put it, the EU Battle groups require the 
Nordics to cooperate tactically, but the Afghanistan 
operation and the closer relationship with NATO are 
issues that call for joint strategies on the political 
and public diplomacy levels. 
 
PRTs and OMLTs 
-------------- 
4. (C) The Finns are particularly hopeful that the 
Nordic approach will help them do more in Afghanistan - 
- a goal which is high on the GOF's agenda but has 
proven politically difficult to implement.  When PDAS 
Kurt Volker visited Finland in mid-September, senior 
MFA and MOD officials enthusiastically described plans 
to offer OMLTs in Afghanistan and to take leadership of 
the ISAF PRT at Mazar-al-Shariff in late 2008 (reftel). 
Since then, however, many questions -- both political 
and operational -- have arisen.  Torstila's meetings 
represented the "initial political effort" to negotiate 
a rotating Finnish-Swedish PRT leadership structure at 
Mazar-al-Sharif, MFA contacts reported.  However, they 
hastened to add, "much more negotiation needs to 
occur," especially regarding troop commitments.  Sweden 
currently has 365 troops in Mazar and leads the PRT, 
while the Finns supply about 90.  The Swedes told 
Torstila that sizeable impending budget cuts will 
likely result in force reductions at Mazar, but they 
hoped that the Finnish troop increases that would have 
to accompany a PRT leadership role could offset Swedish 
decreases.  However, the GOF is currently considering 
an additional 50 to 60 troops -- a figure Finnish 
officials readily admit would fall far short of what is 
necessary to lead the PRT effectively, especially if 
the Swedes draw down.  The 50-60 figure is not set in 
stone and could well increase, MFA contacts said, and 
the Swedes did not in any way reject the Finnish idea 
of rotating PRT leadership.  However, there is 
currently a disconnect and more discussions still 
obviously need to occur. 
 
5. (SBU) As for OMLTs, the Nordic approach offers good 
 
possibilities.  Finnish Political Director Pilvi-Sisko 
Vierros Villeneuve had suggested to PDAS Volker that 
the Finns would offer their own stand-alone OMLT 
(reftel).  However, it appears that the Finnish MOD and 
MFA now believe that an increase in the number of 
"Nordic OMLTs" can be even greater if the GOF pools 
resources with regional partners.  Norway and Sweden 
already operate two OMLTs jointly and, with added 
Finnish contributions, that number could be increased. 
MFA sources say Norway has formally "invited" Finland 
to join OMLT operations as they expand.  Our Finnish 
briefers were unclear at this point as to how many 
Nordic OMLTs are ultimately planned.  However, they 
were enthusiastic about the possibility of an increase 
beyond three under shared Nordic leadership. 
 
NRF: A Tougher Sell than Expected 
--------------------------------- 
6. (C) The Finns are also hopeful that the Nordic 
security approach will help them sell the concept of 
NRF participation.  Before the previous center-right 
government left office, Finland's joining the NRF 
seemed almost a done deal.  The then-Foreign Minister 
(a notorious NATO skeptic) had publicly accepted the 
idea, and President Halonen also seemed to be on board. 
Now, however, the new center-right has encountered 
surprisingly staunch opposition to NRF participation as 
much from within the coalition as from the opposition. 
Some Finnish politicians have begun hiding behind the 
allegation that the NATO Allies are so unclear about 
the future structure of the NRF that they do not want 
Partner countries expressing interest at this point. 
(COMMENT: The Embassy has worked hard to dispel this 
canard, emphasizing that although the Allies are 
carefully considering changes to the NRF's structure 
and deployment guidelines, expressions of interest from 
Partners are indeed welcome.  END COMMENT.) 
 
7. (C) MFA and MOD contacts -- who fully support NRF 
participation -- are very hopeful that as the "Nordic 
approach" develops, it will serve as a useful tool to 
undermine rumors and increase political and public 
support for the NRF.  The key for us is to move forward 
with our Nordic partners to make this happen, one MFA 
office director said.  Neither country can be held 
hostage to the other's progress toward full NRF 
participation, but both Stockholm and Helsinki are 
hopeful of making a firm commitment either at the April 
Bucharest NATO Summit or, at the very latest, in time 
for the November 2008 NATO Force Generation Conference. 
 
The Chad Mission May Stumble 
---------------------------- 
8. (C) Separately, the Finns have expressed 
disappointment that the Nordic EU Battle Group (EUBG) 
that will stand up Jan. 1 will not be deployed as part 
of a proposed ESDP mission to Chad.  The GOF favored 
deployment, but consensus in the EU was that the tasks 
and timetable in Chad did not fit EUBG parameters, MFA 
contacts reported.  Deployment of the BG would have 
permitted 1000 Swedish forces and some 240 Finns to 
participate.  The EU will now seek to staff the Chad 
mission via "the usual force generation" mechanisms; 
however, our disappointed contacts said, budget 
constraints will likely limit the Swedish contribution 
to no more than 200, and the Finnish to about 12 
police/civilian crisis managers. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
9. (C) The GOF is encountering domestic uneasiness 
regarding its ambitious plans to do more in Afghanistan 
and to join the NRF.  As this slow, consensus-building 
process plays out, we will continue to encourage 
creative ideas like the "Nordic approach" which do 
appear to hold promise, both as a way of maximizing 
Nordic resources and winning over the naysayers.  End 
Comment. 
WARE