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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3914, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/23/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3914 2007-08-23 08:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7781
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3914/01 2350837
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230837Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6801
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5165
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2734
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6355
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1756
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3493
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8558
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4622
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5567
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 13 TOKYO 003914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/23/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) Spotlight on anti-terror law deliberations: Half of all fuel 
supplied by MSDF in Indian Ocean goes to US ships 
 
(2) Japan, India to work together in a broad range of areas, but 
gaps exist in expectations -- India in pursuit of actual benefits 
 
(3) Japanese, Indian business leaders urge leaders to sign EPA 
 
(4) US calls for investment in Pacific islands 
 
(5) How Prime Minister Abe will treat key persons -- Fukuda and 
Tanigaki in cabinet reshuffle? Is silence golden for key persons? 
 
(6) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (2): 
DPJ strategy 
 
(7) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (3): 
Prime minister after Abe 
 
(8) "Borderline" ties the hand of SDF 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Spotlight on anti-terror law deliberations: Half of all fuel 
supplied by MSDF in Indian Ocean goes to US ships 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
Eve., August 23, 2007 
 
In connection with the Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) 
non-reimbursable oil-refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, where 
MSDF ships are deployed, it has been learned from a Defense Ministry 
document that over nearly six years, oil was supplied to a total of 
11 countries participating (in mop-up anti-terrorist operations), 
and that nearly 350 times or half of the refueling went to US 
warships. The Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law will expire Nov. 
1, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) has taken a 
stance opposing an extension of that law. While the government and 
the US are stressing that the anti-terrorist war has "international 
breadth," the question of how to evaluate the weight given to 
assisting the US will be one focus of attention in the deliberations 
on the anti-terror bill in the extraordinary session of the Diet 
this fall. 
 
 The document is a paper titled, "State of SDF activities and 
accomplishments." It seems to have been prepared for use mainly to 
brief opposition party lawmakers, based on the opposition camp 
occupying a majority of seats now in the Upper House. 
 
The purpose of the multinational force's "blockade activities at 
sea" is to block terrorist movements at sea and stop oceanic 
transport of weapons and drugs to Afghanistan. According to the 
document, the MSDF since December 2001, not long after the terrorist 
attacks on America, until this July 26, has supplied fuel to 
warships of 11 countries for a total of 769 times, with oil totaling 
approximately 480,000 kiloliters (valued at approximately 21.9 
billion yen). Of this, US ships were supplied 350 times, much more 
than Pakistan, which was supplied 135 times. France came in third 
with 94 times. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003914  002 OF 013 
 
 
However, the number of times for refueling and the volume of oil 
supplied have been dropping every year. The peak was 175,000 
kiloliters in 2002, but the fuel supplied yo the ships dropped to 
48,000 kiloliters in 2006.  Since the special measures law was 
extended last Nov., refueling of Pakistani warships occurred 30 
times, greater than the US (16 times) and France (17 times). 
 
The document refers also to blockade activities at sea. There were 
over 11,000 incidents of boarding inspections; over 140,000 wireless 
inquiries. Stating that the number of suspicious vessels had 
dropped, the report revealed that the number of wireless inquiries 
had dropped from 41,000 in 2004 to 9,000 in 2006. 
 
(2) Japan, India to work together in a broad range of areas, but 
gaps exist in expectations -- India in pursuit of actual benefits 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 23, 2007 
 
Tsuyoshi Yamada, Yushi Kihara, New Delhi 
 
SIPDIS 
 
In a meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe confirmed that the two countries would cooperate 
in a broad range of areas, including global warming and security 
affairs. Japan aims to strengthen relations with India, which is 
rapidly increasing its presence. To this end, Japan has prepared a 
number of "economic assistance" cards toward India. India, however, 
is cool-headedly assessing the actual benefits it might obtain from 
cooperation with Japan, while being positive about improving 
relations with China and Russia as well. 
 
"It's a good example that Japan and India as members of the 
international community will work together to combat climate 
change," Abe stressed at a press briefing after the summit talks 
with Singh yesterday. Abe also indicated his willingness to offer 
technical assistance to India to improve energy efficiency. 
 
The two leaders displayed their intention to work together to create 
a post-Kyoto Protocol framework, but when it came to specifics, the 
gaps in their views were conspicuous. Abe underscored in the talks: 
"I think it is necessary for India to be committed in some way or 
the other to a new framework." In response, Singh said, "I'll give 
serious consideration to the long-term goals," but at a press 
conference, Singh highlighted the need to strike a balance between 
the environmental issue and economic growth. Given that the 
environmental dispute between industrialized and developing 
countries is likely to surface again once full-fledged international 
talks on climate change begin this fall, whether the two countries 
can work together in actuality is an open question. 
 
Eyeing security, Abe is attaching importance to India apparently 
with the aim of forestalling China, which is expanding its military 
strength. During the summit talks, Abe and Singh agreed to 
strengthen defense cooperation and discussed how to expand 
information exchange at the working level on joint military 
exercises and terrorism. 
 
While Japan is pursuing cooperation in a broad range of areas to 
include the environment and security, India is pursuing practical 
benefits like improvement of infrastructure, technical assistance to 
the industrial sector, investment, and acceptance of work force. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003914  003 OF 013 
 
 
India's growth potential is drawing not only Japan's attention but 
also other countries' as well. The United States finalized 
negotiations on a historic civil nuclear agreement by making big 
concessions to India and it is eagerly watching for an opportunity 
to access the distribution sector and the financial market in India. 
America's list of items for cooperation with India ranges from 
military affairs and aerospace to agriculture and is practical. 
 
Russia, which has been traditionally friendly toward India, already 
announced it would render cooperation to India regarding the 
construction of a nuclear power plant in that country. Russia is 
also increasing its presence as a supplier of oil and gas to India. 
Although China has a border dispute with India, some 60 Chinese 
firms have already advanced into India. 
 
Japan and India were alienated from each other for many years, but 
they have now recognized each other as an important partner. But 
India has no intention to give special treatment to Japan as Foreign 
Minister Mukhergee said that India was pushing ahead with 
"unprecedentedly omnidirectional diplomacy" at present. 
 
(3) Japanese, Indian business leaders urge leaders to sign EPA 
 
YOMIURI (Page 11) (Excerpts) 
August 23, 2007 
 
An economic mission accompanying Prime Minister Abe on his visit to 
India, chaired by Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 
Chairman Fujio Mitarai and composed of about 200 business leaders, 
held a business leaders forum with Indian businessmen on Aug. 22. In 
the forum, the Japanese mission urged the Japanese and Indian 
leaders to sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA). The two 
leaders issued a joint statement that included the goal of doubling 
the value of bilateral trade by 2010. Japan and India have so far 
been remotely related on the economic front, but business leaders 
expect the bilateral ties will deepen from now. 
 
300 million middle-income earners 
 
Mitarai said in the forum: "Japan and India have been remote in 
terms of goods, services, humans, equity, and information." 
 
According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, trade 
between Japan and India in 2005 totaled 6.7 billion dollars in value 
terms. This figure accounts for only 3.5 PERCENT  of the value of 
trade between Japan and China. The accumulated amount of direct 
investment in India up to 2005 was 1.79 billion dollars, equivalent 
to only 7.3 PERCENT  of investment in China. But the mission was 
composed of as many as over 200 businessmen, more than the 180 on 
the occasion of the prime minister's visit to the Middle East this 
spring. This large number shows that the Japanese business world is 
greatly interested in doing business in India. 
 
In India with a population of about 1.1 billion, the ratio of 
middle-income earners who earn 90,000 rupees or about 253,000 yen to 
all households sharply increased from 9.5 PERCENT  in 1995 to 28 
PERCENT , or about 3 people, in 2005. The Japanese industrial world 
sees India as a potential consumption market. 
 
Meanwhile, India expects more investment from Japan. Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath said in the forum: "We want not 
only leading companies but also small to medium-sized firms to 
 
TOKYO 00003914  004 OF 013 
 
 
invest more in India." 
 
The weak economic ties between Japan and India are attributed to 
such negative factors in India as delay in economy-related legal 
arrangements, non-transparent investment rules, and poor industrial 
infrastructure, such as railways and port facilities. 
 
In the forum, Mitsui & Co. Chairman Nobuo Ohashi said: "We hope 
India will introduce more convenient rules." 
 
A questionnaire survey by the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation found that Japanese firms see India as the second 
potential country for their new businesses, following China. But as 
tasks India should address, 50 PERCENT  of respondents cited 
inadequate industrial infrastructure, such as railways, and 30.9 
PERCENT  listed nontransparent application of its legal system. 
 
In the Japan-India forum, participants also presented their leaders 
with a package of proposals calling for an early conclusion of an 
EPA and for easing or abolishing restrictions on foreign capital. 
 
In their joint statement, Prime Minister Abe and his Indian 
counterpart Singh pledged to sign an EPA at an early date. An EPA 
now under negotiations proposes trade liberalization, such as 
lowering tariffs, as well as measures related to direct investment, 
such as the construction of plants. If both sign the accord, the 
environment for bilateral trade and investment will significantly 
improve. 
 
In a leaders' statement, both sides confirmed the need for the two 
countries to cooperate in promoting an industrial main-artery 
concept designed to construct railways, etc., between New Delhi and 
Mumbai. The Japanese government has supported this concept. If both 
sides decide to implement such initiatives, investment by Japanese 
private firms is expected to boost. 
 
On this concept, however, it has been reported that India has asked 
Japan to offer a huge amount of financial aid. The two governments' 
working groups planned to compile an interim report on plans to give 
specifics to the concept, timed with the Japan-India summit. But 
since both failed to reach agreement on its scale and funds 
procurement, they were not able to come up with a report. It is 
likely to take time for Japan and India to build a favorable 
environment to strengthen their economic ties. 
 
(4) US calls for investment in Pacific islands 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
Eve., August 22, 2007 
 
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior David Cohen at a press 
conference in Tokyo yesterday urged Japanese business investment in 
Pacific islands like Guam, where part of the US forces stationed in 
Japan will be relocated. The relocation will create demand for new 
infrastructure, such as public facilities, since the island 
population is likely to increase. A conference to discuss business 
opportunities will take place this October in Guam, with concerned 
US government officials, senior officials from various countries, 
and business leaders attending. 
 
(5) How Prime Minister Abe will treat key persons -- Fukuda and 
Tanigaki in cabinet reshuffle? Is silence golden for key persons? 
 
TOKYO 00003914  005 OF 013 
 
 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 23, 2007 
 
Prior to the reshuffling on Aug. 27 of the cabinet and the lineup of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) executives, former Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori said that former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, 
71, and former Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62, would become 
key persons for party unity. The outlook is that the political trend 
will drastically change, depending on how Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
will treat them. 
 
Fukuda may serve in cabinet post, depending on conditions 
 
On July 31, two days after the LDP's devastating setback in the July 
29 House of Councillors election, Mori reminded the prime minister, 
who called on him at his office: 
 
"The key words to the cabinet reshuffle are assurance and security. 
You should ask Fukuda and Tanigaki to assume cabinet posts. It is 
meaningful to ask them to serve in cabinet posts even if they 
refrain from accepting the request." 
 
This story spread immediately. When asked by a junior lawmaker about 
it, Fukuda replied blandly: "Don't you know such a favor will drive 
me into a corner?" Although Fukuda was regarded as the strongest 
rival to Abe in the LDP presidential election last September, he 
announced in July that he would not run due to his age. Although he 
has not appeared in the central political stage since the Abe 
administration was inaugurated, many LDP members still want to see 
him become prime minister due to his consensus building method. 
Faction head-level lawmakers, who do not want to see a rapid 
generational change, have strong confidence in him. Whenever the Abe 
cabinet displays immaturity, a view is always raised that if only 
Fukuda were prime minister. 
 
However, Fukuda and Abe are like oil and water. When Fukuda was 
serving as chief cabinet secretary and Abe was Fukuda's deputy in 
the Koizumi cabinet, the two were seriously at odds over the 
government's North Korea policy and other issues. Abe is a grandson 
of former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and the second son of former 
Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, while Fukuda is the oldest son of 
former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. The fact that both belong to the 
Machimura faction has made their relationship complicated. Due to 
Fukuda's dovish thinking and a hidden motive of wanting to split the 
Machimura faction, there is strong expectation in the Tsushima and 
Koga factions that Fukuda would become the next prime minister. 
 
Fukuda has recently criticized the government, saying, "There is the 
wrong idea in the Prime Minister's Official Residence that they can 
do anything." Regarding Abe's decision to stay in office, he 
reportedly quipped: "That's the worst choice." 
 
Although Fukuda often says that it is not that he became a 
politician because he likes the job, a person close to him said, 
"His interest in national politics has become stronger over the past 
year." The dominant view is that if the prime minister asks him to 
join his cabinet, he won't turn down the offer depending on the 
situation. 
 
He appears to be thinking that if he accepts the offer easily, he 
will lose his value. Fukuda then told his aide: "Silence is 
 
TOKYO 00003914  006 OF 013 
 
 
golden." 
 
Tanigaki gauging circumstances in the party 
 
Tanigaki stayed at his residence in Tokyo on Aug. 4, cancelling his 
planned Mt. Fuji climb, which he did last year. 
 
His aides expected that he finally had made his move, but he carried 
out no political activities, but just cleaned his bicycle. He went 
overnight cycling to Chichibu on Aug. 11. 
 
A senior member of the Tanigaki faction, which is a den of anti-Abe 
forces, said that the LDP's crashing defeat in the Upper House would 
be a good chance for the faction to hold the reins of government. In 
a meeting on Aug. 7 of the Lower House members, former defense chief 
Gen Nakatani, secretary general of the Nakatani faction, urged Abe, 
who was also preset the meeting, to step down from office. He made 
the calculated remark. The prevailing view in the Tanigaki faction 
is that if Tanigaki is offered a cabinet post, he should decline it. 
A mid-level lawmaker in the faction said: "If he joined the Abe 
government, he would lose the chance to become a LDP presidential 
candidate for good." 
 
In a meeting on the night of Aug. 8 at a Japanese restaurant in the 
Akasaka district, Tanigaki sought to constrain his followers, 
saying, "We should watch calmly the circumstances." Tanigaki, whose 
pet word is "bonds" or "ties," believes that jockeying for power 
should be avoided. He has, however, openly said: "Before making a 
decision to remain in his post, the prime minister should sum up the 
defeat in the July Upper House election and show his guidance for 
the future." He has continued to try to check Abe. Aides to Tanigaki 
are upset about his equivocal behavior. One aide said: "We could not 
see early-morning sunlight this year, as well. If Tanigaki accepted 
the offer, his faction would break up." 
 
(6) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (2): 
DPJ strategy 
 
Tokyo Shimbun (Page 2) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
By Shoichi Takayama 
 
Question: The power balance between the ruling and opposition 
parties was reversed in the Upper House.  Although it has been 
nearly a month since the Upper House election, various public 
opinion polls have indicated that the approval rating for the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is high and on a par with that of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  Will the DPJ be able to 
maintain that strength? 
 
Answer:  Indeed, until now, the DPJ usually lost momentum quickly, 
even if it made a leap in the national elections.  That is because 
the opposition parties never had a majority (in either Diet 
chamber).  The ruling parties, in the end, continued to take the 
lead in the Diet, and voters were disappointed at the powerlessness 
of the DPJ.  But things are different this time.  The opposition 
parties have such a great advantage in the Upper House that the LDP 
has not room for political maneuvering to cobble together a 
majority. 
 
A Bitter Experience 
 
TOKYO 00003914  007 OF 013 
 
 
 
Q: What will change? 
 
A: The DPJ now holds the initiative in the Upper House.  DPJ member 
Satsuki Eda was sworn in as Upper House speaker.  Since the LDP was 
formed in 1955, this is the first time that a lawmaker from a party 
other than the LDP has become the Upper House speaker. 
 
Q:  What will happen during the extraordinary Diet session in the 
fall? 
 
A:  The situation should be drastically different from before.  When 
the ruling camp had the initiative, the Upper House simply voted on 
the many government-sponsored bills sent over from the Lower House, 
where more than 70 percent of time allocated for deliberation was 
spent.  However, such will no longer be the case. 
 
The opposition camp will now be able to thoroughly probe into the 
deficiencies of the bills and the ambiguous replies during 
deliberations.  The opposition will be able to summon sworn or 
unsworn witnesses as they wish.  The opposition camp is also 
expected to utilize the right of the Diet Houses to conduct 
investigations of the government, the exercising of which has been 
effectively prevented by the ruling parties, and to look into the 
workings of the administration and the way that taxes are used. 
 
The government and the ruling parties, which will be in trouble, 
will probably call on the opposition camp to hold negotiations to 
revise bills. 
 
Q:  Will the DPJ accept negotiations? 
 
A:  No, that will not happen.  The DPJ had a bitter experience. 
 
At the extraordinary Diet session in 1998, when the opposition 
parties had dominance in the Upper House, then DPJ President Naoto 
Kan stated that the financial issue "will not be utilized as a step 
to seek a change of power."  Because the DPJ took a cooperative line 
with the ruling camp, the Liberal Party under then party leader 
Ichiro Ozawa, gave up on the united front among the opposition 
parties and formed a coalition government with the LDP.  The DPJ 
lost an opportunity to take power. 
 
DPJ lawmakers are feeling strongly that they should never repeat 
that mistake.  DPJ President Ozawa has said, "We will not be able to 
fulfill our responsibility to the people (the popular will) which 
was expressed in the election, if we negotiate with the ruling 
parties and come up with a policy formulated by simply adding one 
plus one and divide it by two." 
 
Numerical Strength 
 
Q:  Then, will the Upper House reject government-sponsored bills one 
after another? 
 
A:  The opposition parties will oppose bills that are symbolic of 
the confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties.  An 
example of this is a bill to extend the anti-terrorism special 
measures law, which is required to continue the Indian Ocean 
refueling mission by Self-Defense Force ships. 
 
However, the opposition camp will not "oppose everything."  They are 
 
TOKYO 00003914  008 OF 013 
 
 
also expected not to unnecessarily adopt censure resolutions against 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe or cabinet ministers.  Because the 
opposition parties have criticized politics by the ruling camp as 
"oppression backed by numerical strength," there is a possibility 
for the opposition parties to antagonize the public, if they take a 
rough approach based on the numerical strength. 
 
Q:  Then, how are they going to take power? 
 
A:  Their scenario is to carry out an offensive at the Diet to drive 
the Abe administration to dissolve the Lower House and call a 
general election, by which the party can take power at once in that 
election. 
 
Q:  Will they be able to take power by taking such an ordinary 
tactic? 
 
A:  By fully utilizing the of the Diet chambers to conduct 
investigations and by summoning witnesses, they will expose problems 
of the administration in all kinds of fields, such as the public 
pension system, the practice of bureaucrats getting lucrative jobs 
after retirement, and the issue of money and politics.  They will 
also adopt at the Upper House bills that can easily gain 
understanding of the people.  These bills include a bill to ban the 
use of pension premiums for other purposes and a bill to eradicate 
the practice of bureaucrats getting lucrative jobs after retirement. 
 The opposition parties think that there will be increasing public 
call for a change of administration, if the ruling parties vote down 
these bills at the Lower House.  If Prime Minister Abe is driven 
into a corner, he will have no other choice but to take a chance and 
dissolve the Lower House for a general election.  Perhaps, this is 
the strategy that Ozawa envisages. 
 
Q:  Will it be so easy as that?  The Lower House election might be 
put on the back burner and Prime Minister Abe might just step down. 
 
A:  There is a possibility for these things to happen.  Although 
that will not be a happy development for the DPJ, which hopes that 
"a Lower House election will be held at an early date, so that we 
can fight against Prime Minister Abe," there is nothing that the 
opposition parties can do about it.  There are no reliable steps to 
drive the prime minister to an  early dissolution. 
 
The Right Path 
 
Q:  Will Ozawa engineer the reorganization of the political parties 
to bring about a power change? 
 
A:  I do not think that he will take that strategy.  Under the Lower 
House's single-seat constituency system, in which a political party 
fields only one candidate in an electoral district, it is difficult 
for a large-scale political realignment to take place.  First of 
all, given the difference in the number of seats held by the ruling 
and opposition parties in the Lower House, a change of power is 
impossible unless about 100 LDP lawmakers leave the party.  The 
people are also fed up with repeated realignments of political 
parties.  A negative opinion about that strategy is prevailing in 
the DPJ: "The political realignment is not the right path to take." 
 
Q:  Is it possible for a change of power to take place in the next 
Lower House election, regardless of when the election will be held 
or who will fight that battle? 
 
TOKYO 00003914  009 OF 013 
 
 
 
A:  The party officials concerned with election affairs are 
explaining that "a basic formula (to gain a victory) was established 
in the Upper House election."  The DPJ should field a fascinating 
candidate, build up cooperation with the other opposition parties, 
and present policies that can gain public approval as the party did 
in single-seat constituency in the Upper House election campaign. 
This is the "right path" for the DPJ to take.  Ozawa is expected to 
tour around provinces again to gain wider support. 
 
(7) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (3): 
Prime minister after Abe 
 
Tokyo Shimbun (Page 2) (Full) 
August 23, 2007 
 
By Ryuji Watanabe 
 
Question:  Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers must be nervous 
about the shuffling of ministers and party executives coming up on 
27 August. 
 
Answer:  No, the situation seems different this time.  Many LDP 
lawmakers are saying that they do not want to board a sinking ship. 
After the crushing defeat in the Upper House election, the lawmakers 
are more interested in the question of when to hold the next Lower 
House election and who should become party leader to fight the 
election battle. 
 
First strike to win the battle 
 
Q:  The previous Lower House election was held in September 2005. 
Lower House lawmakers' term of office will end in September 2009. 
So, there are two years remaining until the next general election. 
 
A:  The ruling coalition comprising of the LDP and New Komeito lost 
their majority in the Upper House.  The opposition parties will now 
launch an offensive to drive the ruling bloc into dissolving the 
Lower House for a snap election.  In order to dodge the opposition 
camp's offensive and stabilize the administration, the ruling 
parties need to again win the majority in the next Lower House 
election and prove that voters do not wish a change of government. 
 
Q:  If bills sponsored by the government or the ruling parties are 
rejected by the Upper House, it will not be possible to enact them 
unless the Lower House passes them again by a two-thirds majority. 
Currently, the ruling bloc has enough Lower House seats for that, 
but it will be difficult for them to maintain those seats after the 
next Lower House race.  Moreover, the ruling parties may even have 
to hand power over to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), depending 
on the election result. 
 
A:  The ruling camp will be in a fix if they are reluctant about 
dissolving the Lower House, out of concern for such a risk.  They 
could be forced to dissolve the Lower House under disadvantageous 
circumstances, if the opposition parties drive them into a corner. 
Instead, the better course of action for the ruling parties would be 
to launch the first strike in order to win the battle: they should 
go ahead and carry out the dissolution at a timing that is 
advantageous for them. 
 
Q:  I wonder if the LDP will fight the Lower House election battle 
 
TOKYO 00003914  010 OF 013 
 
 
under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership. 
 
A:  The prime minister suffered a fatal blow in the Upper House 
race.  Thus, he no longer has the political energy to recover his 
former cabinet approval rating and be the leader in the battle that 
will decide the fate of the LDP.  The dominant view is that the LDP 
should fight the Lower House battle under a new party president 
(prime minister). 
 
Q:  At present, there is not a growing call for Prime Minister Abe's 
resignation. 
 
A:  Moves to "remove Abe" will become increasingly active later this 
year, if the cabinet approval rating remains low even after the 
cabinet reshuffle and if the Diet adopts a censure motion against 
the prime minister.  Even if he tides over the upcoming 
extraordinary Diet session, demands for his resignation will grow 
strong at once, if he faces such a setback as turmoil in 
deliberations during the next ordinary Diet session. 
 
Rivals 
 
Q:  Who are candidates for new LDP president? 
 
A:  Foreign Minister Taro Aso is the most likely candidate to be the 
next party president.  His informal way of talking is gaining high 
popularity.  When Jiji Press conducted an opinion poll in early 
August and asked, "Who is the most suited lawmaker to be the next 
LDP president?"  Aso was in second place (with 14.9 percent) after 
former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (with 17.1 percent).  Aso's 
popularity was much higher than that of the lawmaker in the third 
place. 
 
Q: But Aso's problematic remarks are also cause for concern. 
 
A:  There are many lawmakers who were disappointed at his remark 
that "even people with Alzheimer's disease can understand this 
much."  There is also a concern over his tactic of joining hands and 
acting as one with the prime minister.  Aso is expected to be 
assigned to a key post in the cabinet shuffle on 27 August. 
However, if more people get the impression that he is in the same 
boat with Prime Minister Abe, it will become difficult for him to 
clearly express his own character, even when he becomes LDP 
president. 
 
Q:  Who are his rivals? 
 
A:  Former Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki and former Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda are being mentioned as rival 
candidates.  Tanigaki fought against Abe in the LDP presidential 
election last fall and has been assuming a critical stance toward 
the prime minister since then.  He can run in the party presidential 
race, advocating a change from the "Abe politics," but his 
popularity is not increasing.   Although some LDP members are hoping 
that Fukuda will become the next party president, support for him is 
not growing. 
 
Q:  I hear that there is a plan to let former Prime Minister Koizumi 
become prime minister again, or make Defense Minister Yuriko Koike 
the first female prime minister. 
 
A:  Both of them are clearly denying such a possibility, but the LDP 
 
TOKYO 00003914  011 OF 013 
 
 
is a party that has done whatever it can do to remain in power. 
Because Koizumi and Koike are both popular, it cannot be said that 
the possibility is zero. 
 
Revitalizing the Party 
 
Q:  When will the Lower House be dissolved? 
 
A:  It is rumored in the LDP that the dissolution will take place: 
1) during the current year if there is turmoil during the 
extraordinary Diet session in the fall; 2) in the spring of 2008, 
after the passage of the fiscal 2008 budget bill; and 3) after the 
Lake Toya summit of the Group of Eight major powers in Hokkaido 
(which will be held from 7 to 9 July, 2008). 
 
Q:  But when is it most likely? 
 
A:  If the dissolution is carried out during the current year, the 
LDP will not have enough time to revitalize itself, based on lessons 
learned from the Upper House election.  This way, the LDP may end up 
giving the opposition parties an advantage.  It is necessary for the 
LDP to secure time to rethink its election strategy, notably 
policies for provinces, and reflect these policies on the national 
budget.  If the LDP will do these things, the dissolution will take 
place in or after next spring, when the fiscal 2008 budget bill is 
enacted. 
 
Q:  So, it is more likely that the Lower House will be dissolved 
under Prime Minister Aso next spring. 
 
A:  If we make a prediction at present point, such is likely.  In 
political circles, however, nobody can tell what may happen next. 
Thus, there is a good possibility for a lawmaker other than Aso to 
become prime minister.  Even so, it will not change the trend of the 
time to dissolve the Lower House at an early date under a new party 
president. 
 
(8) "Borderline" ties the hand of SDF 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Abridged) 
August 23, 2007 
 
By Hiroyuki Noguchi 
 
In Japan's security laws, there is a fictitious "borderline" that 
divides "peacetime" from "contingency." It is a product of a 
negative response to the military that was established after the 
war. The fictitious "borderline" was devised by some government 
officials and lawmakers as a "safety device" to prevent the 
Self-Defense Forces from taking reckless actions. Contrary to the 
original purpose, the "borderline" is now serving as a shackle for 
the SDF, heavily restricting its emergency operations. 
 
Suppose a Japanese transportation system was bombed by a North 
Korean special unit. The SDF is allowed to use force only in defense 
operations, which should follow an armed attack on the country from 
outside. Asked for the definition of an armed attack on Japan from 
outside, a government official indicated that "it is a calculated 
and organized armed attack on the country by a foreign country." 
Will a special unit reveal its identity? Given the possibility of 
Islamic fundamentalist groups or extremists in the country attacking 
Japan, the government might not be able to issue an immediate order 
 
TOKYO 00003914  012 OF 013 
 
 
to the SDF for defense operations. 
 
Procedures before issuing an order for defense operations contain 
some problems as well. The government is allowed to issue an order 
for mobilizing the SDF for guarding specific locations following a 
terrorist attack. But influential Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers 
questioned if SDF troops are allowed to point guns at civilians, and 
this has prompted the government to remove such places as the 
Imperial Palace, the Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence), 
the Diet building, and nuclear power plants from the list of 
locations requiring protection, leaving only SDF and US bases on the 
list. In other words, the SDF is allowed to guard other facilities 
only when police forces and the Japan Coast Guard are unable to do 
so. SDF mobilization is often requested by police forces during 
their joint drills. Many people mistakenly believe that mobilizing 
the SDF in case of emergency is ensured by law, which is common 
sense. The nonsensical legislation has been betraying the public. 
 
The betrayal stems form the government's artificial decision that 
police forces would take charge during peacetime and the SDF during 
contingencies, forging a fictitious idea that the SDF would take 
military action only during national contingencies on an extension 
of police authority. 
 
Attacks by special commando units and agents may widely vary in 
area, frequency, scale, and danger. Peacetime and contingency could 
occur randomly. They could even occur at the same time in some 
areas. 
 
At the same time, the existence of the gray zone, which is nether 
peacetime nor contingency, can no longer be explained with the 
borderline theory alone. 
 
A contingency on the Korean Peninsula could easily spill over to 
Japan. But such a situation in the initial stage would not 
constitute a contingency in Japan. The government therefore has come 
up with the concept of "contingencies in areas surrounding Japan," 
which fits in between peacetime and contingency in Japan. 
 
The SDF is allowed to refuel US naval vessels in areas distinct from 
combat zones during contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. Under 
the law, the SDF is also allowed to halt its refueling operation in 
the event a US vessel is attacked while receiving fuel. This is 
tantamount to legal guarantee for betraying and deserting an ally in 
the face of an enemy on the strength of the "borderline." 
 
Rear areas, including the Japanese territories, are particularly 
prone to terrorism. It would be highly effective to let a North 
Korean special unit make a terrorist attack on Japan during a 
contingency on the Korean Peninsula in order to intimidate the 
Japanese public with the aim of forcing the SDF to discontinue its 
logistical support for the United States. Terrorism is expected in 
Japan instead of "areas surrounding Japan." Advanced missile 
technology could also turn the rear areas into combat zones in a 
second. Even if Japan draws a line, North Korea could easily cross 
it. 
 
"The legal basis facing up to reality that can make full use of the 
country's defense capability" and the "state decision-making 
mechanism" that are essential for defending sovereignty are now 
dysfunctional, given those abstract expressions and the fictitious 
"borderline." They would remain dysfunctional as long as the 
 
TOKYO 00003914  013 OF 013 
 
 
legislative and administrative branches hold on to the postwar logic 
of not allowing the SDF to take military action until the last 
minute. 
 
MESERVE