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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3877, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/22/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3877 2007-08-22 08:21 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6682
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3877/01 2340821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220821Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6738
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5135
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2704
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6325
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1726
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3463
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8530
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4593
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5544
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 003877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/22/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) Kin Town assembly calls on US Embassy to halt construction of 
new firing range; Same request to Prime Minister's Official 
Residence (Kantei), as well 
 
(2) Japan-India summit today; Japan eager to strengthen ties, 
despite India's tough diplomatic approach 
 
(3) Japan, Malaysia to strengthen cooperation on PKO 
 
(4) All deputy chief cabinet secretaries to be replaced, number of 
prime ministerial advisors to be reduced 
 
(5) LDP Secretary General Nakagawa expresses positive stance on 
"grand coalition with DPJ" 
 
(6) New Komeito gradually distancing itself from LDP, with Soka 
Gakkai distrustful of Prime Minister Abe 
 
(7) Interview with Nobutaka Machimura, chairman of Machimura 
faction: Government should change order of policy priorities 
 
(8) Editorial: Political funding needs a solid system 
 
(9) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 1): Top-secret team 
set up six months before Iraq war; Cabinet Secretariat alone drafted 
special legislation 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Kin Town assembly calls on US Embassy to halt construction of 
new firing range; Same request to Prime Minister's Official 
Residence (Kantei), as well 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
Tokyo 
 
In connection with the issue of the construction of a small-arms 
firing range for the US Army's special forces being planned near 
Range 3 of the US military's Camp Hansen, a delegation led by 
Yoshimasa Matsuda, head of the town assembly of Kin visited 
consecutively the US Embassy and the Kantei yesterday to call for an 
immediate halt in the planned construction. 
 
According to Matsuda, Raymond Greene, the chief of the security 
affairs section of the US Embassy sought the assembly side's 
understanding, stating: "We looked into whether there might be 
another place for the training, but came up with the conclusion that 
the only place for it was Camp Hansen. The training will be carried 
out more safely and more effectively than before." 
 
Responding for the Kantei, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiji 
Suzuki did not refer specifically to halting the planned 
construction, but would only say, "We will transmit to the US side 
that safety is thoroughly and properly ensured." When the requests 
that started on the 20th were delivered, Matsuda stated: "The 
government has blindly followed the US' intention, and the gap in 
thinking between it and the local government, which is appealing 
 
TOKYO 00003877  002 OF 011 
 
 
against an increase in the local burden, is great. The firing range 
is not yet built, so we would like to continue working on the 
government to block it." 
 
(2) Japan-India summit today; Japan eager to strengthen ties, 
despite India's tough diplomatic approach 
 
SANEKI (Page 5) (Slightly abridged) 
August 22, 2007 
 
Sugimoto, New Delhi 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, now on a tour of Asia, will met Indian 
Prime Minister Singh in India on Aug. 22. Based on his 
value-oriented diplomatic approach, Abe will seek stronger ties with 
India, which places importance on the rule of law and basic human 
rights. China has built up its naval power in the Southwest Asian 
seas region, such as the Indian Ocean. Under such a situation, Japan 
and India share the common challenge of ensuring the safety of sea 
lanes as routes for vessels to transport crude oil from the Middle 
East. India, though, is also eager to expand relations with China. 
It therefore is not certain to what extent Japan will be able to 
deepen strategic ties with India in dealing with China. 
 
Prime Minister Abe said in a policy speech in Indonesia on Aug. 20: 
"Japan-India relations are more remote than what they ought to be in 
the economic, political, and security areas." Abe and Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also confirmed when they met the 
need for both countries to join hands in ensuring safe navigation 
and peace-building in the Straits of Malacca. 
 
Even before assuming office, Prime Minister Abe advocated that Japan 
should strengthen ties with countries that have common values, such 
as democracy. In the Japan-United States summit in April, Abe 
proposed a four-way dialogue among Japan, the US, Australia, and 
India. President Bush expressed his support for it. This proposal is 
apparently aimed to hold in check moves by "China, which does not 
share values with Japan," as said by a government source. 
 
Among the countries that share common values with Japan, the prime 
minister is keen to come closer particularly to India. Besides its 
potential market, an accompanying source cited as the main reason 
for Abe's approach to India: "Both share the interests in terms of 
security, such as the need to ensure the safety of sea lanes as 
routes for oil to be transported from the Middle East." Abe had also 
exchanged views on this issue with leading Indian government 
officials when he visited India in March 2005 as LDP deputy 
secretary general. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
By increasing its defense budget annually in the double-digit range 
for the 19th consecutive year, China has upgraded its distance 
deployment capability. The threat China has posed to Japan and 
India, both of which are adjacent to China, is becoming more serious 
year by year. China supported a project to expand the naval base and 
commercial port facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan, which has a tense 
relationship with India. China also set up a radar base on the 
leased Cocos Island in Burma (Myanmar), located near the Indian 
military base on the Andaman Islands - an Indian territory. In 
Chittagong in Bangladesh, China renovated port facilities as part of 
efforts to make them more convenient for its navy. A Foreign 
Ministry official said: "Its stronger precaution and angry reaction 
to China's moves have prompted India to reinforce its navy." 
 
TOKYO 00003877  003 OF 011 
 
 
 
Under such a situation, Japan, the US, and India carried out their 
first joint training in the Pacific Ocean, in waters near Japan, 
this April. In September, five countries - Japan, the US, Australia, 
India, and Singapore - will conduct joint training in the Bengaru 
Gulf in the Indian Ocean. In the planned meeting with the Indian 
prime minister, Abe is expected to stress the need for the two 
countries to promote security cooperation further and to propose a 
strategic dialogue among Japan, the US, Australia, and India. 
 
When former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India in April 
2005, the Japanese and Indian leaders agreed to start a discussion 
on jointly developing oil and natural gas development in waters near 
the Andaman Islands. During Prime Minister Abe's visit, Japan-India 
cooperation is expected to take shape. 
 
In the past, China and India often engaged in a military clash over 
the demarcation of a borderline, but they have also improved their 
relations, on the strength of deepening economic ties. 
 
In a China-Russia summit this March, the two countries confirmed 
that they would beef up efforts to strengthen trilateral relations 
among China, Russia, and India. In a China-India summit last 
November, the two countries agreed to double the value of their 
trade to 40 billion dollars by 2010. As it stands, they have 
steadily translated their own diplomatic strategies into action. 
Keeping such moves in mind, Japan intends to watch carefully what 
moves India will make, as a Foreign Ministry source said: "India has 
developed a complicated, tough diplomacy." 
 
Prime Minister Abe arrived at Palam Air Force Station in New Delhi, 
India, on the afternoon of Aug. 21, local time. 
 
(3) Japan, Malaysia to strengthen cooperation on PKO 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
The government decided yesterday to strengthen cooperation with 
Malaysia on United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). 
Specifically, Japan will work out personnel assistance measures, 
such as dispatching experts in the Defense Ministry to the PKO 
training center in Malaysia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is scheduled 
to visit Malaysia on Aug. 23. He intends to incorporate such 
assistance measures in a joint statement that the two countries' 
leaders will issue when they meet. 
 
Malaysia is a foremost PKO advanced country in Asia, having its own 
PKO training center. The training center, established in 1996, has 
invited lecturers from various countries. They lecture to government 
forces and civilian police officers about UN organizations and 
technologies related to weapons to be used in PKO. The center has 
also accepted students from many other countries and international 
institutes, including Japanese. 
 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso announced last August a concept to 
establish small private schools (Terakoya) in Asia designed to 
nurture personnel who will engage in peace-building activities. The 
aim of stepping up cooperation with Malaysia in the PKO area is also 
to give impetus to the Terakoya concept. 
 
The joint statement will also specify cooperation between the two 
 
TOKYO 00003877  004 OF 011 
 
 
countries in containing global warming. Japan will provide the 
Malaysian government with its technology to produce biofuel, which 
will lead to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Malaysia produces 
palm oil, raw material for biofuel. The prime minister hopes to back 
up the global efforts to redress the global warming problem through 
such Japan-Malaysia cooperation. 
 
(4) All deputy chief cabinet secretaries to be replaced, number of 
prime ministerial advisors to be reduced 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) 
August 22, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is likely to refresh the Kantei (Prime 
Minister's Official Residence) lineup timed with the reshuffle of 
his cabinet, planned for August 27. It became certain yesterday that 
in addition to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki, who is 
expected to be replaced, Hakubun Shimomura and Seiji Suzuki will 
resign as deputy chief cabinet secretaries for parliamentary 
affairs. There is also a strong possibility that Junzo Matoba will 
step down as deputy chief cabinet secretary for administrative 
affairs. Coordination is also underway to reduce the number of 
advisors to the prime minister, which now stands at five. 
 
Abe launched his cabinet last September that was packed with his 
close friends and aides, such as Shiozaki. Matoba was also picked 
from Abe's brain trust. Although Abe's intention was to run policies 
flexibly, the cabinet lineup has been criticized from within the 
ruling bloc. Abe apparently decided to completely revamp the Kantei 
system as he reshuffles his cabinet. 
 
One plan being mentioned is to appoint former cabinet ministers 
truly versed in Diet affairs as deputy chief cabinet secretaries for 
parliamentary affairs. Some are recommending former National Police 
Agency Director-General Iwao Uruma and others for the post of deputy 
chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs. 
 
In establishing his cabinet last year, Abe increased the number of 
prime ministerial advisors from two to the maximum five, one each 
responsible for national security, economic and fiscal policy, the 
abduction issue, educational revitalization, and public relations. 
The advisors' authority has been ambiguous, and disputes with 
cabinet ministers and concerned ministries and agencies have often 
been mentioned. 
 
For this reason, Abe is considering keeping some advisor posts 
vacant or abolishing them. 
 
The post of advisor on national security has been unfilled since 
Yuriko Koike became defense minister. Now that Kyoko Nakayama, a 
private-sector advisor on the abduction issue, won an Upper House 
seat in the July election, all advisors are now lawmakers. 
 
(5) LDP Secretary General Nakagawa expresses positive stance on 
"grand coalition with DPJ" 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa 
was asked at a news conference on 21 August about whether the LDP 
should form a grand coalition with the Democratic Party of Japan 
 
TOKYO 00003877  005 OF 011 
 
 
(DPJ).  Nakagawa expressed a positive stance, saying, "If we mainly 
consider reform to create better Japan, I believe that the way to 
respond to the popular will is for the ruling and opposition parties 
to march (together)." 
 
Nakagawa said that the DPJ, which has been stepping up a 
confrontational stance, should indicate that the party will "stop 
giving the highest priority to the political situation and implement 
policies for the public as a whole."  In this way, he called on the 
DPJ to change its position.  Nakagawa added: "(The people indicated 
in opinion polls and other ways that) the first thing that they hope 
for is a coalition government of the LDP and the DPJ.  With that in 
mind, I wish to give it consideration in a humble manner." 
 
However, most observers are taking Nakagawa's remarks as a "wishful 
thinking," because Nakagawa is slated to step down as LDP secretary 
general. 
 
(6) New Komeito gradually distancing itself from LDP, with Soka 
Gakkai distrustful of Prime Minister Abe 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
The junior coalition partner New Komeito will today bring together 
representatives from its prefectural chapters at party headquarters 
and examine the results of the July 29 Upper House election. The New 
Komeito joined a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) in 1999. Since then the New Komeito widened support in 
the proportional representation segment, but in the recent Upper 
House election, it suffered a historic setback, seeing a large 
number of voters moving away from the party. A sense of distrust of 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is spreading in the New Komeito's power 
base, Soka Gakkai.  Even in the New Komeito, some are insisting that 
the party should reconsider the current policy line adopted by the 
coalition of the LDP and the New Komeito. Marking the eighth 
anniversary of the formation of the coalition government with the 
LDP, the New Komeito's leadership finds it increasingly difficult to 
manage the situation. 
 
Grumbling 
 
"I thought Prime Minister Abe could have garnered more votes." Soka 
Gakkai Honorary Chairman Daisaku Ikeda reportedly made this 
complaint to a senior New Komeito member at a Soka Gakkai staff 
meeting held in Tokyo's Hachioji City on Aug. 1, when the New 
Komeito was still in the midst of the shock of its crushing defeat 
in the Upper House election. 
 
Ikeda delivered a speech in the session premised on continuing to 
give support to the Abe administration in the future as well. 
Perhaps for that, his "grumbling" did not appear in Soka Gakkai's 
newspaper, but this episode revealed that the LDP-New Komeito line 
is becoming "fragile." 
 
At a session of the New Komeito Lower House caucus held in the Diet 
at noon on Aug. 9, a veteran lawmaker made this shocking analysis: 
"The LDP may be on the road to collapse. Our party must make clear 
our free and unbiased line." Because this remark could be taken to 
mean leaving the coalition, the conference room became deathly 
silent. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003877  006 OF 011 
 
 
There was no one who echoed that view, but other lawmakers, too, 
expressed displeasure at the LDP, with one arguing, "There was no 
good effect of being in the ruling bloc on the Upper House 
election." Another lawmaker complained: "Except for some areas, 
election cooperation this time between the LDP and the New Komeito 
did not go well." 
 
The New Komeito saw its incumbent candidates lose their seats in 
three constituencies -- Aichi, Kanagawa, and Saitama -- in the Upper 
House election this time. Even in the proportional representation 
segment, the votes the party garnered this time came to 7,765,000 
from the previous 8,620,000. This outcome was far from the party's 
longstanding goal of winning 10 million votes in the proportional 
representation segment. 
 
"Strained cooperative ties" 
 
The New Komeito had supported Abe principally because he would be 
the "face of election." Otherwise, there had been from the beginning 
big gaps between Abe, an advocate of revising the Constitution, and 
the New Komeito, which has adopted a pacifist policy line, over 
foreign and security affairs. Well aware of that, the New Komeito 
leadership has contained supporters' complaints so far. If Abe is no 
longer useful as the "face of elections," the party would be bound 
to be criticized by its supporters. 
 
Perhaps for these circumstances or other reasons, the New Komeito is 
beginning to distance itself from the LDP. In fact, one veteran 
lawmaker revealed: "Our relationship with the LDP will take a 
strained, cooperative one. We are ready to give harsh advice to the 
LDP, and we will adopt a confrontational stance toward them." New 
Komeito Representative Akihiro Ota intends to play the role of a 
counterpart of the prime minister from now on. 
 
Double-edged sword 
 
Intensifying criticism of the government and the LDP would be a 
"double-edged sword" for the New Komeito, however. Excessive 
criticism could bring confusion to the political situation as the 
major opposition Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) is stepping up 
its offensive against the government and the LDP. It would be the 
New Komeito that would be most troubled should the Lower House be 
resolved for a snap general election, given the party's meticulous 
preparations for its "organized election". 
 
One New Komeito executive officer noted: "If the New Komeoto failed 
in the next Lower House election, we would vanish. We have been 
faced with the most serious crisis our party was formed." 
 
(7) Interview with Nobutaka Machimura, chairman of Machimura 
faction: Government should change order of policy priorities 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 18, 2007 
 
Following the Liberal Democratic Party's crushing defeat in the July 
House of Councillors election, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has decided 
to reorganize his cabinet and the lineup of LDP leadership on Aug. 
27, determined to reconstruct his party. The Nikkei interviewed key 
persons in the ruling camp to ask for their views about important 
points in reorganizing the cabinet and outlooks for the political 
situation. 
 
TOKYO 00003877  007 OF 011 
 
 
 
-- Calls for the prime minister's resignation have yet to die down, 
don't you agree? 
 
Since we suffered a devastating defeat in the election, various 
views naturally came out. When the Hosokawa government was launched 
and our party was driven into opposition, harsher opinions were 
presented in joint plenary meetings of party members of both houses 
of the Diet. The current situation is much calmer than at that 
time. 
 
-- The prime minister, before all of the ballots were counted, had 
already expressed his intention to stay in power. Some lashed out at 
this stance. 
 
The problem was whether the timing was proper or not. 
 
-- What are key points in reorganizing the cabinet? 
 
It is important to place the right person in the right place. Since 
we experienced a humiliating defeat in the election, it is also 
necessary to change the order of policy priorities. The government 
has lost public trust because of the pension problem. Since the 
health, labor and welfare minister has to take care of many areas, 
it might be desirable to establish a ministerial post for pension 
issues. 
 
-- There are calls for replacing Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa 
Shiozaki. 
 
I hear a considerable number of persons are calling for his 
resignation. The prime minister's judgment is reflected most 
significantly in selecting the chief cabinet secretary. 
 
-- If the prime minister, who has yet to gain public confidence, 
continues to stay in power, politics led by the Kantei will have to 
be reviewed. 
 
The Hashimoto administration introduced the Kantei-led structure for 
the first time. Since then, that system has been kept in place. The 
structure itself is on the right track, but it is not desirable for 
the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which is just an advisory 
panel to the prime minister, to be acting like a decision-making 
panel. Some critics wonder if academics and business leaders really 
know the circumstances of local communities. 
 
-- The focus of attention in the extraordinary Diet session this 
fall will be on an extension of the Antiterrorism Special Measures 
Law. 
 
It will be acceptable if it will become possible for Japan to 
continue to dispatch (Self-Defense Force troops) by revising the 
bill. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) should discuss the issue 
in a cautious manner. In the party, there are members who are 
supportive of extending the law. But the party president has clearly 
expressed his opposition to the government's plan. In this case, the 
president's stance is regarded as the party's policy. The president 
of a responsible political party should not take such an approach. 
 
-- Do you think the House of Representatives will be dissolved for a 
snap election within a year? 
 
 
TOKYO 00003877  008 OF 011 
 
 
It is premature to talk about the possibility of dissolving the 
Lower House. The DPJ apparently aims to have the administration 
dissolve the Lower House as soon as possible within this year. We 
should consider it more prudently. 
 
-- Some suggest that political groups should be required to produce 
receipts for expenditures of more than one yen in amending the 
Political Funds Control Law again. 
 
I think this is a proper idea. We should take measures, based on the 
principle of making the flow of political funds as transparent as 
possible. 
 
(8) Editorial: Political funding needs a solid system 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 22, 2007 
 
The Abe cabinet was hit by yet another politics-and-money scandal. 
 
At the center of this scandal is Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa 
Shiozaki, the linchpin of the Abe cabinet. A staff member at his 
local office has reportedly embezzled a large sum of money by 
double-booking office expenses. 
 
It is appalling to learn that the chief cabinet secretary has failed 
to manage and supervise his own staff despite a series of political 
fund scandals involving cabinet ministers. 
 
In order to conceal the embezzlement, the staff member attached 
copied receipts to two sets of funding reports. The method is the 
same as that of former Agriculture Minister Norihiko Akagi's case 
that came to light just before the July House of Councillors 
election. 
 
Shiozaki's case is worse than Akagi's in that the staffer used two 
sets of funding reports that differ in nature to conceal the 
embezzlement. 
 
Under the Political Funds Control Law, political organizations, such 
as party chapters, are required to submit their annual political 
funding reports either to the internal affairs and communications 
minister or to prefectural election administration committees. In 
addition, the Public Offices Election Law requires them to file 
campaign spending reports with prefectural election administration 
committees. 
 
According to the Shiozaki office, the staff member embezzled some 
6.3 million yen in political funds held by the LDP branch which 
Shiozaki heads. To cover this up, he reportedly attached copies of 
receipts that were originally used for Shiozaki's campaign funding 
report to the funding report of the LDP branch. 
 
The system requiring two separate funding reports under the two laws 
is clearly a breeding ground for irregularities. 
 
Following the ruling bloc's crushing defeat in the previous 
election, the Democratic Party of Japan and New Komeito are planning 
to revise the Political Funds Control Law to mandate all political 
groups to attach receipts for expenditures of one yen or more for 
political activities and operating expenses. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003877  009 OF 011 
 
 
Their plan merits high marks, though that is not enough for 
disclosing the use of political funds to the public. 
 
First, a system must be established requiring political groups to 
produce original receipts. In the corporate world, expenses cannot 
be settled without receipts. The problem lies in the system itself 
that allows political organizations to attach copied receipts to 
their funding reports. 
 
It is also essential to make them submit their funding reports 
solely to the internal affairs and communications minister to make 
it easier to cross examine. 
 
Further, a system must be created so that anyone can see the funding 
reports, including receipts, on the Internet. In order to see 
receipts under the current system, one must ask for information 
disclosure, which is time-consuming. 
 
We find it difficult to understand that Shiozaki simply released a 
short statement, instead of holding a press conference, in the wake 
of the revelation of the serious embezzlement of political funds by 
his staff member. 
 
The chief cabinet secretary handled the matter poorly, and it seems 
natural that the Liberal Democratic Party's discussion on the 
question of politics and money has been stalled. 
 
The LDP's failure to make a positive move could be a chance for 
other parties, such as the DPJ and New Komeito, to win public trust. 
We want to see political parties vie for better plans to realize 
transparency in the extraordinary Diet session in the fall. 
 
(9) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 1): Top-secret team 
set up six months before Iraq war; Cabinet Secretariat alone drafted 
special legislation 
 
TOKYO (Top play) (Full) 
August 19, 2007 
 
"The way things are going, I can't send troops. I need a resolution 
from the United Nations." 
 
On the night of April 16, 2003, (then) Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi was at his temporary official residence in Higashigotanta, 
Tokyo. He suddenly made a telephone call to US President Bush and 
asked him over the phone to work for a UN resolution. 
 
A month earlier, the United States had launched attacks on Iraq. "I 
will strengthen the Japan-US alliance." With this commitment behind 
him, Koizumi had made up his mind to send troops from the 
Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. 
 
Koizumi was concerned about how to justify his plan to send SDF 
troops to Iraq. If Koizumi had brought up his SDF dispatch plan for 
the sake of the Japan-US alliance, he would have faced criticism for 
kowtowing to the United States. As a result, his SDF Iraq dispatch 
plan might have fallen through. Koizumi wanted to be able to account 
for his SDF dispatch to Iraq as Japan's international contribution. 
To do so, Koizumi thought that a UN resolution would be needed for 
the international community to help with Iraq's nation-rebuilding 
efforts. 
 
TOKYO 00003877  010 OF 011 
 
 
 
Japan sent the same message to the United States through various 
diplomatic channels. The United States, as a result, conducted 
lobbying activities at the United Nations. On May 22, soon after 
major conflict began in Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1483. It was exactly what Koizumi had wanted. 
 
Shortly thereafter, US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage visited 
Japan. Armitage met Taku Yamasaki, the then secretary general of the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party. "We were able to get a resolution," 
Armitage told Yamasaki in the meeting. Armitage was in high spirits. 
He added, "Why don't you create a special measures law?" Yamasaki 
recalled, "The prime minister and I had made it a minimum 
prerequisite to obtain a UN resolution, so the United States was 
desperate." 
 
Major countries like Russia, China, and France came out against the 
Iraq war. The United States was becoming isolated. Japan was the 
first to stand behind the United States in the Iraq war. Japan must 
have appeared to be a precious supporter. 
 
"Go ahead with new legislation." In late May, Koizumi told his chief 
cabinet secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, to work out a new law. It was 
Koizumi's official order to create a special legislative measure for 
Japan's Iraq assistance, which was later shaped into the Law for 
Special Measures to Implement Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Assistance Activities and Security Assistance Activities in Iraq, or 
the Iraq Special Measures Law for short. 
 
However, the Cabinet Secretariat had already set up a team of more 
than 10 bureaucrats to work out a draft of the Iraq Special Measures 
Law in private. It was six months before the Iraq war was started. 
Across from the prime minister's office is the Cabinet Office, a 
prefabricated hut was erected in a corner location. Walking down the 
prefab's creaking passage, there was one room where the team of 
Cabinet Secretariat bureaucrats worked to draft the Iraq Special 
Measures Law. 
 
Teijiro Furukawa, the then deputy chief cabinet secretary for 
administrative affairs, served five prime ministers as the 
government's top bureaucrat. Furukawa told the team to rack their 
brains about what Japan could do once the United States launched its 
use of armed force in Iraq. 
 
Strangely enough, the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency at the 
time were excluded from the team. The Cabinet Secretariat's 
bureaucrats are mostly from other government offices. Of course, 
there are also some people seconded on loan from the Foreign 
Ministry and the Defense Agency. The Cabinet Secretariat banned them 
even from consulting with their home offices. That was because the 
Cabinet Secretariat had feared information leaks. 
 
"We've got to make preparations at all times so the prime minister 
can make right decisions-that's the iron rule for us the 
government's administrative officials," Furukawa said. "But," he 
added, "I made detailed reports to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda." 
With this, Furukawa stressed that the bureaucracy did not run away 
with itself for the special legislation. 
 
On June 9, 2003, the government presented the LDP and its coalition 
partner, New Komeito, with a draft bill for the special measures law 
that features "humanitarian and reconstruction assistance 
 
TOKYO 00003877  011 OF 011 
 
 
activities" and "security assistance activities" (or rear-echelon 
support for US forces). It was only two days after Koizumi clarified 
his intention to create a new law. The government could come up with 
the special legislation since the Cabinet Secretariat had prepared 
at an early stage to work it out. 
 
There was a miscalculation. The special legislation, as one of its 
features, was worded: "dealing with weapons of mass destruction." 
The Defense Agency raised an objection to this wording, claiming 
that the SDF cannot deal with WMDs. The wording was crossed out in 
the draft bill. 
 
Intelligence from the United States weighed heavily with the Cabinet 
Secretariat. The United States reiterated that there must be WMDs in 
 
SIPDIS 
Iraq. The Cabinet Secretariat thought nothing of the SDF's 
capability. Its legislative team worked well. However, its 
legislative team was provided with biased information. 
 
The United States later said its military could not discover any 
WMDs in Iraq. Its justification for the Iraq war therefore is shaky. 
The UN resolution does not refer to whether the Iraq war was 
justified. Japan, which based its support for the Iraq war on that 
UN resolution, cannot verify the propriety of the Iraq war, yet it 
continues the SDF mission in Iraq. 
 
This series, Thinking of SDF as Japan's new garrison, has so far 
looked at what the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces 
have done in their respective overseas activities, including their 
assistance with Iraq. This series, in its fourth installment, will 
shed light on what went on behind the scenes of the civilian control 
set up that ordered such overseas activities. 
 
MESERVE