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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2043, NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION IN UNISON: FACT OR FICTION?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA2043 2007-09-07 00:38 2011-06-01 08:00 SECRET Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXRO0405
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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1189
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5 PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 002043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCOR NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION IN UNISON:  FACT OR FICTION? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
- - - - 
 
1.  (C) On September 4, leaders from the two main liberal 
opposition parties in Nicaragua, the Liberal Alliance of 
Nicaragua (ALN) and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
announced that they had signed an agreement to pursue a 
common legislative agenda.  A few days later, on September 7, 
both parties voted in unison against giving President Ortega 
the power to create citizen councils (CPCs).  Although it has 
not been publicized, Post also has obtained a second 
agreement, signed by ALN President Eduardo Montealegre and 
PLC President Jorge Castillo Quant, which outlines four steps 
for cooperation in advance of the November 2008 municipal 
elections.  Well informed sources from both parties assure us 
that their parties' intentions to cooperate are genuine, but 
mutual trust is low.  Both the announcement of an ALN-PLC 
cooperation agreement and the September 7 vote are welcome 
indications of growing opposition unity, but in a political 
system where games-playing is the norm, we believe that it 
will take some months of demonstrated good will by both 
parties -- supported by cooperative actions -- to prove 
whether there is a genuine intent to forge a strong 
democratic opposition to President Ortega.  End Summary. 
 
A Show of Opposition Unity 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (U) On September 4, leaders from the ALN and PLC appeared 
before the press to announce that after weeks of secret 
negotiations, they had reached an agreement on a joint 
legislative agenda.  The agreement indicated that the two 
parties have agreed to 18 common legislative actions, to 
include working together to reform the Law 290 (to limit 
President Ortega's ability to create Citizens' Power Councils 
- CPCs) and creating a mechanism to reach agreement on how to 
repeal the Ley Marco (the law that delayed the entry into 
force of constitutional reforms that limit the Executive's 
power).  The two parties' Whips (jefes de bancada) Maria 
Eugenia Sequeira (ALN) and Maximino Rodriguez flanked their 
party presidents at the press event. 
 
3.  (C) ALN President's chief advisor Kitty Monterrey passed 
us on September 5 a copy of an additional document, signed by 
both parties, that outlines a wider vision of cooperation, 
including a promise to work together towards the creation of 
an electoral alliance in advance of the November 2008 
municipal elections.  The agreement lists four specific areas 
of electoral cooperation that the parties will pursue:  a) a 
mechanism to identify and select candidates; b) a decision on 
a common ballot number (Note:  on the 2006 election ballots 
the PLC candidates were listed under box number 1 and ALN by 
box 9.  End note.); c) campaign finances; and d) campaign 
conduct.  Monterrey told us that the ALN national leadership 
was already in the process of drafting a letter to all 
municipal ALN leaders, instructing them to start working with 
their PLC counterparts with a view toward starting a process 
of identifying candidates for the 2008 elections. 
 
 
Skin Deep? 
- - - - - 
 
4.  (C) ALN President Montealegre had previously expressed to 
us his doubts that the ALN would be able to reach a 
legislative agreement with the PLC, citing the lack of PLC 
desire to cooperate.  Monterrey echoed these doubts to us 
this week, noting that the ALN leadership questions whether 
the PLC will stick to the deal.  She opined that despite the 
grass-roots pressure from PLC supporters for opposition 
liberal unity against the Sandinistas, many PLC deputies are 
still under the sway of PLC leader and convicted felon 
Arnoldo Aleman.  In Monterrey's view, there are few PLC 
deputies that Aleman can't still buy or blackmail, and Aleman 
does not support liberal opposition unity (unless he's in 
control).  However, she explained, the ALN must be perceived 
as promoting unity.  If, for some reason, unity doesn't 
prosper, the ALN does not want to be seen as the spoiler. 
 
5.  (C) For the PLC's part, Deputy Enrique Quinonez told us 
that many national PLC figures have a genuine desire to 
foster greater liberal cohesion.  He noted that 
disillusionment with Aleman is not limited to the PLC 
 
MANAGUA 00002043  002 OF 002 
 
 
grassroots, as many PLC Deputies resent the continued heavy 
handed pressure of Aleman.  According to Quinonez, when 
Aleman was told that members of the PLC were negotiating a 
legislative strategy with the ALN, Aleman said "OK, I give 
you permission to talk to them."  The response, Quinonez 
alleged, was "we are not asking for your permission, we're 
telling you."  Quinonez admitted that Aleman can still use 
his power -- both money and control over certain institutions 
of state, e.g. the courts, the Comptroller's office, the 
National Electoral Council (CSE) -- to leverage the obedience 
of some PLC deputies.  However, he maintained that Aleman's 
power within the party is waning, as frustration with 
Aleman's pro-Sandinista actions grows. 
 
Proof is in the Pudding? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Quinonez argued that we would see the PLC working 
with the ALN to provide effective opposition to the 
Sandinista regime of Daniel Ortega.  For example, he 
reemphasized the message that we have been hearing for weeks 
from PLC leaders, that it would be "political suicide" for 
any PLC legislator not to support amendments to the Law 290, 
conscribing Ortega's ability to create a nationwide network 
of Citizens' Power Councils (CPCs).  "This was a clear 
mandate from the (PLC) party convention," Quinonez argued. 
 
7.  (C) On September 7, the National Assembly debated the 
reforms to Law 290 that the opposition controlled Justice 
Committee had proposed.  The proposed reforms would remove 
from the powers of the President the right to create 
"Councils" as part of the executive branch.  As our PLC 
contacts had predicted, all members of the PLC voted with the 
ALN, as well as the opposition members from the tiny 
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) party, in favor of these 
reforms.  In the final vote, the united opposition beat the 
Sandinista Assembly Deputies in 52 to 34 vote. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
8.  (C) We continue to discount statements that downplay 
Aleman's control over the PLC, and we believe that the ALN's 
doubts about the PLC's true intentions are reasonably 
founded.  If PLC leaders want us to believe that the party 
has turned a corner -- and now represents a pro-democracy 
party, rather than a pro-corruption, pro-pacto party -- they 
will need to demonstrate a consistent record over time of 
responsible opposition, and real cooperation with 
pro-democracy forces.  At this point, with Aleman still at 
the helm, the prospects of PLC behaving as positive force for 
democracy in Nicaragua appear limited indeed. 
 
9.  (S) As previously reported, it is Post's belief that the 
democratic forces in this country remain especially 
vulnerable.  However, the public show of growing cohesion 
among the opposition parties is welcome.  Whatever the 
motivations, the fact that the PLC did not back down on its 
promises to help strike the legislative basis for Ortega to 
create Citizens' Power Councils (CPCs) also represents a 
positive step.  If, and that's a big if, the PLC and ALN can 
continue to work together within the National Assembly, and 
can truly forge an electoral alliance, the prospects of a 
Sandinista victory in the 2008 municipal elections will be 
diminished.  The 2008 elections are not yet a lost cause, and 
we need to stand prepared to assist those who represent a 
democratic future for this country.  If the opposition 
parties themselves manage to come together, the prospects for 
our assistance falling on fertile ground will be much 
increased. 
TRIVELLI