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Viewing cable 07BASRAH95, PROMOTING GRASS ROOTS EFFORTS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BASRAH95 2007-10-13 13:03 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REO Basrah
VZCZCXRO8841
RR RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0095 2861303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131303Z OCT 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0615
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0198
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0649
UNCLAS BASRAH 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT STATE FOR DRL, S/P, S/I, AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER EAID KWMN IZ
SUBJECT: PROMOTING GRASS ROOTS EFFORTS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE 
 
REF: (A) BASRAH 88 (B) BASRAH 41 (C) BASRAH 16 
 
1. (SBU) Over the past two months, militia attacks against 
Coalition personnel in Basrah have significantly subsided, but 
the absence of anti-Coalition violence has not resulted in 
tranquility for the citizens of Basrah.  Shi'a militias and 
criminal gangs continue to terrorize Basrawis through a campaign 
of murder, intimidation, kidnappings, rape, and torture, in a 
struggle for power in Iraq's most prosperous province.  Various 
accounts indicate the weekly murder rate could be as high as 40 
to 50.  Assassinations of or attacks against public officials, 
prominent clerics, and women, who choose not to espouse strict 
Muslim traditions, are commonplace.  (See Ref. A.)  In what was 
once considered Iraq's open city, people are now afraid to 
venture out at night. 
 
2. (SBU) British soldiers no longer patrol the streets of 
Basrah, and the impending drawdown of UK forces tempers 
expectations for future counter-militia operations.  Iraqi 
Security Forces, under new and capable leadership, have made 
some strides but reforming a police force that is rampant with 
militia members is an arduous task, further compounded by 
Iranian intervention.  Within the last month, there have been 
five attempts on the life of the police chief; several of his 
senior officers have not fared so well. 
 
3. (SBU) Militias and political parties are now referred to as 
one and the same, a reflection of the transformation of 
political interaction.  In the scramble for power, increasing 
the ranks is imperative, and nothing offers more promise to 
disenfranchised young males than the opportunity to earn money 
and wield power.  Even for the educated, there are few 
opportunities outside of the party/militia system, and those who 
choose to remain independent are left vulnerable. 
 
4. (SBU) As we contemplate the way forward, we must not resign 
ourselves to a Basrah driven by force, fear, cronyism, and 
foreign subversion.  This is antithetical to our vision for 
Iraq, and abandons in vain those who have relied on our promise 
for a better future.  How to address this problem remains our 
major challenge.  A direct confrontation with the militias is 
now a task for the ISF, and one which they are not yet fully 
prepared to undertake.  Job-creation is also an important 
component to the solution, and we should continue to encourage 
the utilization of Iraqi revenues and the attraction of foreign 
direct investment.  We also must be careful to prevent any new 
investments from being co-opted by the militias. 
 
5. (SBU) Perhaps, the simplest solution lies with the people of 
Basrah themselves.  By most accounts, the vast majority of 
Basrawis oppose the militias and detest Iranian meddling but 
fear for their lives.  There are however indications that people 
are willing to take a stand against violence.  In May, thousands 
took to the streets in Basrah to protest against the militias. 
(Ref. B)  During a February conference, women leaders discussed 
their counter-violence efforts (ref. C), and tribal leaders are 
looking for ways to address the growing influence of militias. 
We should harness this enmity for the malign actors and the 
desire for a better Basrah by mobilizing the tribal and civic 
leaders to stop the violence and take back their communities. 
 
6 (SBU) One tried and tested method for tackling community 
violence is CeaseFire.  (www.ceasefirechicago.org)  Created in 
Chicago by Gary Slutkin, M.D., the CeaseFire premise is that 
violence is an epidemic perpetrated by a small group of actors. 
It unites community leaders and mobilizes their forces in 
concert to stem the spread of the epidemic and force the bad 
elements from their communities.  It has been successful in 
Chicago and is being implemented in several other U.S. cities. 
The Office of Policy and Planning (S/P) has been consulting with 
Dr. Slutkin on developing a CeaseFire program for Iraq. 
 
7. (SBU) The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) 
may soon be awarding grants to organizations to promote 
democracy and good governance in Iraq.  The American Islamic 
Congress, (AIC), which has an office in Basrah, intends to 
submit a project proposal for Basrah based on the Ceasefire 
model.  REO Basrah would endorse such a proposal and could 
provide additional support.  We could link community leaders to 
security officials who are committed to taking on the militias, 
and provide them with quick response funds (QRF) for community 
parks and centers.  The people in Basrah have no wish to live in 
fear of the excessive violence that has overtaken their 
province.  While they are best placed to reclaim their 
communities, we should assist them in doing so. 
 
BONO