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Viewing cable 07BOGOTA6697, CODEL PRICE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BOGOTA6697 2007-09-13 15:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #6697/01 2561516
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131516Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8769
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9306
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ SEP 8912
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5389
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0623
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4063
UNCLAS BOGOTA 006697 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ETRD KJUS PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  In an August 28 meeting with Codel Price, 
President Uribe explained the Justice and Peace Law and 
reiterated his commitment to extradite former paramilitaries 
who violate their peace process obligations.  He reviewed GOC 
efforts to reintegrate former paramilitaries -as well as FARC 
and ELN deserters- into civilian life, and discussed GOC 
efforts to combat the emergence of new criminal groups. 
Uribe recognized the GOC needs to do more to reduce labor 
violence, but cautioned that the failure of the U.S. Congress 
to approve the bilateral Free Trade Agreement would represent 
a serious political blow.  He stressed bipartisan U.S. 
support for Plan Colombia remains key to forcing the FARC to 
negotiate, and outlined GOC attempts to engage the ELN.  In 
response to Chairman Price's query, Uribe said he had 
significant differences with President Chavez but preferred 
to discuss them in private rather than to confront him 
publicly.  End Summary 
 
2. (U)  U.S. Participants: 
 
Representative David Price 
Representative David Dreier 
Representative Wayne Gilchrest 
Representative Jeff Miller 
Representative Rush Holt 
Representative Adam Schiff 
Representative Sam Farr 
DAS Christopher McMullen 
CDA Brian Nichols 
POLCouns John Creamer 
 
 
Colombian Participants: 
 
President Alvaro Uribe 
Ambassador Carolina Barco 
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos 
Trade Minister Luis Plata 
Presidential Trade Advisor Sandra Suarez 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Adriana Mejia 
National Planning Director Carolina Renteria 
 
 
3. (U)  House Democracy Assistance Committee Chairman David 
Price and his delegation called on President Uribe August 28 
for nearly two hours.  Rep. Price reviewed the Codel's 
meeting with their Colombian Congressional counterparts and 
asked if the GOC had considered strengthening the Colombian 
Congress' role in the budget process.  Representative Dreier 
said the Codel is considering helping the Colombian Congress 
develop its own budget analysis capability and asked 
President Uribe if such a project would be useful. 
 
4. (SBU)  Uribe said in contrast with some of its neighbors, 
Colombian democracy has a long history of respect for 
independent institutions. Colombia has four independent 
judicial institutions -the Constitutional Court, Supreme 
Court, Superior Judicial Council, and the Prosecutor 
General's Office- as well as two independent disciplinary 
bodies.  He acknowledged the executive controls the 
initiative on economic legislation, but said Congress had 
significantly modified all three tax reform packages proposed 
by the GOC.  Moreover, Congress recently passed a bill making 
it easier for Congress to censure a cabinet member, over 
executive branch objections.  Defense Minister and former 
Finance Minister Santos said Colombia's tradition of 
macroeconomic stability stems in part from the current budget 
process, saying "if it's not broke, why fix it."  Still, 
Uribe and Santos agreed it would be helpful to improve 
Congress' analytical capacity.  They would also support 
congressional intern exchanges with the United States. 
 
5. (SBU)  Price recalled several opposition legislators had 
criticized the Justice and Peace Law for favoring 
reconciliation at the cost of justice, and asked for Uribe's 
view.  Uribe replied the Justice and Peace Law breaks with 
past Colombian practice of giving former guerrillas a 
complete amnesty.  Several members of the current Congress 
had benefited from pardons for their past guerrilla activity. 
 In contrast, the Justice and Peace Law provide for reduced 
5-8 year sentences for former paramilitaries guilty of gross 
human rights abuses who confess their crimes and compensate 
their victims.  These paramilitaries are also banned from 
participating in politics.  Uribe said the GOC would expel 
paramilitaries who failed to comply with these requirements 
from the process and would extradite them if requested.  He 
had removed a paramilitary ringleader from the process for 
continuing criminal activity, and was reviewing the case of 
another for possible extradition to the United States. 
 
6. (SBU)  Uribe explained that the leftwing ELN and FARC 
reject the JPL as too harsh and demand a complete amnesty or 
pardon for their crimes.  Many opposition legislators 
criticizing the Justice and Peace Law as too soft support 
amnesty for the two guerrilla groups.  Uribe continued the 
GOC position believes that both the paramilitaries and 
leftwing guerrillas should receive equal treatment.  In the 
event of an ELN or FARC peace process, reconciling these 
different views would be difficult. 
 
7. (SBU)  Uribe stressed his support for extradition, noting 
the GOC had extradited more than 500 criminals to the United 
States during his presidency.  The FARC, ELN and some 
opposition legislators want to ban extradition, but he would 
oppose such a move.  Uribe said he had suspended the 
extradition of 11 former paramilitary leaders due to their 
participation in the peace process, but reiterated his 
commitment to lift the suspensions if they violated their 
obligations. 
 
8. (SBU)  Representative Farr offered that the GOC effort to 
demobilize and reintegrate into civilian society more than 
30,000 former paramilitaries is extraordinary and asked if 
any other countries are studying the program.  Uribe welcomed 
visits from any countries interested in learning from 
Colombia's experience.  Between the paramilitary process and 
individual desertions from the FARC and ELN, the GOC is 
reintegrating 46,000 former fighters into civilian life.  The 
recidivism rate among the demobilized is only 5%, but this 
means more than 2000 individuals have returned to new, 
emerging criminal groups. These criminal bands differ from 
the former paramilitaries, since they have no political goals 
and do not combat the FARC.  Still, they contribute to 
violence and undermine the rule of law.  Uribe said the GOC 
continued to combat these groups, with the security forces 
capturing 1800 and killing 400 over the last year. 
 
9. (SBU)  Representative Dreier voiced support for the 
bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), saying he hopes the 
United State Congress approves the accord.  Representative 
Holt explained the U.S. debate over the FTA centers largely 
on issues, such as labor, human rights and environmental 
standards, which have nothing to do with Colombia.  Uribe 
understood, but cautioned that if the United States Congress 
approves trade deals with Peru and Panama but not Colombia, 
the region will see it as a blow to Colombia. 
 
10. (U)  Uribe expected that the Colombian Congress will soon 
approve the environmental and labor changes sought by the 
United States in the FTA.  The GOC also seeks to improve 
protection of labor union members.  Murders of unionists fell 
over 60% between 2002 and 2006, and the GOC spent over $10 
million in 2006 to protect 1500 union leaders.  The GOC 
recognizes it needs to do more, but the overall trend is 
positive. 
 
11. (SBU)  Representative Schiff noted the progress in 
Colombia, and asked what Uribe's endgame with the ELN and 
FARC is.  Uribe said the transition of the FARC and ELN from 
ideological groups to narcotraffickers severely complicates 
GOC peace efforts.  Still, the GOC has held peace talks with 
the weaker of the two -the ELN- for almost two years in an 
effort to achieve a ceasefire.  The talks have floundered, 
because the ELN prefers to discuss abstract political issues 
rather than specific elements of a ceasefire.  Uribe said the 
GOC remains open to talks, but fears it will soon have no one 
to talk to if the process drags on.  Each month, more and 
more ELN fighters join the FARC. 
 
12. (SBU)  Uribe said GOC military pressure has succeeded in 
reducing the FARC from 27,000 members in 2002 to 10,000 
fighters today.  The FARC faces substantial military pressure 
but refuses to enter into serious peace talks.  Uribe 
predicted sustained military action -coupled with vigorous 
counternarcotic programs- would drive the FARC to the 
negotiating table by 2009 or 2010.  However, the GOC would 
need continued U.S. support under Plan Colombia to maintain 
this pressure.  In this regard, Colombia needs continued 
bipartisan support in the United States. 
 
13. (SBU)  Representative Miller said he supports the FTA on 
national security grounds and asked President Uribe how he 
planned to handle the August 31 visit of Venezuelan President 
Chavez.  Uribe said Venezuela and Colombia have differing 
ideologies, but share a 2200 kilometer border, growing 
commercial ties, and strong people-to-people links. 
Venezuela represents a key export market for Colombia, 
especially for labor-intensive industrial goods, and Colombia 
accounts for a large share of Venezuela,s non-oil exports. 
When Chavez abandoned the Andean Community, he created 
difficulties for many Colombian firms.  The GOC wants to 
persuade Venezuela to return to the regional group. 
 
14. (SBU)  Uribe said he tries to handle relations with 
Chavez in a cordial way.  He recognizes his ideological 
differences with Chavez, but does not like to publicly 
challenge him.  He believes it is more effective to discuss 
his concerns with Chavez in private.  Referring to Chavez, 
role as a facilitator in a possible humanitarian exchange 
with the FARC, Uribe attributed it to his authorization of 
opposition Senator Piedad Cordoba to help with the FARC. 
Cordoba immediately went to Caracas and asked for Chavez' 
support. 
 
15. (SBU)  Uribe said Chavez subsequently called him and 
offered his assistance. Uribe accepted, but on two 
conditions.  First, he said the GOC would never accept the 
FARC's demand for a demilitarized zone to hold talks on an 
exchange.  Second, any FARC prisoners released as part of an 
accord could not return to criminal activity.  Uribe said he 
would use Chavez' visit to reiterate these two conditions, as 
well as to explain past GOC efforts to engage the group.  In 
addition, Uribe stressed the GOC had communicated to the FARC 
that the three U.S. hostages must be part of any humanitarian 
exchange. 
 
16. (U)  Representative Price has cleared this message. 
Brownfield