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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA6899, SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL MCCAFFREY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BOGOTA6899 2007-09-21 18:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #6899/01 2641828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211828Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9053
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS BOGOTA 006899 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR GENERAL (RET) BARRY MCCAFFREY FROM AMBASSADOR WILLIAM 
R. BROWNFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PTER CO
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL MCCAFFREY 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) President Uribe's "democratic security" policy has 
hit the FARC and ELN hard over the past five years, with 
security improving across the country.  Colombians are free 
to travel highways and confidence has skyrocketed, 
translating into record economic growth.  The paramilitary 
peace process demobilized over 32,000 fighters, reducing 
human rights violations and creating new space for leftist 
political parties and civil society.  The GOC is seeking U.S. 
Congressional support for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement (CTPA) which President Uribe considers key to spur 
economic growth, attract international investors, and boost 
revenues to fund social programs and win the fight against 
narco-terrorism.  The U.S. Congress' reluctance to approve 
the CTPA due to perceived human rights problems -- after 
Colombia's years as an unflinching U.S. ally -- has 
bewildered many Colombians, including Uribe. 
 
2. (SBU) In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
consolidation strategy that puts increased emphasis on 
socio-economic development and territorial control.  Linking 
military and civilian efforts to consolidate GOC presence in 
conflictive zones remains a challenge, and comes in an 
environment of shrinking U.S. assistance.  The release of the 
three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in February 2003, 
the longest held U.S. hostages in the world, remains a top 
priority.  President Uribe recently accepted Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez's offer to act as an intermediary for a 
possible "humanitarian exchange" of FARC-held hostages for 
FARC prisoners in GOC jails. End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Security Outlook 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) President Uribe's "democratic security" policy has 
seriously weakened the FARC and ELN over the past five years, 
while the paramilitary peace process demobilized 32,000 
fighters.  The Colombian security forces experienced a 24 
percent increase in manpower--rising from 295,000 to 
390,000--and GOC efforts to boost training and equipment 
translated into improved performance.  Kidnappings have 
fallen from 2800 in 2002 to 687 in 2006, and murders fell 
from 29,000 to 17,000 during the same period.  For the first 
time in decades, citizens can freely travel the highways. 
USG security assistance has also been critical in improving 
logistics, mobility, planning, and intelligence capabilities. 
 Uribe's consistent 70 plus percent approval ratings a year 
into his second term (which ends in 2010) reflect his 
successful security policy. 
 
4. (SBU) The FARC has failed in its efforts to mount a major 
attack against Bogota and its environs since November 2003, 
and increasingly operates in ever more remote areas.  The 
military now operates in the historic heartland of the FARC, 
as well as in the main coca growing regions, and has killed 
several major mid-level FARC commanders in recent months. 
The GOC scored its most significant strike on the FARC 
leadership in years, killing FARC 16th Front commander Tomas 
Medina Cracas, aka "Negro Acacio" on September 1. Still, 
landmines, disease, logistic issues, limited airlift, 
distance, and difficult terrain hamper security operations. 
Moreover, the FARC continues to attack isolated or smaller 
military and civilian targets. 
 
5. (SBU) The GOC recognizes the need for an integrated 
military-civilian program to consolidate recent security 
gains and establish lasting control over former conflict 
zones. In 2005, it created the Center for Coordinated 
Integral Action (CCAI), to link the delivery of social 
services (health care, education, legal, etc.) and the 
establishment of a civilian presence to military efforts. 
Setting up civilian institutions in recently-secured areas 
present important resource and logistical challenges, but are 
be key to whether the GOC can win over local residents of 
historically abandoned areas. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Colombian Congress and Local Elections 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) The Colombian Congress passed the President's top 
legislative priorities last year, including the critical 
Colombia Trade Promotion Act (CTPA), and a vital bill 
reforming federal and state revenue sharing. Legislators have 
now focused on the October 28 local and departmental 
elections, making significant legislative advances before 
then unlikely.  Public approval of Congress fell as a result 
of the paramilitary political scandal that erupted in May, 
and fifteen legislators have been jailed for alleged links to 
the groups.  Fifteen more remain under investigation for 
alleged paramilitary ties. 
 
7. (U) The GOC has mounted a substantial effort to prevent 
the FARC, ELN and local criminal groups from influencing the 
results of the October elections, but many human rights 
groups remain concerned.  The GOC has also invited a large 
Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observation 
mission to observe the electoral process, and we are 
supporting a large domestic observation operation as well. 
The FARC and other groups have killed 54 candidates to date, 
but the elections are generally expected to be free and fair. 
 
------------------------- 
Fighting Narcotrafficking 
------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The GOC has invested its substantial resources in 
the fight against narcotrafficking.  Eradication of coca and 
poppy fields reached record levels in 2006. The GOC has 
increased its manual eradication program, but understands it 
cannot replace aerial spraying.  Security forces seized a 
near-record 203 metric tons of cocaine and coca base in 2006, 
and destroyed a record 200 cocaine laboratories.  We continue 
to work with the GOC to determine how to transfer key tasks 
as we anticipate that assistance from the U.S. will decline 
substantially in the future.  The GOC has approved over 500 
extraditions to the United States, including 109 cases so far 
in 2007. 
 
------------------------ 
Plan Colombia Next Steps 
------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
consolidation strategy.  The proposal contains a heightened 
emphasis on social development, assigning new resources to 
consolidate governance, promote human rights, and to help 
displaced people, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. 
It also aims to further reintegrate 42,000 demobilized 
ex-combatants and deserters. 
 
10. (U) USAID receives approximately $130 million a year 
which funds programs in four key strategic area: alternative 
development and economic policy reform; justice reform, human 
rights and governance; demobilization and reintegration of 
illegal armed groups and assistance to internally displaced 
persons.  Alternative development receives approximately $70 
million a year, with spending on internally displaced person 
accounting for an additional $30 million.  Colombia has 
between 2 and 3 million displaced persons, including 
Afro-Colombians and other vulnerable populations. 
 
------------------------- 
Positive Economic Outlook 
------------------------- 
 
11. (U) Improved security has helped to boost the Colombian 
economy.  2006 GDP growth was 6.8 percent, while growth in 
the first half of 2007 has averaged 7.5 percent.  The United 
States remains Colombia's largest trade partner 
(approximately 40 percent of exports and 28 percent of 
imports).  Colombian exports to the U.S. have grown USD 1 
billion per year since the renewal and expansion of the 
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), a unilateral trade 
preference program, in late 2002. U.S. exports to Colombia 
increased approximately USD 2 billion during that period. 
 
12. (SBU) The CTPA remains the GOC's highest economic 
priority.  The Colombian Congress approved the CTPA in June 
and has since begun deliberations on the modification 
protocol.  Uribe and Colombians are increasingly bewildered 
that the U.S. Congress has not considered or passed the CTPA 
in light of what they see as Colombia's unflinching 
friendship over the past five years.  Some (including Vice 
President Francisco Santos) have mentioned to the media that 
Colombia may have to review it relations with the United 
States if the CTPA does not pass.  The U.S. Congress has 
extended trade preferences for Colombian exporters under the 
ATPA through February 2008. 
 
----- 
Labor 
----- 
 
13. (U) Trade unionists continue to fall victim to violence, 
but the number killed fell by over 60 percent from 2001-2006. 
 This drop reflects the GOC's overall success in reducing 
violence (homicides fell by over 40 percent during the same 
period), as well as increased funding for special protection 
programs for unionists, human rights activists, journalists, 
and other threatened groups.  The GOC also created a special 
unit to investigate and prosecute cases of labor violence, 
the sub-unit has successfully prosecuted 20 "priority" cases 
to date.  Still, human rights groups seek to condition U.S. 
congressional approval of the CPTA on further GOC progress in 
prosecuting cases of violence against unionists. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Military Justice and Improved Human Rights Record 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
14. (SBU) The GOC continues to make slow progress on human 
rights cases involving military abuse or collaboration with 
paramilitaries.  Minister of Defense Santos has identified 
military justice reform as a top priority; in October, he 
named the first civilian -- and the first woman -- as 
Director of the Military Criminal Justice System.  Human 
rights training is mandatory for all members of the military 
and police. In June 2007, the GOC set up a senior-level 
commission to develop policies to reduce extrajudicial 
killings and to support ongoing investigation of alleged 
killings.  In its annual 2006 report, the UN High Commission 
on Human Rights voiced concern that allegations of 
extrajudicial killings by Colombian security forces rose from 
145 in 2005 to 178 in 2006. 
 
-------------- 
Demobilization 
-------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 11,000 have deserted from all 
illegal armed groups (about half from the FARC).  FARC 
desertions increased significantly in 2007.  The GOC has 
developed a reintegration program to meet the demobilized 
needs -- the largest such reintegration program ever 
attempted.  A small percentage of renegade paramilitaries 
have joined new criminal groups,largely dedicated to drug 
trafficking, racketeering, and other crimes. 
 
16. (SBU) The Justice and Peace Law process for the 
ex-paramilitaries -- which provides reduced 5-8 year 
sentences for paramilitaries guilty of human rights abuses in 
exchange for truth and reparations -- is exposing the full 
extent of paramilitary penetration of Colombian society and 
politics.  It has helped solve over 200 murders and led to 
the exhumation of over 800 bodies of paramilitary victims. 
 
------------- 
Peace Process 
------------- 
 
17. (SBU) The military and the FARC have decimated the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), causing many of its fronts to 
increase narcotrafficking activities.  The GOC and ELN spent 
two years negotiating in Cuba without success.  Talks stalled 
largely because the ELN overestimates its leverage, insisting 
on substantive political reforms unacceptable to the GOC. 
The GOC-ELN talks recently moved to Venezuela, and the GOC 
agreed to have President Chavez facilitate the talks. 
 
18. (SBU) The FARC has refused to engage in meaningful peace 
talks, and killed eleven state legislators it had held 
hostage for five years.  President Uribe accepted an offer by 
Chavez to act as an intermediary to facilitate a possible 
"humanitarian exchange" of 45 "political" hostages held by 
the FARC for FARC prisoners in Colombian jails.   Still, 
Uribe said he would not accept the FARC's demand for a 
demilitarized zone as a prerequisite for talks, nor would he 
allow freed FARC prisoners to return to the FARC's ranks. 
Chavez and a FARC official have tentatively scheduled a 
meeting in Venezuela on October 8.  Another intermediary, 
Senator Piedad Cordoba, is seeking a meeting in the United 
States with FARC members "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia" 
(convicted in the United States of terrorism and drug 
charges, respectively).  The USG is considering the request. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
19. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 remain the longest held U.S. hostages in the 
world.  Their safe release remains a top U.S. priority, and 
we continually revise our diplomatic and military options for 
freeing the hostages.  The GOC continues to provide full 
assistance, and President Uribe has assured us the U.S. 
hostages will be included in any humanitarian exchange. 
Brownfield