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Viewing cable 07NDJAMENA755, SUDAN REBEL ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING IN CHAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NDJAMENA755 2007-09-27 15:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO9997
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0755/01 2701553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271553Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5744
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0387
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN REBEL ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING IN CHAD 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1461 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  The UN/AU organized September 19-20 
meeting in N'Djamena was billed as an opportunity to organize 
Sudan rebel movement delegations and positions before the 
October 27, 2007 negotiation in Tripoli, but from most 
accounts it was inconclusive on all fronts and lacked the 
presence of senior rebel leadership.  Another attempt may be 
tried in early October, possibly in N'Djamena.  JEM 
negotiator Lissan, in N'Djamena for the meeting, informed CDA 
that Chadian rebels at the Sudan border intended another try 
at unseating President Deby, however, he felt that the GOC 
was one step ahead of them.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Charge d'Affaires met with Boubou Niang, Deputy 
Head of the African Union (AU) Darfur Peace Agreement 
Implementation Team (DPIAT) and Vladimir Zhagora, Senior 
Political Affairs Officer in the UN Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA) on September 21 to discuss the AU/UN-organized 
meeting in N'Djamena of non-signatories to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA).  The turnout for the meeting included JEM 
negotiator Ahmed Tugod Lissan and one representative of 
Khamis Abdullah's SLA wing.  SLA's Ahmet Abd al-Shafi was not 
present.  There were no representatives from SLM/Unity 
(apparently Abdullah Yahya had stated that internal problems 
precluded participation.)  Senior statesman Ahmed Ibrahim 
Diraij, a NMRD representative and Arab leader Salah Abu Sura 
were present. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Niang and Zhagora explained that it had been hoped 
that delegation composition and common negotiating positions 
could be discussed during the two day meeting. 
Unfortunately, movement turnout had been too low-level to 
achieve anything (although a request for capacity building 
was registered.)  They commented on Abd Al-Wahid al-Nur's 
unrealistic list of preconditions, which included janjaweed 
disarmament, return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
and peace-keeping troops from the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia exclusively. 
 
4.  (SBU)  In a meeting September 22 with JEM negotiator 
Tugod Lissan, Lissan confirmed that the meeting had not 
advanced any issues but noted that he was staying in 
N'Djamena for a few weeks and there might be another attempt 
in early October to bring players together.  He reiterated 
that the movements wanted to have a capacity building 
workshop before the October 27 meeting in Tripoli.  He was 
also adamant that, as the non-signatories, only JEM and SLA 
were the appropriate interlocutors for the negotiations.  He 
stated that the concerns of others (such as some of the newer 
Arab groups) could be accommodated, but, as they did not have 
a real presence on the ground in Darfur, they should not be 
at the table.  As for Salah Abu Sura - a member of the Sudan 
Communist party - JEM would never recognize him or allow him 
to be part of the talks.  He noted the positive presence of 
Sulayman Jammous whom he described as experienced and 
open-minded.  Jammous had the stature to encourage SLA 
independents Adam Bakhit, Adam Shogar and Sharif Hariri to 
coalesce. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Lissan stated that the starting point for the 
negotiations was still an open issue.  He felt that the 
approach used in Arusha - which he described as laying out 
issues without excluding those that were not in the DPA - was 
the most helpful tack to take.  Looking at obstacles to an 
eventual peace, he mentioned the resettlement of Arabs from 
Chad and Niger.  He stated that this would be a major issue - 
JEM was asking for these settlers to be removed from the 
areas where they were installing themselves.  IDPs must not 
stay in the temporary areas determined by the government but 
must be returned home.  Concerning the Hybrid Peace-Keeping 
Operation (PKO), he stated that this force may shore up the 
government's belief that it did not need to look at the root 
causes of the Darfur conflict - only at the superficial ones. 
 Concerning Khalid Ibrahim's comments to the press on 
reverting to force for an independent Darfur if the Tripoli 
talks did not succeed, Lissan intimated that this had an 
element of pre-negotiation grandstanding. 
 
JEM ON SLA 
 
6.  (SBU)  Lissan cautioned that it was impossible for the 
SLA to unify under one leadership.  The wings could only be 
dealt with as separate movements.  In a tour d'horizon of SLA 
leaders, Lissan described Abd al-Wahid as 'an obstacle.'  He 
controlled IDP committees in 'show camps' which do his 
bidding and are able to appear more significant than they 
are.  Abd al-Shafi, by contrast, had more support on the 
ground.  He was more open minded than Abd al-Wahid, and he 
 
NDJAMENA 00000755  002 OF 002 
 
 
had the respect of the Fur intellectuals.  Khamis Abdullah 
was not as strong on the ground and not as experienced 
politically, although he had Masalit support.  Lissan argued 
that JEM was able to avoid some of the SLA's problems by 
having better organization; by having established a political 
wing before a military presence and by having cadres with 
more education and cohesive institutions.  The NMRD was 
totally a Chadian creation.  He acknowledged that there had 
been reports of JEM divisions.  JEM field commanders (he 
mentioned Banda) had been dissatisfied and had tried to split 
the movement.  There had been allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement on the ground; Banda and another field 
commander had been sidelined for abuses. 
 
JEM ON ERITREA AND LIBYA 
 
7.  (SBU)  Lissan also cautioned that Eritrea could be an 
obstacle.  The Government of Eritrea wanted to host the talks 
in order to curry favor with Sudan government.  They also had 
close relations with the head of Sudanese intelligence, Saleh 
Gosh.  In any event, Ertitrean efforts had not been able to 
attract the main players.  Neither SLA nor JEM had gone to 
Asmara.  Eritrea had only been able to attract the bit 
players:  the 'Asmara Front' of Diraij, NMRD and Khamis 
Abdulla (who was kept there against his will.)  Libya, on the 
other hand was strongly influencing the AU.  The effect of 
'Le Guide' could be seen in the AU's new position that they 
didn't want international forces - only Africans - in the 
Hybrid PKO.  'Sudan cannot say no to Libya, otherwise Libya 
will immediately start supporting the Sudanese rebels.' 
 
JEM TAKE ON CHAD REBEL ACTION 
 
8.  (SBU)  Lissan agreed to discuss the current situation of 
the Chadian rebels (with whom he had been crossing paths in 
Tripoli.)  He stated that Chad rebel leaders Timan Erdimi and 
Mahamat Nouri intended to take one more shot at toppling the 
regime.  (Comment:  this expectation corresponds with GOC 
views.  There has been a massive and widely observed 
positioning of Chadian troops on the border.  End Comment.) 
According to Lissan, the Tripoli Agreement (whereby Sudan and 
Chad agreed to desist in supporting rebel groups bent on the 
others' destabilization) was not being observed.  The Chadian 
rebels were receiving ample support from Sudan.  Queried as 
to whether JEM troops would support Chadian troops in any 
eventual clash with Chadian rebels, Lissan responded that 
this was not likely; Chadian troops were well-stationed along 
the border, JEM forces were not right now part of the 
defensive position.  Furthermore, Chad had many informants 
among the rebel troops and was aware of rebel plans and 
movements. 
 
LONG-TIME REBEL OBSERVER STRESSES NEED TO ORGANIZE SLA 
AS FIRST STEP 
 
9.  (SBU)  In a meeting with CDA September 24, Chad 
Ambassador to Sudan, Haroun Bahradine, agreed that the 
meeting had not succeeded, but ascribed it to invitations 
going out late.  Another meeting was needed before October 
27.  But he cautioned that the negotiations would never 
advance unless the SLA had a chance to resolve internal 
differences.  The presence of four SLA wings made it 
impossible for the movements as a whole to have a coherent 
position.  (The four wings being those belonging to Abd 
al-Wahid, Yahya, al Shafi (whom he described as smart and the 
natural heir to al-Wahid) and Khamis Abdullah.)  He also 
stated that the movements had no resources, and need 
additional financial support in order to 'travel to their 
people - hear their views - get the word out.' 
TAMLYN