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Viewing cable 07BASRAH82, ELECTRICITY ISSUES IN BASRAH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BASRAH82 2007-09-08 14:51 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REO Basrah
VZCZCXRO1890
RR RUEHBC
DE RUEHBC #0082/01 2511451
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081451Z SEP 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0595
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0177
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0627
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EAID ECON PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ELECTRICITY ISSUES IN BASRAH 
 
REF: A. BASRAH 077 
     B. BAGHDAD 2757 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: REO Discussions with a wide range of contacts 
revealed an intermittent supply of 8 to 9 hours of grid 
electricity per day for Basrah, with ever rising demand.  Single 
family or neighborhood for-profit generators are common, as is 
theft from grid lines. The lack of consumer billing provides no 
incentive to reduce demand. Basrah's refusal to cut load may be 
rooted in historical distrust of Baghdad. Generator fuel 
availability is insufficient. PRT and Army Corps of Engineers 
projects are helping to improve the system, but long-term 
maintenance deficiencies are troubling.  Oil field generators 
have excess capacity that could be tapped.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Electricity generation in Basrah is insufficient and 
demand continues to rise.  To obtain information for this cable, 
REO officers talked with Basrah University professors, 
Provincial Council members, Provincial officials, political 
party contacts, sheiks and clerics.  The answers were 
surprisingly uniform.  It is still dangerous for 
Coalition-related foreigners to travel outside the Basrah Air 
Station, so it is difficult to verify oral reports. 
 
3. (U) By uniform accounts, grid electricity is on for a pattern 
of two hours at a time, followed by four hours of no 
electricity.  (One contact reported three hours on, three hours 
off.) This pattern is counterproductive for general business 
activity and certainly for state-owned industries such as water 
and sewage systems.  In poor neighborhoods, it is common for a 
wealthier person to own a generator with which he sells 
electricity to his neighbors.  It is commonly reported that 
everyone who can afford a generator owns one.  All of our 
contacts with whom we spoke have their own generators and noted 
that a frequent problem was insufficient generator fuel. 
 
4. (U) Splicing into grid electric lines to draw off electricity 
is common.  Contacts noted that even if police were to arrest 
someone for theft of electricity -- which never happens -- the 
judicial system would not punish him.  Some politicians were 
nostalgic for Saddam Hussein's regime because of its absence of 
crime; if a person were caught stealing electricity, he was 
executed.  Most commentators reported that consumer electricity 
during Saddam's regime was about the same as now: 2 hours on and 
4 off. 
 
5. (U) The Basrah Electricity Authority has a billing process 
for electricity consumption, but it is not in use.  Although 
there is new home and business construction in Basrah, there is 
no active system to sign up (for fee) new users.  (Note: The 
Basra PRT and Army Corps of Engineers recently conducted a 
workshop to improve management of electricity and other 
infrastructure, reported Septel.  End Note.) While hard to 
quantify, it was universally reported that consumption of 
electricity has increased manifold and continues to increase. 
Where people had one air conditioner or fan, they now have six. 
People that had a radio in their house now have satellite 
television. (Note: Some USG experts in Basrah note that the 
commonly reported demand in the province for electricity, 
1200mw, would probably be around 900 if electricity was metered 
and people had to pay for it.  Conversely, if supply increased, 
demand would simply increase even faster as there is still 
plenty demand for air conditioners and other consumer items. 
End Note.) 
 
6.  Basrah substation managers are refusing at times to comply 
with directions from the Ministry of Electricity (ME) to shed 
load, it was commonly acknowledged.  Some commentators noting 
that militia forces threaten substation managers into not 
reducing Basrah load when directed.  Many noted a historic 
suspicion of Basrawis towards Baghdad, rooted in the common 
perception that Basrah had always produced power for the 
national system while the needs of the people in the populous 
province were not met.  Under Saddam's regime, if a substation 
manager had withheld electricity, he would have been executed. 
With little law enforcement in Al-Basrah, it was not surprising 
to many commentators that local managers would withhold 
electricity now that they could get away with it. 
 
7. (SBU) Governor Muhammed Wa'eli, in an August 30 REO meeting 
(Ref A), claimed that Basrah produces 7-800 Mw, with half of 
that powering the oil facilities and ports - leaving only around 
450mw for Basrah.  He agreed that electricity consumption in 
Basrah has increased due to a higher job growth rate than other 
provinces and increasing use of appliances.  Wa'eli suggested 
forming a committee to survey electrical consumption in order to 
demonstrate to Baghdad the increased Basrah demand. 
 
8. (SBU) Discussions with private contractors that have worked 
on electricity generation noted that oil production facilities 
 
BASRAH 00000082  002 OF 002 
 
 
have been withholding electricity from the national grid.  In 
one account, contractors involved in installing generation 
capacity for oil fields (to power their own operations) had 
excess capacity built in to feed that excess to the national 
grid.  The contractors wanted to test the designed maximum load, 
since the oil facilities would only need a fraction of the load. 
The site managers would not allow this for fear that the central 
government would learn that there was excess generation capacity 
and it would all be taken for Baghdad. 
 
9. (SBU) USG programs to improve generation are numerous and 
largely successful, but fuel supply and maintenance are 
obstacles.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has a number of 
substation projects in the province, and the Basra PRT is 
financing a $11.2 million 132kV Power Feeder cable.  All 
projects face an important limitation that U.S. citizens cannot 
visit the projects due to threats from militias; however the PRT 
and ACE have noted that they have good Iraqi engineers who 
supervise projects and use digital imaging to assess progress. 
 
10. (SBU) The greater problem is lack of maintenance once these 
projects are finished; in all discussions, including with 
Basrawis, it was noted that Basrawis are not planning for, 
budgeting for or executing maintenance for sophisticated 
machinery.  Electric transmission lines, while not suffering 
from much sabotage in Basrah, do suffer from lack of regular 
maintenance.  Other commentators have noted the generators built 
in 2003 and 2004 -- of a type quickly built but short-lived - 
were now wearing out.  A recent workshop (Septel) by the Basrah 
PRT and ACE to train politicians, technical directors and 
academics in electricity system management should help to meet 
electricity needs in Basrah. 
SIGNATURE