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Viewing cable 07NAIROBI3513, A TALE OF TWO ORANGE CONVENTIONS: OPPOSITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI3513 2007-09-04 08:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO7214
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #3513/01 2470859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040859Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2068
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9509
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5434
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4816
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2227
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1434
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2376
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2307
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 003513 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KE PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: A TALE OF TWO ORANGE CONVENTIONS:  OPPOSITION 
FORMALLY DISUNITES 
 
REF: A. 06 NAIROBI 4419 
 
     B. 06 NAIROBI 5393 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya 
(ODM-K) nominated Kalonzo Musyoka for President at its 
convention held on 31 August.  The Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) nominated Raila Odinga for President at its convention 
the following day.  As in '92 and '97, the opposition will 
enter the presidential campaign season disunited.  However, a 
last minute re-unification of the opposition, as occurred in 
the 2002 election, remains possible, though we judge this 
unlikely.  It is more probable that Kalonzo will opt to 
support Kibaki after the election and then bargain for a 
prominent cabinet post. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Ref A describes the Kenyan political scene prior to 
the opposition break up.  Ref B provides a briefing on 
Kenya's major ethnic voting blocs.  Three members of the 
Embassy political section attended both conventions described 
here. 
 
ODM-K: Kalonzo's Essentially Ethnic-Kamba Convention 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) ODM-K held its one day nominating convention on 31 
August at Nairobi's Kasarani Sports Center.  The party had 
planned for 4,200 delegates to attend from across the 
country.  In the end far more attended in an unofficial 
capacity, overwhelmingly from Kalonzo's ethnic Kamba 
community of Eastern Province.  Kalonzo's only competitor was 
nominated Member of Parliament from Western Province (ethnic 
Luhya) Julia Ojiambo.  The vote count was roughly 2/3s for 
Kalonzo and 1/3 for Ojiambo.  Following the announcement of 
Kalonzo's victory, Ojiambo conceded and pronounced herself to 
be Kalonzo's running mate.  Kalonzo was non-committal on that 
subject when he gave his acceptance speech.  The convention 
was marked by very limited political support outside 
Kalonzo's home region.  The only prominent local political 
leaders at the convention who were not from Kalonzo's home 
region were ODM-K Chairman Samuel Pogishio (MP from Rift 
Valley Province, ethnic Kalenjin) and Lucas Maitha (MP from 
Coast Province, ethnic Mijikenda).  Neither politician has 
the stature to deliver more than a slice of their ethnic 
communities.  Ojiambo was not able to recruit any prominent 
Western Province (ethnic Luhya) politicians to join her. 
 
4. (SBU)  Kalonzo gave a stirring speech and left the door 
open to an orange reconciliation somewhere down the line. 
For logistical reasons, any reconciliation that would change 
the ballot must occur no less than two months prior to the 
election (as was the case in 2002).  We see the chances of an 
Orange reconciliation as quite low for both personal and 
political reasons.  Kalonzo is the most popular politician in 
Kambaland, but Kibaki is nearly as popular among Kambas as is 
native son Kalonzo.  Raila Odinga has no popularity in 
Kambaland.  The Kambas make up about 11 percent of the 
population.  They heeded Kalonzo's urgings not to support the 
Kibaki government's draft constitution in November 2005, but 
Kibaki has gained in popularity since then.  Kambas are well 
represented in the Kibaki cabinet.  Kalonzo is absolutely 
committed to running for President.  We suspect that he will 
maintain his candidacy and work to elect as many ODM-K MPs as 
possible.  He will then seek to bargain post-election for a 
senior cabinet post with Kibaki, the presumptive winner 
(according to conventional wisdom).  This was the strategy 
successfully followed by FORD-P Chief Simeon Nyachae in 2002. 
 
5. (SBU) Alternatively, Kalonzo might be tempted to give up 
his candidacy in favor of Kibaki if the Vice Presidency were 
offered to him.  If the Kibaki government's 40 percent score 
in the November 2005 referendum vote is taken as a guide, 
then all Kibaki needs is one major voting bloc to switch 
sides.  Kalonzo's Kamba vote could give the Kibaki team an 
additional 11 percent for a total of 51 percent, even if they 
make no gains elsewhere.  All that is required under the 
Kenyan constitution is a plurality of the national vote with 
at least 25 percent support in five of the eight provinces. 
 
ODM: Raila Crowned King, Courtiers From Throughout Kenya 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
NAIROBI 00003513  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) ODM held its one day nominating convention on 1 
September at the same Kasarani Sports Center.  The party 
planned for 4,200 delegates from across the country, but the 
actual delegate vote count came to only 3,449.  Delegates 
were more nationally representative than in the previous 
day's ODM-K event.  The vote count came to 77 percent for 
Raila, 11 percent for former Vice President (under Moi) 
Musalia Mudavadi (ethnic Luhya from Western Province), 10 
percent for William Ruto (ethnic Kalenjin from Rift Valley 
Province) with Joseph Nyaga (Central Province) and Najib 
Balala (Coast Province) sharing the remaining two percent. 
(Note: Balala had withdrawn prior to the vote in favor of 
Raila.)  Raila support was overwhelming from his native 
Nyanza Province and substantial everywhere else except 
Western Province.  Mudavadi's support was entirely from his 
native Western Province.  All four of Raila's ODM competitors 
conceded and supported Raila.  Balala commented "Raila has in 
the past been a kingmaker.  Today he is our King."  Despite 
some sections of the press reporting that Mudavadi was tapped 
as Raila's running mate, in fact no one was named at the 
convention to fill that role.  Raila called all the 
contenders to join him on stage and proclaimed that together 
they formed a "pentagon" that would collectively lead the 
party to victory. 
 
7. (SBU) The convention was lively.  Several witnesses 
confirmed to us that financial inducement of delegates was 
practiced by al ODM leaders.  The ODM party machinery 
(dominated by pro-Raila, ethnic Luo, Nyanza Province 
officials) closely scrutinized delegations from Central and 
Eastern provinces, fearing external influence peddling by 
Kibaki (via the Central Province delegation) and Kalonzo (via 
the Eastern Province delegation).  Raila and Mudavadi were 
observed in a local restaurant supervising their agents' 
activities and bargaining with one another until the early 
morning hours of the day of the convention.  Post convention, 
Raila told Mudavadi supporters (according to a close Mudavadi 
aide) that Mudavadi would be his "Deputy Captain."  The press 
and others interpret this to mean "Vice President in a Raila 
administration," but there has been no formal communication 
to this effect.  Most observers doubt that Mudavadi would be 
able to deliver the fractured Western Province Luhya vote 
(see ref B).  PolCounselor asked Raila if he had named 
Mudavadi as his VP.  He replied "yes," and then changed the 
subject. 
 
8. (SBU)  ODM confidence is based on its success in defeating 
Kibaki 60/40 in the November 2005 national referendum on the 
draft constitution.  We believe this confidence is misplaced. 
 KANU was a member of the orange movement in 2005.  It is now 
leaning decidedly in a pro-Kibaki direction.  Moi personally 
supported the Orange "no" stance on the draft constitution, 
but his deep pockets will now be used to support Kibaki's 
re-election.  Many voters who did not support the draft 
constitution do in fact support Kibaki as president.  Kalonzo 
was part of the orange team in 2005, but is now running 
against Raila, so ODM cannot expect to keep the Kamba vote, 
which amounts to about 11 percent. 
 
9. (SBU) Rala is a stirring speaker and has a compelling 
political biography, including a starring role in the fight 
to bring multiparty democracy to Kenya.  His narrative of 
"the rich political elite have robbed Kenya long enough and 
now it is time for we the people to take over" resonates with 
much of Kenyan society.  However, his reputation for 
demagoguery and political opportunism, past associations with 
far left politics and the '82 military coup attempt, and 
widespread cultural prejudice against Luos all inhibit his 
electabilty. 
 
Comment: For Now a 3-Way Race, Kibaki Still to Choose Party 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Kenya's national election campaign will formally 
begin once parliament is dissolved sometime in September 
(probably mid-month).  The biggest unanswered question 
remains what party Kibaki will run under (NARC?, NARC-K?, 
DP?) and what alliances he will then forge (formal alliance 
with KANU?).  The three contenders, Raila, Kalonzo and Kibaki 
 
NAIROBI 00003513  003 OF 003 
 
 
were all allies in 2002 in the successful effort to expel 
KANU from State House.  All three come from Kenya's 
traditional political elite.  All three count among their 
supporters both reformers and unreconstructed political 
dinosaurs. No matter who wins, Kenya will not be governed in 
a dramatically different fashion under any of these three 
leaders. 
RANNEBERGER