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Viewing cable 07BRASILIA1865, VENEZUELAN MERCOSUL ACCESSION MAY NOT PASS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BRASILIA1865 2007-09-28 19:29 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1495
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1865/01 2711929
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281929Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0070
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6311
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5024
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3802
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7036
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 6444
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7172
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5175
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0883
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 
TAGS: PREL ECIN BR VE XR
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN MERCOSUL ACCESSION MAY NOT PASS 
BRAZILIAN CONGRESS 
 
REF: BRASILIA 1568 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 b & d 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  The bill to approve Venezuelan accession 
to Mercosul may not pass the Brazilian congress, in spite of 
support from the administration and the government's large 
majority in the chamber of deputies.  President Chavez may 
have torpedoed Venezuela's chances when, at the September 20 
summit with President Lula in Manaus, Brazil, he reportedly 
insulted the Brazilian congress a second time.  Although GOB 
officials continue to express confidence in eventual passage 
of the bill, the chamber of deputies has postponed 
consideration of the bill to late October, and a leading 
senator believes the Senate may reject the bill.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Venezuelan accession to Mercosul may be rejected by 
the Brazilian congress after President Hugo Chavez again 
insulted the congress during his summit with President Lula 
on September 20 in Manaus, Brazil.  Consideration of the bill 
in the chamber of deputies Foreign Relations and National 
Defense Committee had already been delayed a week when four 
deputies, one a former defense minister and immediate past 
president of the chamber of deputies from a party in the 
government coalition, requested more time to examine the 
proposal.  On September 26 the committee decided to postpone 
consideration until October 24, reportedly because of 
"pending technical issues" that should have been resolved 
before the protocol on Venezuelan accession was signed last 
year, and because Chavez's remarks had "generated a bad 
feeling," in the words of Deputy Vieira da Cunha (government 
coalition PDT, Rio Grande do Sul state), the committee 
chairman. 
 
3.  (C)  In a meeting with Ambassador Sobel on September 26, 
Senator Heraclito Fortes (opposition DEM, Piaui state), 
chairman of the senate Foreign Relations and National Defense 
Committee, said it would now be hard for Venezuelan Mercosul 
accession to pass the senate.  "Chavez is playing an unclear 
game," Fortes said, "because he faces domestic difficulties 
in joining Mercosul" even as he presses for it on the 
international front.  Fortes went on to say, "His behavior 
proves he is not normal, and now we have the Manaus 
declarations against Congress."  Fortes added that Chavez 
would like to have veto power in Mercosul, which would be 
"too much power for someone so unstable."  Moreover, Fortes 
said, compliance with the Democracy Clause would be hard for 
Chavez to achieve.  Summing up, Fortes said it would be hard 
for the bill to pass his committee, a change from early 
August (reftel), when he seemed to favor approving Venezuelan 
accession, despite his negative views of Chavez. 
 
4.  (C) At a September 28 meeting, Clemente de Lima Baena 
Soares, who heads the office at the Ministry of External 
Relations (Itamaraty) covering Andean countries, Guyana, and 
Suriname, told PolCouns that he had been in Manaus for the 
Lula-Chavez Summit and that the one newspaper that reported 
Chavez's comments about the Brazilian congress (O Estado de 
Sao Paulo) got it wrong.  He said other papers had not 
reported and had even denied that Chavez had made such a 
comment.  (Note: This is inaccurate, as Chavez's remarks were 
also reported by O Globo and Correio Braziliense.  End note.) 
 He acknowledged, however, that the damage had been done, and 
said that Venezuelan accession will certainly not be approved 
before the end of the year, and would now require a great 
deal of effort from the Administration to ensure passage.  He 
was optimistic that it would eventually be approved, though, 
saying it was a high priority for the Administration, and 
they would do the deals necessary in the senate to make sure 
it happens. 
 
5.  (C) Comment: The GOB's strong support for Venezuela's 
entry into Mercosul almost certainly reflects a strategy that 
aims to counter Chavez's regional influence and integration 
plans by moving him into an organization over which Brazil 
exercises a great deal of control.  However, whether reported 
accurately or not, the backlash caused by Chavez's comments 
regarding the Brazilian congress have put the GOB in a 
difficult position and have raised serious doubts about the 
prospects for approval of Venezuela's entry in Mercosul, when 
only a week ago most commentators believed it was simply a 
question of time.  Ultimately, though, we believe that if 
 
BRASILIA 00001865  002 OF 002 
 
 
Lula wants Venezuelan accession to Mercosul he can give 
legislators enough incentives to ensure passage. 
 
Sobel