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Viewing cable 07TOKYO4011, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/29/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO4011 2007-08-29 08:21 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2807
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #4011/01 2410821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290821Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7050
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5291
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2864
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6490
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1863
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3610
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8688
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4748
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5671
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 004011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/29/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) Opinion poll: Support rate for new Abe cabinet at 40.5 PERCENT 
 
(2) Spot poll on new Abe cabinet 
 
(3) Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy losing voice in decision 
making 
 
(4) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 4): Gulf trauma 
expands SDF's overseas activities 
 
(5) UN geographical panel supports Japan's rebuttal, noting, "A new 
name can't be forced on Japan" 
 
(6) New Abe cabinet: Faltering growth strategy; Argument calling for 
putting on hold consumption tax hike; Premise for corporate tax 
break collapses 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Opinion poll: Support rate for new Abe cabinet at 40.5 PERCENT 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
August 29, 2007 
 
In the wake of the establishment of the new Abe cabinet, Kyodo News 
Service conducted a nationwide telephone opinion survey from the 
night of August 27 through the 28th. The rate of support increased 
11.5 points to 40.5 PERCENT  from the previous survey conducted on 
July 30-31 immediately after the July 29 House of Councillors 
election. The disapproval rate dropped 13.5 points to 45.5 PERCENT . 
The approval rate has surpassed the 40 PERCENT  level for the first 
time since mid-May. 
 
Asked for reasons for supporting the cabinet, 34.3 PERCENT  of 
respondents -- the largest number -- said "because there is no one 
more appropriate," 25.0 PERCENT  cited "trust in the prime 
minister," and 9.4 PERCENT  said because they pin hopes on political 
reform. A mere 2.2 PERCENT  of respondents said the prime minister 
has leadership. 
 
(2) Spot poll on new Abe cabinet 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 29, 2007 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage) 
 
Q: Prime Minister Abe shuffled his cabinet on Aug. 27. Do you 
support the new Abe cabinet? 
 
Yes 44.2 
No 36.1 
Other answers (O/A) 2.6 
No answer (N/A) 17.1 
 
Q: When you saw the Abe cabinet's new lineup and his ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party's new executive lineup, did you think Prime 
Minister Abe has changed his political approach? 
 
TOKYO 00004011  002 OF 008 
 
 
 
Yes 25.0 
Yes to a certain degree 14.2 
No to a certain degree 10.3 
No 37.5 
N/A 12.9 
 
Q: Do you think something can be expected of the new cabinet as 
compared with the one before its shuffle? 
 
Yes 54.8 
No 28.1 
Can't say which 9.5 
N/A 7.6 
 
Q: Do you think the new cabinet has many people who are able or 
experienced? 
 
Yes 62.1 
No 22.7 
N/A 15.3 
 
Q: Do you think the new cabinet has many people who are fresh? 
 
Yes 28.1 
No 57.8 
N/A 14.1 
 
Q: Do you think the new cabinet has many people who are close to 
Prime Minister Abe? 
 
Yes 29.7 
No 48.0 
N/A 22.3 
 
 
Q: Do you think Prime Minister Abe considered LDP factions and 
heavyweights? 
 
Yes 54.9 
No 26.4 
N/A 18.6 
 
Q: What would you like the new cabinet to tackle on a priority 
basis? Pick as many as you like from among those listed below, if 
any. 
 
Economy, employment 82.4 
Consumption tax 57.3 
Pension system 87.5 
Social divide 56.2 
Education 69.5 
North Korea 63.2 
Politics and money 73.4 
Constitutional revision 35.1 
O/A 0.6 
Nothing in particular 0.5 
N/A 1.0 
 
Q: Do you think it would be better to dissolve the House of 
Representatives as soon as possible for a general election? 
 
 
TOKYO 00004011  003 OF 008 
 
 
Yes 38.8 
No 53.2 
N/A 8.0 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 31.8 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30.9 
New Komeito (NK) 4.0 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.4 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.9 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.3 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.1 
Other political parties --- 
None 25.2 
N/A 3.5 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from 7 p.m., Aug. 27, 
through Aug. 28 on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) 
basis. A total of 1,753 households were found to have one or more 
eligible voters. Valid answers were obtained from 1,036 persons 
(59.1 PERCENT ). 
 
(3) Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy losing voice in decision 
making 
 
MAINICHI (Page 11) (Abridged) 
August 29, 2007 
 
The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which has been 
serving as a driving force behind the structural reform drive by the 
Koizumi and Abe administrations, is on the verge of collapse. The 
reason is that with the opposition bloc controlling the House of 
Councillors following the July election, chances are increasing that 
the authority to coordinate and determine essential economic 
policies will shift to talks between the ruling and opposition camps 
and between the government and ruling coalition. Although Hiroko 
Ota, who will continue to serve as state minister in charge of 
economic and fiscal policy in the new Abe cabinet, has described 
fiscal consolidation and economic growth as "two wheels of a cart," 
the government's economic policy itself might change in quality. 
 
The Abe administration, inheriting the scheme of overhauling the 
nation's revenues and expenditures at the same time from the 
previous Koizumi administration, has aimed at achieving a budget 
surplus in 2011. The CEFP chaired by Prime Minister Abe produced in 
June what is called the Economic and Fiscal Reform 2007 that 
advocates continued spending cuts. 
 
The CEFP is markedly less powerful than during the Koizumi era when 
the council often bulldozed its views regarding postal privatization 
and other tough issues. Still, the council has been serving as the 
venue for the Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence) to make 
policy decisions, allowing Prime Minister Abe to squelch objections 
in the government and ruling parties. 
 
That was all based on the ruling bloc's dominance in the Diet. The 
situation has dramatically changed with the subsidy-oriented 
Democratic Party of Japan's overwhelming victory in the July Upper 
House election. 
 
In reshuffling his cabinet, Abe has given the post of chief cabinet 
 
TOKYO 00004011  004 OF 008 
 
 
secretary to Kaoru Yosano, a former economic and fiscal policy 
 
SIPDIS 
minister and currently a CEFP member attaching importance to fiscal 
discipline. Abe has also retained Economic and Fiscal Minister Ota. 
But today's political situation no longer allows the CEFP to play a 
central role in decision making. 
 
The opposition bloc is likely to press the ruling coalition hard for 
greater spending in the upcoming budged compilation. Even if the 
CEFP calls for strict fiscal discipline and a continued reform 
course, its voice might be toned down in Diet deliberations. 
 
(4) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 4): Gulf trauma 
expands SDF's overseas activities 
 
TOKYO (Page 1) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
One says Japan has a "trauma" from the Gulf War. 
 
In 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the border and invaded Kuwait. 
Multinational forces launched operations to remove the Iraqi 
occupation troops in Kuwait in the Gulf War. Japan contributed a 
huge amount of money to the tune of 13 billion dollars, equivalent 
to 1.7 trillion yen at the time. However, Japan came under fire in 
the international community for not sending any troops from its 
Self-Defense Forces to help Kuwait. Japan was blamed for shedding no 
blood or sweat. 
 
Japan felt small in those days. This bad feeling became a trauma, 
which motivated Japan to send SDF members for overseas activities. 
Whenever Japan was called to send SDF troops for overseas 
activities, the Gulf War trauma always flashed back in the Diet. 
What was the truth? 
 
In March 1991, the government of Kuwait ran an advertisement in a US 
newspaper to thank 30 countries, including the United States. 
Japan's name was not on the thank-you list. 
 
The then chief cabinet secretary, Koichi Kato, a former secretary 
general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, recalls: "In the 
LDP, 40 PERCENT  were upset. But 60 PERCENT  in the party gave up 
because they knew money can't buy everything." 
 
In point of fact, however, the 13 billion dollars might have been 
mostly paid to the United States, which led the multinational 
forces. 
 
In addition to its initial donation, Japan seconded the 
multinational forces with another outlay of 9 billion dollars or 
1.18 trillion yen. In that money's disclosed breakdown, 1.079 yen 
went to the United States. However, the amount of money that went to 
Kuwait was only 630 million yen-far smaller than the money paid to 
the United States. The money was originally for the postwar 
reconstruction of Kuwait. However, the money was not used for that 
purpose. That is why Japan was not in the thank-you ad. 
 
"That's the Foreign Ministry's fault," says a former high-ranking 
official of the government. This former government official added: 
"Japan paid the greater part of the war costs. But the Foreign 
Ministry didn't explain this fact to Kuwait. They say a country that 
makes no personnel contributions is not appreciated in the world. 
 
TOKYO 00004011  005 OF 008 
 
 
That's wrong." 
 
However, the Japanese government did not give up on personnel 
contributions in the Gulf War. 
 
In August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, a group of Foreign 
Ministry officials gathered every night in their administrative vice 
minister's room. Their meetings lasted till dawn. The discussions 
heated up on whether to send civilians like the Japan Overseas 
Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) or whether to send SDF personnel. The 
then administrative vice foreign minister, Takakazu Kuriyama, 
maintained that the SDF is a military force. The Foreign Ministry 
then planned to have SDF members take days off and send these 
off-duty SDF members in the capacity of civilians. 
 
However, the then LDP secretary general, Ichiro Ozawa, who now heads 
the leading opposition Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto), agreed 
with the Defense Agency, now the Defense Ministry, on its plan to 
send SDF members. The government brought a "United Nations Peace 
Cooperation Bill" before the Diet. However, the opposition bench 
voted against the legislation. In the end, the bill died stillborn. 
What came up next was an agreement of the LDP, New Komeito, and the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP or Minshato) to create another body 
that is apart from the SDF. This non-SDF entity was intended to work 
together with the United Nations on its peacekeeping operations. It 
was a compromise with an image of civilians. 
 
The idea of launching a non-SDF body faded out in the process of 
parliamentary deliberations. Instead, a law for cooperation on UN 
peacekeeping operations or the so-called PKO Cooperation Law, which 
features allowing Japan to send SDF personnel for overseas 
activities, was enacted in June 1992. The LDP often referred to the 
"Gulf War trauma" as a telling phrase. 
 
Nine years later, in September 2001, terrorists attacked the United 
States at its nerve centers. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign 
Ministry asserted that the Gulf War trauma must not be repeated. The 
Diet speeded up its deliberations to legislate special measures 
against terrorism. After a month's deliberations, the legislation 
was enacted into the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. Under this 
antiterror law, Japan has sent a Maritime Self-Defense Force 
squadron to the Indian Ocean to back up an antiterror campaign in 
Afghanistan. 
 
The "Gulf War trauma" was talked about in Diet deliberations on the 
Iraq Special Measures Law for Japan's dispatch of SDF troops to 
Iraq. "The SDF makes a good show when going out," says former 
Ambassador to the United States Shunji Yanai, who was director 
general of the Treaties Bureau at the Foreign Ministry when the Gulf 
War broke out. "In the case of 13 billion dollars," Yanai added, "it 
doesn't." 
 
What touched off the "Gulf War trauma"? Was it really the Foreign 
Ministry's fault? The trauma has been a source of energy for Japan 
to expand the scope of SDF activities overseas. In December last 
year, the Self-Defense Forces Law was revised at long last to task 
the SDF with overseas activities as its primary missions. Its magic 
spell is still alive. 
 
(5) UN geographical panel supports Japan's rebuttal, noting, "A new 
name can't be forced on Japan" 
 
 
TOKYO 00004011  006 OF 008 
 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 29, 2007 
 
Masako Nagato, New York 
 
The ninth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of 
Geographical Names was held. In the session on Aug. 27, South Korea 
and North Korea suggested renaming the Sea of Japan "East Sea" or 
"Korean Sea" respectively, but the discussion made no headway with 
many participants favoring Japan's rebuttal saying that "this 
conference is neither a conference to discuss a certain geographical 
dispute over renaming nor is it a conference with the authority to 
decide on a geographical name." 
 
South Korea and North Korea have made similar assertions since 1992, 
the year after they joined the UN, but Chairman Ormeling indicated 
that the matter should be resolved through talks among the countries 
concerned, noting: "Each country cannot force other countries to use 
a certain geographical name. The standardization of geographical 
names will be promoted if there is a consensus among the countries 
concerned." 
 
Japan intends to hold discussions with South Korea, but the South 
Koreans criticize Japan's position, arguing, "Japan is not 
cooperative about consultations." 
 
South Korea and North Korea have insisted that they have 
historically called this sea area the "East Sea" or the "Korean 
Sea", but that they were forced by Japan to call it the Sea of 
Japan. 
 
On the other hand, Japan rebutted that Western countries in their 
maps created in the early 19th century already called that area the 
"Sea of Japan," and that the act of naming it the "Sea of Japan" had 
nothing to do with Japan's colonial rule of Korea. 
 
Japan also explained that the name "Sea of Japan" has been endorsed 
or used by the UN and the International Hydrographic Organization 
(IHO), adding that a survey conducted in 2005 by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs found that some 90 PERCENT  of textbooks and maps 
used by 67 countries described that area the Sea of Japan. 
 
According to the Japanese government, there was no country that 
declared its support for either South Korea's or North Korea's 
proposal, but Japan's assertion received agreement from Australia, 
Britain, France, and some other countries, including indirect 
agreement. 
 
(6) New Abe cabinet: Faltering growth strategy; Argument calling for 
putting on hold consumption tax hike; Premise for corporate tax 
break collapses 
 
ASAHI (Page 9) (Excerpts) 
August 29, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Abe replaced some key ministers in the cabinet 
shuffle on Aug. 27. The new cabinet has gotten under way with the 
opposition camp now controlling the Upper House. It is going to face 
many tough issues including an extension of the Antiterrorism 
Special Measures Law, the immediate focus of attention, as well as a 
number of livelihood issues, including tax reform, pensions and 
education. Where is policy heading now? 
 
TOKYO 00004011  007 OF 008 
 
 
 
Tax and fiscal policy 
 
Asked about his impression of the new Abe cabinet, Yasuaki Wakui, 
president of Kuraray, a leading chemical company, during a press 
conference on Aug. 28, categorically said, "I cannot possibly 
imagine this cabinet will serve out until the Lower House members' 
tenure expires in Sep. 2009." He continued, "It is not possible now 
for the cabinet to adopt policies as we wish. I don't think we can 
drastically reform the tax system. The cabinet has no power base to 
accomplish its various policy goals." 
 
Business circles are increasingly concerned that the realization of 
a corporate tax break, on which they are pinning high hopes, might 
be put off further into the future. A corporate tax reduction 
intended to boost the competitiveness of companies and to lure 
foreign companies has been a key pillar of the government's growth 
strategy, which is one of the showcases of the Abe cabinet's 
management of the economy and fiscal administration. 
 
Business circles have been strengthening a call for lowering by 10 
PERCENT the effective tax rate of 40 PERCENT  imposed on companies. 
It would have been a major tax break amounting to 4 trillion yen. 
However, their calculation was derailed due to the crushing defeat 
of the ruling parties in the July Upper House election. 
 
The newly-appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano attaches 
importance to the reconstruction of public finances. Some business 
leaders take the view that Yosano is negative about a corporate tax 
cut because he attaches importance to fiscal reconstruction, as can 
be seen in the fact that he played a leading role in the fiscal 
structural reforms of the Hashimoto administration. 
 
What makes this prospect more decisive is the fact that it has 
become difficult to hike the consumption tax, which had been 
regarded as a precondition for a corporate tax break. It had been 
expected that a bill hiking the consumption tax would be introduced 
during the ordinary Diet session next year. However, an increasing 
number of LDP Tax System Research Commission members now take the 
view that it would be useless to submit a bill that the opposition 
camp is strongly opposing. 
 
Since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) has become the 
first party in the Upper House election, even if the ruling camp 
submits a bill amending the tax system or a budget bill, it can no 
longer secure Diet approval for certain. In order to realize policy 
proposals, talks with the DPJ have become necessary, but it will not 
be an easy job. 
 
The ruling camp has hinted at a desire to give priority to facing 
the DPJ over such issues as the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law 
and the "politics and money" scandals for the time being. However, 
if minimum pension benefits and subsidies for farmers become 
subjects for Diet debate, the issue of how to finance expanded 
benefit payouts will crop up. The DPJ has yet to make full 
preparations for discussions on such issues. 
 
The cabinet will receive pressure not only from the DPJ but also 
from the ruling camp over the compilation of the fiscal 2008 
budget. 
 
In the budget request guidelines compiled right after the Upper 
 
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House, the cabinet has managed to maintain its policy of cutting 
public works by 3 PERCENT  and constraining social security spending 
by 220 billion yen. However, ruling party members are not content 
with the outcome, with some complaining, "We were defeated in the 
Upper House election, because we were unable to secure enough 
budgets for regional districts." 
 
The fiscal environment is extremely harsh. Efforts to reconstruct 
state finance strapped with more than 580 trillion yen in 
outstanding balance of debts have yet to be put on the track. 
 
DONOVAN