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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW4730, Party Time: Four Parties Hold Congresses in Moscow

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4730 2007-09-27 03:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO9133
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #4730/01 2700328
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270328Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4171
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2436
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2722
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4555
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: Party Time: Four Parties Hold Congresses in Moscow 
 
Ref: Moscow 04599 
 
MOSCOW 00004730  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Over the past week, four of the 15 registered political 
parties held their national congresses in Moscow to select their 
candidates for the December Duma elections.  As in any election 
campaign they also attempted to engage an in electoral battle with 
their rivals. As press reports have noted, the two main leftist 
parties -- the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and 
"For a Just Russia" (SR) -- as well as the smaller Union of Rightist 
Forces (SPS) have sought to attract a more diverse electorate by 
promoting candidates beyond the usual older, male party apparatchiks 
that have dominated political life here. The success of any or all 
of these parties in attracting voters beyond their core 
constituencies could change the shape of the future Duma on the 
margins, either by the weaker parties gaining enough support to 
cross the 7 percent threshold to be a part of the legislature or by 
helping to stop the Kremlin-backed United Russia (YR) from gaining a 
majority.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------- 
The Left 
-------- 
 
2. (SBU) The most contested political space is on the left, where 
the KPRF and SR are positioning themselves to take advantage of a 
perceived leftward shift in public attitudes. Neither party produced 
the media splash that LDPR's selection of Andrey Lugovoy had 
provided a week earlier (REFTEL), but presented well-orchestrated 
and largely predictable political theater to bolster their 
respective constituencies and attract uncommitted converts. 
 
3. (SBU) The KPRF's congress on 23 September demonstrated the 
communists' continuing identity crisis. Is the party to continue as 
the inheritor of the "Party of Lenin" and its role as the advocate 
for those who have been disadvantaged in the new Russia? Or should 
it transform itself into a more modern social democratic party on 
the European model with the hope of attracting a younger, more 
prosperous electorate?  Statements by longstanding chief, Gennadiy 
Zyuganov, hewed closer to the former with calls for nationalizing 
the strategic sectors of the economy, criticisms of continuing 
"counter-revolution," and a call to fight against "bureaucrats, 
oligarchs, and bandits."  As in the past, there were signs of a 
split within the party; Duma deputy Oleg Smolin gave a speech in 
which he "presented for discussion" the idea that party could 
benefit from a shift in the national mood to the left, especially 
among the urban population, intellectuals, and young voters, by 
pursuing classic strategies of the European left (albeit with an eye 
toward the Russian experience). 
 
3. (SBU) The KPRF's cadre policies also demonstrated tension between 
the two approaches. On one hand, the party made much of its 
commitment to youth, placing at least six young activists at the top 
of regional party lists. Moreover, the party committed itself to 
paying special attention to large cities, where the leadership 
believes that it can attract more voters. On the other, the top 
three of the party list -- longstanding party chairman Genndiy 
Zyuganov, Nobel laureate Zhores Alferov, and former presidential 
candidate and "unaffiliated" agrarian Nikolay Kharitonov -- and the 
heads of the other 79 party lists reflected a traditional reliance 
on "seasoned" apparatchiks. The newspaper Gazeta noted that the 
average age of the KPRF congress delegate was 59 years. 
 
4. (SBU) For its part, the Kremlin-authorized "For a Fair Russia" 
party (SR) used its cadre selections at party congress, also on 
September 23, to underscore its commitment to recruiting young, 
intellectual voters.  As expected, the party leader, Sergey Mironov, 
will head the national candidate list, but in a surprise move, the 
party selected the leader of its youth wing, Sergey Shergunov, to 
serve in its troika.  It also selected a former Communist and 
currently serving Duma deputy Svetlana GQyacheva.  In a calculated 
move to raise interest, SR kept observers guessing until the last 
moment about the contents of its list. 
 
5. (SBU) SR continued its efforts to claim the mantel of the left 
form the Communists.  At the conference, it adopted the slogan 
"Socialism Version 3.0".  Along with a younger candidate in the 
national troika, SR hopes to capture young voters who are not 
attracted to the Communists.  The placement of a former communist 
not currently a member of SR in the troika indicates the party will 
fight hard for the left-wing vote. 
 
--------- 
The Right 
--------- 
 
MOSCOW 00004730  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) The parties on the right continued to struggle for 
relevance, in part by using the same strategies of the left in 
promoting female, young, and intellectual candidates. The Union of 
Right Forces (SPS) held its party conference on September 21 and 
appointed party leader head, Nikita Belykh, to the top spot on its 
national troika.  Boris Nemtsov, a long-time party activist, came 
out of semi-retirement to take the second spot in the list.  In a 
surprise move, also apparently calculated to attract women voters, 
SPS included Marietta Chudakova as its third member.  Chudakova made 
a name for herself as a scholar of Russian author Mikhail Bulgakov. 
 
7. (SBU) Perhaps the only surprise from the SPS congress was the 
exclusion of Vladimir Ryzhkov, Duma deputy from Altay Kray, from the 
party lists.  Rumors had suggested that he would be the third member 
of the troika for SPS.  Press speculation suggests that the Kremlin 
objected to his inclusion on SPS's list.  In public statements, 
however, SPS leaders have strongly asserted that they would not and 
did not submit their party lists to the Kremlin for approval. 
 
8. (SBU) The new Kremlin-motivated right-center party, Civic Force 
(GS), held its party conference on September 23.  It selected its 
two main faces, party leader Mikhail Barshchevskiy and his de facto 
lieutenant Aleksandr Ryavkin.  Viktor Pokhmelkin switched his 
allegiance from SR to GS and quickly took the third slot in GS's 
national troika.  Pokhmelkin moved to SR within the past two weeks. 
As a current Duma deputy and leader of a grass-roots drivers' 
political association, he brings experience and greater credibility 
to the GS ticket. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: This season, a number of candidates have switched 
parties in this electoral season.  Aleksey Mitrofanov, previously 
high in LDPR now heads the SR list in Penza.  Numerous other 
examples demonstrate the rather fluid divides between the current 
parties.  Some of the changes appear designed to assure election. 
LDPR's success in December and continued existence have been brought 
into doubt by recent polling data.  Pokhmelkin's dissatisfaction 
with SR made his future with that party questionable. 
 
10. (SBU) Despite the looming shadow of the more powerful and 
wealthy "party of power," United Russia (YR), the competition for 
uncommitted voters who plan to take part in the election will have 
an impact on the margins and could mean the difference between 
survival in the Duma and political extinction. (Polling by the Fund 
for Societal Opinion found that 21% of respondents who planned to 
vote in the Duma elections were undecided in mid-September. Nearly 
half, 48%, of respondents said they supported YR, 9% the KPRF, 7% 
for LDPR, and 6% for SR. On the right, SPS attracted the support of 
only 1% of respondents, GS virtually no support.) While everyone 
expects United Russia to win the most votes, an active battle to 
succeed in Russia's electoral environment appears to have taken 
shape and will have an impact on the margins in the character of the 
next Duma. 
 
RUSSELL