Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07USNATO479, BUILDING SUPPORT FOR A NAC VISIT TO GEORGIA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07USNATO479.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USNATO479 2007-09-05 16:50 2011-06-12 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4026861.ece
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0479/01 2481650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051650Z SEP 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1150
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 5503
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000479
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GG
SUBJECT: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR A NAC VISIT TO GEORGIA
Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reason
1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (U) This cable contains an action request.
Please see paragraphs 2 and 7.

2. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: At a September 4
informal discussion among NATO Perm Reps, there was
significant movement towards consensus in favor of the
proposed October 3-4 visit of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) to Tbilisi. However, several Allies -- Germany,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Belgium -- remained opposed and
several more -- France, Spain, and the Netherlands -- were
non-committal. Perm Reps agree to revisit the issue on
Tuesday, September 11 for a final decision on whether the NAC
would make the trip to Georgia or the Secretary-General (SYG)
would travel alone. In light of the importance of a positive
decision both to the integrity of NATOs Intensified Dialogue
process and to Georgias ambitions to move to NATO Membership
Action Plan, post requests the Department instruct Embassies
Berlin, Athens, Madrid, Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris and The
Hague to demarche host governments on U.S. support for a NAC
visit to Tbilisi, in order to recognize NATO appreciation for
the government of Georgias progress on reforms, which are
integral to Georgias Intensified Dialogue with NATO. END
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

3. (C) At the weekly informal NATO Perm Reps coffee on
September 4, SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer strongly urged the NAC
to join him on the proposed October 3-4 visit to Tbilisi.
The SYG said a visit by the NAC would be an opportunity to
support Georgias undeniable progress in reforms, to express
NATO appreciation for the government of Georgias restraint
in the face of Russian provocations, and to send Georgia the
right messages directly on the need for continued progress
and restraint.

4. (C) Germany led opposition to a NAC visit. German
Charge Wunderlich said Berlin is firmly opposed to the visit
because the timing, implying that recent tensions between
Georgia and Russia over the August 6 missile incident and
between Russia and the West over Kosovo made the visit
inopportune. Greek Political Counselor Georges was more
explicit and said the NAC should not make the visit because
of the likely Russian reaction: It would be best if the NATO
Secretary General traveled alone to Tbilisi because some
Allies do not want to anger Russia. French Ambassador Duque
said Paris was not opposed to the visit in principle because
it was a natural part of NATOs Intensive Dialogue with
Georgia, but urged the PermReps to return to the issue on
September 11 for a final decision.

5. (C) Spain argued a trip should not take place until
after the OSCE releases a formal report on the August 6
missile incident. Dutch Perm Rep Schaper said the Dutch were
cautious, but would not block consensus

6. (C) Ambassador Nuland noted that there would be no
better time for the NAC visit than the proposed dates in
October given upcoming Russian Duma and Presidential
elections. She also said the visit was a natural part of
Georgias Intensified Dialogue with NATO. Allies supporting
a NAC visit included Canada, whose Perm Rep Mcrae strongly
supported the NAC visit and remarked in response to Spanish
arguments that it would be unwise for NATO to put off a
decision because of the possible actions of another
International Organization. Denmark and the UK also strongly
supported the visit, noting that the NAC had already visited
Russia on June 25-26 and had earlier visited Ukraine, the
other country in NATOs Intensified Dialogue. Norway,
Turkey, and Portugal said they would agree to the visit as
long as it was in no way explicitly linked to a possible
decision to invite Georgia into NATOs Membership Action
Plan.

7. (C) Action Request: USNATO requests that the Department
instruct relevant embassies to relay USG views on the
advisability of a NAC trip to Georgia.

8. (U) We have used the following arguments and offer them
as suggestions:
-- NATO Allies have engaged Georgias Government in an
Intensive Dialogue that began two years ago. Most Allies,
including the US, have acknowledged Georgias strong
progress. A NAC visit to Georgia is an opportunity for the
NAC to support Georgias progress and to ask for more reform.
-- NATO has a relationship with Georgia through its
Intensified Dialogue and a visit by the NAC is a natural part
of this relationship. The NAC has already visited Russia
this year and has previously visited Ukraine, the other
country in Intensified Dialogue.
-- The Government of Georgia has shown restraint, maturity,
and concern for regional stability in its measured response
to several provocations and violations of Georgias airspace
and territorial sovereignty. A NAC visit would encourage
Georgia to continue to show restraint and to consult closely
with the Allies.
-- (as appropriate) We need to be careful not to signal to
Russia that it has a veto on issues such as NAC travel.

NULAND