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Viewing cable 07RABAT1523, SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION - COMMENTARY ON CHOICE OF PRIME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07RABAT1523 2007-09-25 09:38 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO6829
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHRB #1523/01 2680938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250938Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7481
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4540
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9407
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2188
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0510
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0686
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3536
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3401
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4785
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3577
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0116
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001523 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/MAG, IIP/G/NEA/SA 
LONDON FOR MOC 
DUBAI FOR PELLETIER 
 
E.0.12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO SCUL OIIP KIRC PHUM KMPI MO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION - COMMENTARY ON CHOICE OF PRIME 
MINISTER 
 
 
1.  (U) The Moroccan print press has commented extensively on King 
Mohamed VI's September 19 decision to appoint Istiqlal Party 
Secretary General Abbas El Fassi as the new prime minister.  Most of 
 
SIPDIS 
the press, including the partisan, pro-Palace, and more conservative 
independent press, offered strong support for the "democratic logic" 
of choosing the head of the party that won the largest bloc of seats 
in parliament.  Many newspapers offered this support while noting 
that El Fassi has never completely overcome the taint of involvement 
in a scandal (the Annajat affair) dating back to an earlier tenure 
as employment minister.  Several newspapers opined that the King's 
decision contributed to moving Morocco towards a true constitutional 
monarchy, in which the King's decision to appoint the head of the 
leading party as prime minister would become purely mechanical. 
Many newspapers made no effort to hide the impression that many 
Moroccans had hoped for a prime minister from among the Istiqlal 
young guard. 
 
2.  (U) A minority of fiercely independent newspapers, known for 
their opposition to the government, have strongly criticized the 
decision, in spite of its "democratic logic."  Al-Massae, the 
largest circulation daily newspaper in Morocco with a growing 
reputation for populism, harshly attacked El Fassi for his refusal 
to acknowledge responsibility in the Annajat affair.  Independent 
French-language weeklies "Tel Quel" and "Le Journal" focused more on 
El Fassi's thin record of achievement and weak past performance 
(despite a long career of public service), his status as a 
consummate representative of the "old guard," and his unpopularity. 
Both weeklies also criticized what they perceive to be his excessive 
deference to the King, citing past statements that he has no 
intention to pursue policies independent from those of the king. 
These weeklies worry that - at precisely the time that Morocco's 
ministers and parliament should be exerting greater independence in 
the interest of promoting democracy - El Fassi will make no effort 
to pursue an agenda independent from that of the palace.  They view 
this as undermining long-term prospects for democracy in Morocco. 
 
3.  (U) Selected Block Quotes: 
 
A. "The King's Wager," editorial by director Ahmed Benchemsi in 
independent French-language weekly "Tel Quel" on 9/22-28: 
 
The choice of the Secretary General of Istiqlal is not illegitimate, 
because he is the chief of the party that arrived at the head of the 
legislative elections.  In theory, his journey has been more than 
honorable: lawyer by profession, four times a minister, twice 
ambassador . . . for those that do not know him, Mr. El Fassi seems 
to be an acceptable head of government.  But those that know him 
found it necessary, this Wednesday of Ramadan, to break the fast 
with a tablet of aspirin.  There is first of all the Annajat 
debacle, which will continue to dog him all his life, Prime Minister 
or not.  . . . Today he still refuses to admit responsibility in a 
scandal that created tens of thousands of victims.  Pressed to 
explain this, as well as multiple internal tensions the party was 
facing, he, during a national council in 2002 . . . broke down in 
sobs in front of 800 people!  In order to compose himself, several 
senior party members had to hug him and console him!!  [As a result 
of this] he was judged incapable of directing a serious ministry by 
Jettou, who offered him, in 2002, the post of "Minister of State 
without Portfolio."  An exclusively protocolary function that 
satisfied him for five years, without coming out with a single good 
idea worth reporting. 
 
. . . The political vision of Abbas El Fassi has always been 
summarized by this sole credo: "I support His Majesty the King, 
whatever he decides."  . . . Given the nature of the Moroccan 
regime, the prime minister must first and foremost work hand in hand 
with the monarchy.  But to deprive oneself of any margin of error, 
to renounce straight off the least autonomy of decision[-making], to 
abandon any hope of moving, even vaguely, towards a democratic 
re-alignment of powers. . . yes, the logic that led Abbas El Fassi 
to the prime ministry is a victory for democracy.  But it is at the 
same time its worst defeat.  The Moroccan political system has just 
engendered its ultimate paradox.  . . .as for the sensitive files 
(Sahara, security, Islamism, civil liberties . . . ), who will 
manage them with [former Interior Minister Deputy Fouad Ali] El 
Himma gone?  The Prime Minister?  This Prime Minister?  This is a 
bad joke, which does not make us feel like laughing.  [For Mohamed 
VI,] this was a very big, very risky bet that he was not obliged to 
 
RABAT 00001523  002 OF 003 
 
 
make.  But he is the king, he is sovereign, and he has made his 
choice.  It remains for the rest of us to cross our fingers, in 
trying to calm our anxieties . . . 
 
B. "First Pawn of His Majesty," commentary by Karim Bouhkari and 
Driss Benanni in "Tel Quel" on 9/22-28: 
 
The nomination of Abbas is not a scandal because it follows 
democratic logic.  . . . if for the independent press, as for a part 
of the political class (who will surely not dare to say so), this 
nomination is an enormous disappointment, it is first and foremost 
because Abbas does not represent the values of progress, of work and 
of modernity.  He who was installed on the throne of Istiqlal, for 
nearly ten years, has always been the prototype of the "submissive," 
incapable of moving a little finger without the green light of [the 
King].  What's worse, his submissiveness appears to be the key to 
his ascension, and nothing in his journey proves otherwise.  To sell 
to Moroccans this [equation] (submission=success) is a very bad 
advertisement for a country that aspires to more. 
 
C. "Despairing," editorial by Ali Ammar, director of independent 
French-language weekly "Le Journal" on 9/22-28: 
 
Everyone is in agreement in saying, with sometimes a bit of 
cynicism, that this is the democratic logic.  Now, when a rupture 
was necessary, the abstentionism being the most important message, 
the king decided to leave well enough alone to the point of 
nominating a man of the past, without recognized competencies.  He 
chose the least unifying, the least charismatic, the least popular, 
as a result notably of the debacle that dogs him, the Annajat 
scandal remaining in all our memories.  . . .[He is] the archetype 
of the politician that the silent masses dread so much, as a result 
of which they turned away from the ballot boxes.  Is this therefore 
democracy?  All this only to arrive here?  . . . The image projected 
by Abbas El Fassi is unanimously perceived as contradictory with 
that of an empathetic monarchy.  It is one of a dogmatic past, of 
gamy [i.e. corrupt] institutions, perfected by a despotic regime, 
certainly not by a Morocco in transition.  How will this improbable 
team be able to lead us towards the modernity that we need so 
desperately? 
 
D. "Right to the end," editorial in business-oriented 
French-language weekly "La Vie Economique" on 9/21-27: 
 
For the first time in the history of modern Morocco, democratic 
logic will have prevailed right to the end. A method of voting 
chosen by the parties themselves, an electoral apportionment 
validated by the majority, elections . . . in whose unfolding the 
State remained neutral, and a Prime Minister nominated from the 
party ranked at the top, according to the will of the people, or at 
least the voters. Those who skipped the vote can only take it out on 
themselves. . . . There remains THE question that everyone is 
posing: has this democratic logic that everyone wished for served 
and strengthened the interests of the nation? As backers of the 
press, we will defend [our right] to judge the qualities of Mr. El 
Fassi as Prime Minister. We will note down that the number of people 
[who were] disappointed at the announcement was not negligible, 
which tends to support the hypothesis that if Istiqlal won so many 
seats, it was principally thanks to the image conveyed by its young 
ministers. We voted for Istiqlal thinking about Hejira, Ghellab, 
Douiri and Baddou, while Abbas El Fassi was only elected with a very 
slight margin over his competitor. But we forgot that - democratic 
practices require it - it is the head of the victorious party that 
inherits the highest ministerial post. Do we want democracy? There 
it is, in its most successfully completed expression. It is for the 
people to take responsibility for their choice and for Mr. El Fassi 
to prove that he is worthy of the confidence placed in him. 
 
E. "Democratic normality," commentary by Omar Dahbi in independent 
French-language daily "Aujourd'hui le Maroc" on 9/21: 
 
If it was predictable that the PM would be nominated from within the 
party that obtained the largest number of seats in Parliament, the 
fact of choosing the head of the party was not as obvious. With this 
choice, HM the King has not only established democratic normality, 
but also has installed, with the nomination of Abbas El Fassi, a new 
practice in the young Moroccan democracy. To nominate the head of 
the party that arrived on top in the elections and to charge him 
 
RABAT 00001523  003 OF 003 
 
 
with forming a coalition government means that the choice of the 
voter was totally respected. Voting for a party will mean, from now 
on, making one's choice about the party and the person that will 
direct the future government. And, if Article 24 of the Constitution 
makes the choice of PM a prerogative of sovereignty, HM the King has 
just installed a new tradition that will certainly take root among 
Morocco's political customs. 
 
F. "Little good morning," front page commentary by Khalil Hachimi 
Idrissi, director of "Aujourd'hui le Maroc" on 9/21: 
 
. . . The process leading to this nomination [of the Prime Minister] 
has become strictly technical. His Majesty the King has given to 
Moroccan political parties the means to construct by themselves, 
seriously, their future and the future of the country. In this 
experimental situation, it is up to Abbas El Fassi and to Istiqlal 
to inaugurate this new formula. For them, certainly, another 
historic rendezvous with the country. Good luck. 
 
G.  "Prime Minister," front page editorial by Abdelmouneim Dilami, 
director of independent business-oriented daily "L'Economiste" on 
9/21: 
 
Abbas El Fassi as Prime Minister: the choice at the polls has been 
strictly respected.  . . . The big winner in this whole affair is 
Morocco itself and its citizens, the voters and the non-voters. 
Democracy has functioned freely, without a quake. Quite the 
contrary. Democracy confirmed the strategic choices already made. 
 
Riley