Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07ADDISABABA2796, A/S Frazer's Meeting with AU Commission Chair Alpha Oumar
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ADDISABABA2796.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07ADDISABABA2796 | 2007-09-10 15:27 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Addis Ababa |
VZCZCXRO2948
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2796/01 2531527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101527Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7783
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6264
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7097
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002796
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/S AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN
ROME PLEASE PASS TO A/S FRAZER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN SO SU AU
SUBJECT: A/S Frazer's Meeting with AU Commission Chair Alpha Oumar
Konare
1.(U): This cable is from U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU)
Ambassador Dr. Cindy L. Courville.
¶2. (U): SUMMARY
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer
met with AU Commission Chair Professor Alpha Oumar Konare on
September 7, 2007 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Their discussions focused on Darfur and on Somalia.
END SUMMARY
¶3. (U): PARTICIPANTS
AU
Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, AU Commission Chair
Mr. Kayumbu Mazimhaka, AU Commission Deputy Chair
Amb. Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security
Professor C.A.L. Johnson, Secretary to the AU Commission Amb. John
Shinkaye, Chief of Staff of the AU Commission Chair's Cabinet
USG
A/S Frazer
Amb. Cindy Courville, USAU
Daphne Titus, USAU
Berouk Mesfin, USAU
Lauren Landis, AF/SPG
DARFUR
¶4. (SBU):: The meeting began with A/S Frazer saying that she felt
significant progress was made on Sudan. She felt comfortable with
the UN resolution and with the fact that peace talks are moving
forward. She emphasized the need to adopt an approach to the peace
process which included talking to all parties, bringing in the IDPs,
and making sure that Abdul Wahid does not stand outside the process,
is not marginalized and is effectively brought in.
¶5. (SBU): On the Government of Sudan's (GoS) acceptance of the UNSC
resolution, A/S Frazer indicated that the GoS was moving forward
because of the stringent sanctions applied by the USG. Although she
would like the sanctions lifted as soon as possible, A/S Frazer
underlined the importance of keeping the pressure on the GoS. She
also stressed that the ball was now in the court of the UN and the
AU.
¶6. (SBU): Chairperson Konare appreciated A/S Frazer's assessment
and set out to explain the developments of the past few weeks. He
said that although he understood the errors committed by the GoS, he
felt that it was not necessary to impose sanctions as there has been
a change in behavior on the part of the GoS. He asserted that the
best way forward was to play a card of confidence. Chairperson
Konare said that the political groundwork ought to be done and
maintained, and that, at the same time, all partners and African
Heads of States ought to take a firm stand. He said that the African
Heads of State took such a firm stand in 2006 when they refused the
AU presidency to Sudan. It was reinforced, according to Chairperson
Konare, by the Arab League in general and King Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia in particular, the latter putting tremendous political
pressure on Sudan.
¶7. (SBU): Chairperson Konare reiterated his position that it was
important to have faith in the GoS, but at the same time, necessary
to show resolve and vigilance towards the GoS and the rebel
movements. He hopes the USG will play this card of confidence, and
also told French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in July to keep
playing this card. Chairperson Konare mentioned that he thought the
Gordon Brown/Nicolas Sarkosy offensive did not reflect the situation
on the ground. He disputed the prevailing notion of Sudan being a
burning house, although he acknowledged that there were problems
that needed to be addressed and actions that should even be
condemned.
¶8. (SBU): Chairperson Konare pointed out that if the Darfur problem
is not resolved quickly, it could spill over and create unmanageable
consequences, not only for Sudan but also for the whole of Africa.
He said that he has clearly told the Sudanese that the AU was
ADDIS ABAB 00002796 002 OF 005
fighting for one Sudan, a democratic Sudan that accepts diversity.
He declared that the independence of the South was not a solution,
and noted that the late John Garang understood the risks of
independence. He further said that the AU has repeatedly told the
various neighbours of Sudan not to play the game of destabilizing
Sudan. Chairperson Konare clearly stated that destabilizing Sudan
would result in destabilizing the Great Lakes region, the Horn of
Africa and even the Sahel.
¶9. (SBU): In reference to the upcoming UNGA, Chairperson Konare
asserted that the Darfur meeting scheduled for September 21 in New
York will provide a forum to facilitate evaluation of the political
process and the implementation of the UN resolution, and also help
speed up the process. He said that the meeting will have senior
level participants, and organized under AU/UN auspices, as well as
bring in humanitarian and human rights organizations working in
Darfur. The GoS would be invited; the USG and the EU could
participate as observers. He said that listening to all the parties
involved was of primary importance. He further said that an agreed
calendar listing dates for the implementation of resolutions and
decisions must be created.
¶10. (SBU): As far as Darfur is concerned, Chairperson Konare feels
that, despite obvious weaknesses in management and logistics, the AU
is searching for a formula that will enable it to move forward as
quickly as possible. He said that waiting for the perfect or ideal
situation was simply imprudent. The important thing for him was for
relevant parties to analyze the existing possibilities for
deployment. He hoped, as in his statements in Khartoum, to rely on
the African troops at hand that can be deployed quickly. Then, it
would be possible to bring in the UN to help in the domains where no
African troops have volunteered and, at the same time, avoid the
creation of a crisis of confidence on the part of the GoS.
¶11. (SBU): Chairperson Konare emphasized that it was crucial to
strike an agreement between the rebel movements and the GoS. Such an
agreement could create a solid basis to move forward. Chairperson
Konare added that Abdul Wahid has failed to clearly articulate what
he wants, and has only himself to blame for failing to negotiate and
obtain guarantees from the GoS.
¶12. (SBU): First, A/S Frazer raised concern about the delay in the
UN appointment of the Rwandan the Deputy Force Commander. She said
that the USG had done vetting and would like to see the appointment
confirmed. Secondly, she also raised concern that the mission should
not exclusively be composed of African troops, highlighting the
participation of a Chinese engineering company. She felt that
accepting a sequencing of deployment in Sudan that involved going to
the limits of African forces before infilling with non-African
troops was neither feasible nor effective, and would undermine
efforts to recruit for Somalia, where the participation of African
peacekeepers is even more critical.
¶13. (SBU): In response, Chairperson Konare emphasized the
importance of avoiding a crisis of confidence with the GoS. He then
stated that the AU has received no evidence whatsoever of improper
conduct against Rwandan Deputy Force Commander Major General Karenzi
Karake. Konare also said that the Deputy Force Commander still has
the confidence of the AU, and that he had already instructed
Commissioner Djinnit to tell the Deputy Force Commander to
immediately proceed to his post. If some negative evidence is
forthcoming in the future, the AU will take the appropriate
measures. He stressed the fact that the Rwandan troops are the most
exemplary in all the engagements they participate in, that he did
not wish to create confusion in their ranks, and that he especially
did not want to create the impression of defiance towards President
Kagame without reason.
¶14. (SBU): During the discussion of African troops, Chairperson
Konare underscored the need for a common understanding. He said
that, frankly speaking, there were a lot of difficulties during the
negotiations with the GoS. Thus, a compromise was warranted, in the
sense that African troops will deploy first to fill required
billets. If there are not enough African troops available to fill
the required billets, then non-African troops would be called in. At
this point, A/S Frazer commented that the resolution only used the
term predominantly African. Chairperson Konare replied that such
language represented a UN game. He has repeatedly told UN
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Guehemo that the
UN should take care of management, logistics and other technical
ADDIS ABAB 00002796 003 OF 005
aspects of the hybrid.
¶15. (SBU): A/S Frazer again noted that in no text, whether UN
Security Council resolutions or PSC communiques, was it mentioned
that the Darfur mission will only be filled by African troops. She
added that doing it in sequence could create a problem, and that the
force should not be all-African. A/S underlined that all relevant
written documents only state that the force will be predominantly
African, and states such as Nepal and Bangladesh are willing and
able to send troops.
¶16. (SBU): Commissioner Djinnit and Deputy Chairperson Mazimhaka
then explained to Chairperson Konare that while most of the force
would be African, it may be necessary to deploy non-African troops
in the early phase of the deployment before December 31, such as the
Chinese engineers and the Nepalese. They emphasized to Chairperson
Konare that the overall balnce in the end will result in a
predominance of African troops. Chairperson Konare pointed out that
that he was not a military planner, and accepted the explanation
provided by Djinnit and Mazimhaka. Chairperson Konare underlined
that the AU values the support of both the UN and USG and that all
three working together could only increase the efficiency of the
mission in Darfur. He said that the AU had absolutely no reason to
support the GoS. He said that, at no time, did he change his stance
on the matter. He affirmed the need to avoid misunderstandings and
to continue having discussions, and declared that the AU cannot move
forward without the support of the USG. Chairperson Konare said that
is essential to maintain a common front in order to resolve the
Darfur problem. Otherwise, the GoS will be able to play on the lack
of a common front.
¶17. (SBU): Chairperson Konare said that it was not easy for the UN
and the AU to arrive at a common understanding. The AU always tried
to move forward with what it has at its disposal, and then make
adjustments. Konare reiterated the importance of not perpetually
giving the impression that the GoS cannot be trusted even if there
are credible reasons to doubt its sincerity. He drew attention to
the large amount of incentives the USG offered to the GoS in
previous years; offers that were not taken up by the GoS and that
are no longer on the table as a result. Maintaining the common front
was, for Chairperson Konare, the only way to force the GoS not to
spoil the present window of opportunity. Despite, the track record
of the GoS, Chairperson Konare believes that compromise is sometimes
needed to go forward as the situation can change completely, for
instance, if the rebel movements and the GoS reach a deal.
SOMALIA
¶18. (SBU): Chairperson Konare stated that Somalia was clearly a big
problem. He mentioned the meeting of Somali opposition forces
organized by the Eritrean Government on September 6. Chairperson
Konare was convinced that the date for the meeting was not innocent
as there was a meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
on the same day. He said that it was the anti-Ethiopian feeling that
united the forces gathered in Asmara, the same anti-Ethiopian
feeling displayed by President Isaias. Chairperson Konare said that
this sentiment is dangerous and could lead to war if all concerned
parties including the AU and USG are not cautious. He said that he
did not have all the facts about the conclusion of the Somali
reconciliation conference in Mogadishu. Yet, he believed that the
conference did not reach its goal as testified by what was underway
in Asmara. He said that there are many things that need correction,
and that broadening the dialogue with some of the forces sitting in
Asmara. He declared that African troops ought to be quickly sent to
Somalia, thus ensuring the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.
¶19. (SBU): He also said that a worrying factor was the weakness of
the present Somali Government and undue foreign interference.
Chairperson Konare is convinced that only a strong and
representative government, which takes care of the people's problems
and has its own capable army, can bring a solution to the actual
Somali conflict. The two ways of having a representative government
were, according to him, either having elections or establishing an
all-inclusive dialogue. He said he was surprised to hear the Somali
Government talk of holding elections within two years. Holding such
elections in the absence of real political parties, of freedom of
press and uncompromised businessmen would only give power to the
Islamists who totally hold sway over the Somali social fabric.
¶20. (SBU): Chairperson Konare said that it was easier and less
ADDIS ABAB 00002796 004 OF 005
costly to help set up a strong government with its own army rather
than end up sending 10,000 or 30,000 African troops. He added that
UN troops would not be a solution and even doubted if the UN would
step in Somalia any time soon. Instead, he recommended that the UN
and AU work hand in hand to ensure the redeployment of the Ethiopian
troops. If the Ethiopian troops do not withdraw fast, Chairperson
Konare predicted dire implications for Ethiopia. He said that, for
Ethiopia, withdrawing from Somalia would enable it to solve the
trouble in the Ogaden and to contain the potential Islamist threat
within its own borders.
¶21. (SBU): Chairperson Konare informed A/S Frazer that he had
appointed a new representative for Somalia that will be based in
Mogadishu in order to take part in the political process. He
considered that the present Somali Government has left the AU aside
on the political front, and believed that if the AU is not brought
on board the situation in Somalia will not improve at all, with the
dynamics set in Asmara getting the upper hand. A/S Frazer completely
agreed with the analysis of Chairperson Konare and said that the
focus should be on bringing in African troops. The USG is ready to
provide USD 2-3 million to finance any contingent that is ready to
go in. It will complete the training of the Burundian battalion by
mid-October. The French did not train the Burundians well according
to A/S Frazer, and the USG provided them training with the proper
equipment.
¶22. (SBU): Chairperson Konare highlighted once again the urgency of
getting African troops because he is greatly preoccupied by the
political situation in Burundi which was rather volatile and getting
sticky, and also of the possibility that there could be a coup. He
said that Commissioner Djinnit went to Burundi to advice Burundian
President Nkurunziza to manage the political situation as serenely
as possible. He said that the priority for Nigeria was Darfur and
not Somalia. As to the possibility that South Africa would provide
equipment, Chairperson Konare voiced his concern that South Africa's
internal situation was not conducive. Commissioner Djinnit informed
the meeting's participants that South Africa had initially made a
general commitment to provide support in finance, logistics, and
that he would pursue the matter with South African Foreign Minister
Zuma. A/S Frazer inquired if Chapter 8 could be used to assist
African troops to go in. Commissioner Djinnit replied that there was
such a possibility, and that Chairperson Konare had sent a letter to
the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asking for the UN's assistance
in finance and logistics. Chairperson Konare added that the UN ought
to recognize that it has a responsibility to make sure that there is
peace and a strong government in Somalia.
¶23. (SBU): A/S Frazer noted that the national reconciliation
conference had actually issued a good communiqu and seems to try to
reach out to all entities and groups. She raised the significance of
having the AU speak out more on the extremist elements. A/S Frazer
also said that Eritrea was playing the spoiler and that it was not
acceptable. Chairperson Konare reiterated the importance of getting
Ethiopian troops out, thus denying the anti-Ethiopian opposition of
a pretext not to join in the dialogue. And, he said that the
appointment of a new representative for Somalia based in Mogadishu
was to increase the AU's evaluation, approval or censure of
different groups. He agreed that Eritrea was acting as a
troublemaker in Somalia, and also in Darfur. Nevertheless, he
alluded to the support that Eritrea, which is too weak to act alone,
receives from close allies of the US such as Qatar.
OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES
¶24. (SBU): Chairperson Konare then called the attention of A/S
Frazer to a number of regional issues that the USG should be
attentive to. The first issue was that of Sudan and Somalia. The
second issue was the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
And the third issue was the deteriorating situation in the Sahel.
Chairperson Konare said that he did not need to say more on the
first issue, as it was sufficiently covered in the meeting. As to
the second issue, that of the Democratic Republic of Congo, he
recommended that President Kabila should be pressed not to put down
the rebellion of General Nkunda militarily and rather seek dialogue
and negotiation. He also identified the Interhamwe as the primary
obstacle for a lasting peace in the country and emphasized the dire
need to get rid of the threat from this force. A/S Frazer responded
to this issue by saying that she has spoken to Presidents Museveni,
Kabila and Kagame that they have all kept open their lines of
communication, and that there will be soon a Tripartite Plus meeting
ADDIS ABAB 00002796 005 OF 005
in Kampala, Uganda. She acknowledged the need for a more aggressive
joint operation to push back negative forces.
¶25. (SBU): Turning to the third issue, that of the Sahel,
Chairperson Konare explained that drug trafficking was destabilizing
the Sahel's fragile African states. The drug trafficking route going
through the coast and Mauritania was responsible for destabilizing
Mauritania, the north of Niger, the north of Mali, Chad, Darfur, and
Algeria where a deadly suicide bomb attack occurred just yesterday.
He raised the instability in Niger as a case in point. The Prime
Minister's government was recently voted out of office, and the
Tuareg are engaged in a rebellion in the north of the country.
Furthermore, Niger has oil-related problems with Libya, and
uranium-related problems with the French nuclear engineering group
Areva. He said that he recently sent Commissioner Djinnit to urge
Niger's President Tandja, who seems to have opted to crush the
Tuareg rebellion militarily, to exercise maximum restraint. He also
noted that Niger's destabilization could spill over and touch Chad,
Darfur and Mali, citing the recent incident involving suspected
Tuareg rebels who abducted Malian soldiers and took them off to
Niger. Chairperson Konare was also concerned that a coup d'etat
could be staged in Niger.
¶26. (SBU): Chairperson Konare especially criticized the
Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative launched by the USG. He
complained that the initiative bypassed state authorities and dealt
directly with local communities. He also questioned the rationale of
the initiative citing the example of Morocco where Islamists are
expected to make gains in the upcoming elections. A/S Frazer
responded by saying that the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism
Initiative aimed at countering extremist influences in the Sahel and
at assisting governments to better control their borders by focusing
on military training of state authorities while supporting NGO
activities that assist local communites via USAID programs. She also
pointed out the problem the USG has in dealing with rebel groups
such as the ONLF and the Tuareg rebellion, which are domestically
based but still entertain links to extremist groups such as Al
Qaeda.
¶27. (SBU): A/S Frazer concluded the meeting by offering to
follow-up with Chairperson Konare on strategizing about how best to
deal with Africa's many insurgencies and to ensure that the TSCTP is
effective in countering the terror threat in the Sahel.
¶28. (U:) Assistant Secretary Frazer has cleared this message.
YAMAMOTO