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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1121, DRC EBOLA EPIDEMIC UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1121 2007-09-19 06:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO1551
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPB
RUEHPOD RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1121/01 2620602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190602Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6908
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
HHS PASS TO CDC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON SENV TBIO PGOV CG
SUBJECT: DRC EBOLA EPIDEMIC UPDATE 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 1075 
 B. KINSHASA 1085 
 C. KINSHASA 1094 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The Ebola fever epidemic in south-central DRC has 
now claimed 172 lives.  Nearly 400 suspected cases remain clustered 
around the towns of Mweka and Luebo in the West Kasai province. 
Unconfirmed cases have been reported as far as 300 kms from the 
epicenter, some little more than 50 kms from the Angolan border. CDC 
epidemiologists visited the epidemic epicenter and environs and 
reported finding a difficult environment and challenging 
circumstances in which to respond to the outbreak.  A GDRC-chaired 
coordinating committee, including MOH, CDC, USAID, and WHO 
representatives, is meeting daily.  The GDRC has presented its 
action plan and budget figures to donors and partners, and CDC and 
Post are responding, including the arrival of a 10-member CDC team 
from Atlanta. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Latest Numbers and Possible Geographic Spread 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) As of September 18, the number of suspected cases of Ebola 
fever has risen to 380 and the number of confirmed deaths due to 
Ebola is now at 172.  This 45 percent lethality rate is considered 
to be low, but may be due to an overestimation of the actual 
caseload.  Suspected and confirmed cases remain centered around the 
original epicenter of the village of Kampungu, but rumored cases are 
being investigated as far away as Kananga (125 kms southeast), the 
regional with over half a million inhabitants, Tshikapa (125 kms 
south), an artisanal diamond mining center less than 75 kms from the 
Angolan border, and Muena Ditu (300 kms southeast), along the main 
train line to second city Lubumbashi in Katanga province. 
 
---------------------------- 
CDC Field Visit to Epicenter 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Center for Disease Control (CDC) epidemiologists Luca 
Flamigni and Peter Kilmarx visited Kampungu and environs September 
13, 14 and briefed the Charge, Econcouns, and USAID/Health on 
September 17.  Flamigni (CDC/DRC) and Kilmarx (CDC/Atlanta, former 
Peace Corps volunteer in this area 1983-86, and veteran of the 
Kikwit Ebola epidemic of 1995) described the difficult circumstances 
that CDC, World Health Organization (WHO), Medecins sans Frontieres 
(MSF) and Congolese Ministry of Health (MOH) personnel are operating 
in.  Suspected Ebola cases are currently found mainly between the 
West Kasai towns of Mweka (eight hours northwest of Kananga by car) 
and Luebo (two hours south of Mweka by car).  Landing strips in 
Mweka and Luebo, both rarely used, are overgrown by vegetation, 
frequented by grazing animals, and suitable only for planes able to 
navigate rough ground and land/take off in short distances.  Cargo 
will be limited to approximately one ton per plane. 
 
------------------------------- 
Difficult Operating Environment 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Kilmarx and Flamigni described villages with non-functional 
health clinics (one of which, in the epicenter village of Kampungu, 
is now the MSF headquarters) and towns with barely functional 
hospitals.  (Note: Luebo, divided in half by the Lulua river, and 30 
minutes by car from the epicenter, has both an MOH and a Mission 
hospital.  End note.)  Suspected cases are currently either in 
mudblock "isolation wards" in villages such as Kampungu, or else in 
bare-bone cement block wards in the Mweka and Luebo hospitals, with 
little or no care/treatment and few precautions taken regarding 
visitors.  While MSF personnel were using appropriate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) in Kampungu, these same measures were not 
yet being used in the hospitals.  Laboratory analysis, public health 
messages, epidemic surveillance/tracking, sanitary conditions, and 
coordination were judged as either poor or severely constrained by 
the lack of logistics and infrastructure. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Coordinating Committee Meeting in Kinshasa 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Kilmarx and CDC/ DRC chief of party Karen Hawkins-Reed met 
with the Minister of Health on September 17 and then Kilmarx 
presented his technical findings and recommendations to the 
assembled MOH-chaired Ebola Coordinating Committee.  All parties 
(GDRC, CDC, WHO) agreed to make Luebo, the nearest large town to the 
epicenter of the epidemic, the location for the CDC laboratory and 
epidemic response headquarters.  WHO-sponsored Canadian laboratory 
support will also be there.  The Luebo Zone physician was designated 
 
KINSHASA 00001121  002 OF 002 
 
 
as the Ebola mission chief at the site.  Isolation units will be 
established according to need in the villages and towns affected. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MOH Requests CDC, Donor Assistance 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The MOH gave CDC a letter of invitation over the weekend. 
The letter requests CDC assistance in areas of coordination, lab 
services, epidemic containment/control, social mobilization, and 
logistical support.  The MOH Chief of Staff agreed to provide 
mission orders for CDC field staff to facilitate their interactions 
with local GDRD authorities.  During the Coordinating Committee 
meeting, MOH presented its proposed action plan and budget to 
donors.  Health Minister Makwenge Kaput recommended MOH and WHO 
coordination on all funding issues. 
 
------------------------ 
CDC and Embassy Response 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) The CDC team of ten (five laboratory technicians, three 
epidemiologists, an epidemic investigator and an epidemic 
communications expert) will be arriving September 18 and 19 with 56 
pieces containing equipment and supplies.  An additional two air 
freight shipments from Atlanta will arrive September 18 and 22. 
Embassy is in process of procuring needed logistical and 
administrative support services and materials.  USAID/OFDA is 
preparing the disaster declaration and emergency funding request 
cable, and this is expected to be sent on September 19.  Post will 
continue to provide daily updates based upon CDC sitreps and the 
results of the daily Ebola Coordinating Committee meetings.  The 
Public Diplomacy section is preparing to coordinate with the CDC 
communications expert to provide public information on USG 
activities. 
 
Brock