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Viewing cable 07CAIRO3097, ANTI-COMPETITIVE FINDING TESTS EGYPT'S REGULATORY REGIME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07CAIRO3097 2007-10-22 07:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #3097/01 2950758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220758Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7261
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0351
UNCLAS CAIRO 003097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA 
USAID FOR ANE/MEA MCCLOUD AND RILEY 
TREASURY FOR MATHIASON AND HIRSON 
COMMERCE FOR 4520/ITA/ANESA/OBERG 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EG
SUBJECT:  ANTI-COMPETITIVE FINDING TESTS EGYPT'S REGULATORY REGIME 
 
REF:  CAIRO 673 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) recently 
released a report alleging anti-competitive collusion among 12 
Egyptian cement producers.  The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MOTI) referred the companies to the Public Prosecutor for 
prosecution under Egypt's competition law.  If found guilty, the 
companies could face fines of up to LE 10 million ($1.8 million). 
The companies have rejected ECA's findings, and claim that the court 
case will harm investment in Egypt.  Analysts believe the fines will 
not be sufficient to dissuade anti-competitive behaviour in the 
cement sector.  Investigation of the cement and steel sectors began 
in July 2006 and findings for the steel sector are expected in 
December.  The cement case could serve as an indicator of the 
Egyptian judicial system's capacity to handle complex commercial 
cases.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) In early October the ECA announced the results of an 
investigation into anti-competitive practices in the cement sector. 
The ECA found that 12 Egyptian cement companies, 11 of which are 
privately-owned, colluded to manipulate prices and restrict market 
distribution.  After announcement of ECA's findings, the MOTI 
referred the companies to the Public Prosecutor for prosecution 
under Egypt's competition law.  If the companies are found in 
violation of the law, they face penalties ranging from LE 30,000 
($5,000) to 10 million ($1.8 million).  The court has not indicated 
when it expects to rule, but contacts at ECA said the Public 
Prosecutor has already discussed the findings of the investigation 
with ECA Head Mona Yassin, and will soon question cement company 
representatives directly. 
 
3.  (U) Cement prices fell from LE 380($69)/ton to LE 365 ($65)/ton 
on news of ECA's findings.  Shares of some cement companies also 
fell:  Cement Helwan shares dropped 1.7% to LE 40.6 ($7), Ameriya 
Cement fell 1.6% to LE 30.9 ($5.60) and Cement Beni Suef plunged 
2.3% to LE 143.4 ($25).  Speaking to the press, representatives of 
the cement companies rejected ECA's findings, claiming it is 
impossible to divide market share and manipulate prices as alleged 
in the ECA report.  An official of National Cement Company (NCC), 
Egypt's only majority public-owned cement producer and one of those 
cited in the ECA report, told the press that NCC never colluded with 
competitors on pricing.  Company representatives predicted the court 
would rule in their favour, and claimed that the case harms Egypt's 
investment prospects, especially potential foreign investment.  MOTI 
officials countered that enforcement of fair competition will 
encourage foreign investment. 
 
4.  (U) Local analysts have questioned the case's potential to curb 
anti-competitive practices in the cement sector, noting that the 
maximum fine under the competition law is equivalent to one day's 
profit for some cement companies.  Speaking on a local TV news show, 
Ahmed Ezz, Deputy Chief of the Cement Exporters' Council and a 
prominent NDP member, called the competition law "weak."  Ezz said 
he hoped, however, that a court ruling against the companies would 
bring down domestic cement prices.  (Comment:  Ezz must walk a fine 
line in this case.  As Deputy Chief of the Cement Exporters' 
Council, he is concerned with the industry's interests, but as a 
member of the People's Assembly and NDP Economic Policy Committee, 
he has to take a public stance in favor of free and fair 
competition).  Taher Helmy, former president of AmCham Egypt, told 
reporters the case highlights Egypt's upholding of free market 
principles.  Omar Mehanna, current president of Amcham Egypt and 
part owner of Suez Cement, one of the companies cited by ECA, said 
he hoped the case would finally put to rest claims of 
anti-competitive behavior in the cement sector. 
 
5.  (U) Minister of Trade Rachid initiated the ECA investigation of 
Egypt's cement and steel companies in July 2006, when prices of both 
commodities began rising as the region's construction boom 
intensified.  Cement retailers and dealers accused cement companies 
of pushing up prices by lowering supplies.  In February 2007, MOTI 
asked cement producers to observe voluntary price caps, and imposed 
export fees on cement and steel, citing shortages in the domestic 
market as producers sold overseas for higher prices while benefiting 
from subsidized energy at home (reftel).  The initial export fees 
proved ineffective in controlling prices, and the LE 65/ton fee on 
cement exports was increased to LE 85/ton in August.  ECA's 
investigation of the steel companies is ongoing, and results are 
expected in December. 
 
6.  (U) According to ECA officials, the investigation analyzed 
Egypt's cement market from 2002 - 2006, using data from a variety of 
sources, including cement producers themselves.  ECA surveyed the 
market and interviewed distributors, traders, and contractors in 15 
Egyptian governorates.  The data was analyzed in cooperation with 
international experts from competition authorities of various 
countries.  The investigation found evidence of a cartel involving 
agreements between cement companies on pricing, in violation to 
Article (6)(a) of the competition law, as well as agreements to 
restrict market supply, in violation to Article (6)(d) of the law. 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment:  The outcome of this case will provide several 
measures of the effectiveness of Egypt's economic reform program. 
Although it is a relatively discrete case involving one sector of 
the economy, it could serve as an indicator of the judicial system's 
overall capacity to handle commercial cases.  Improvement of 
commercial and contract law enforcement is consistently cited by the 
private sector as one of the major drawing points for increased 
investment.  The case will also measure the effectiveness of U.S. 
assistance to Egypt's reform program, as USAID has provided 
significant support to ECA in building technical capacity and to the 
judicial system in handling commercial cases.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the case will demonstrate the GOE's commitment to 
transparent regulation and law enforcement, even when the 
enforcement threatens the interests of prominent political figures. 
RICCIARDONE