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Viewing cable 07SEOUL2481, PRESIDENT ROH SETS MODEST GOALS FOR SUMMIT IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL2481 2007-08-17 08:10 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2481/01 2290810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170810Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6070
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2992
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3111
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8214
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2140
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
UNCLAS SEOUL 002481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ROH SETS MODEST GOALS FOR SUMMIT IN 
NATIONAL DAY SPEECH 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) In his August 15 National Day speech, President Roh 
Moo-hyun set modest goals for his planned August 28-30 summit 
with the DPRK's Kim Jong-il, saying that the meeting should 
help the two Koreas "develop their relationship into one that 
is predictable and trustworthy," and defending his 
administration's "trust and engagement" approach toward North 
Korea.  There was no mention of unification, a staple of past 
speeches.  The speech praised U.S.-ROK ties as "comprehensive 
and dynamic," avoided past years' criticism of Japan except 
to note its "oppressive colonial rule" that ended 62 years 
ago, and repeated Roh's theme that South Korea should become 
the hub of a transformed Northeast Asia.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
MODEST GOALS FOR SUMMIT; "INTER-KOREAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
2. (SBU) As if responding to conservative editorials that 
have criticized the planned August 28-30 North-South summit 
as politically motivated and possibly harmful to ROK 
interests, Roh struck a reassuring tone in the section of his 
speech on the summit.  He noted the seven years of strained 
relations since the last summit in 2000, implying that the 
two Koreas were now over the hump in terms of overcoming the 
nuclear issue, saying that the summit would, "serve as an 
occasion to normalize inter-Korean relations that have gone 
through difficulties due to the North's nuclear program." 
Press reports have pointed to the possibility that Seoul and 
Pyongyang could agree to establish liaison offices in each 
other's capitals, as a step toward normalization, but Roh did 
not mention such a step or other specific desired outcomes. 
Instead, he asked for leeway in approaching the summit:  "I 
hope you will not burden me by saying, 'Don't do this or 
don't do that.' I hope you won't tell me, 'Get this without 
fail.'" 
 
3. (SBU) In keeping with his administration's "peace and 
prosperity" policy toward North Korea, Roh said that the 
summit would "contribute to further solidifying peace" and 
advance "common South-North prosperity."  The word "common" 
is consistent with what the Roh administration has advanced 
as a justification for what critics see as policy of giving 
economic benefits to the North ("cooperative projects have 
grown fourfold") without insisting on anything in return. 
Helping the North's economy helps the South, the Roh 
government argues, in terms of lowering tensions on the 
border (Kaesong was an invasion route), offering 
opportunities to South Korean companies (low-wage skilled 
labor at the Kaesong Industrial Complex), as advance 
investments to prepare for eventual unification, and to give 
the North "a chance to make an economic turnaround." 
 
4. (SBU) This year's National Day speech made no mention of 
unification, however, departing from past practice.  Instead, 
there was only an oblique reference to the "daunting task" of 
overcoming the country's division.  In discussing South-North 
relations in the lead up to the summit, Roh listed the two 
sides' previous agreements (the 1972 Joint Communique, the 
1991 South-North Basic Agreement, the 1992 Joint Declaration 
of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the June 
2000 South-North Joint Declaration) and said the two sides 
should respect those agreements and "develop the South-North 
relationship into one that is predictable and trustworthy." 
This contrasts with last year's National Day speech, during 
which Roh said that "many obstacles still hinder a road to 
national unification."  The pragmatic call for a stable 
relationship tracks with the public's attitude:  few are 
eager for unification in the near-term; most want a stable 
North Korea that neither upsets South Korea's economy nor 
sends streams of refugees south. 
 
5. (SBU) Roh's attention-getting line -- "I feel we need to 
start discussing the formation of an inter-Korean economic 
community" -- can be read in two ways:  (1) as a call to 
search for mutually beneficial "productive investment 
collaboration," and (2) as a signal that, for the foreseeable 
future, the two Koreas should seek to coexist with increased 
economic cooperation, rather than aiming for reunification 
over the near term.  That is not a change in policy -- since 
 
ROK governments have sought peaceful coexistence since the 
1970s, have not been in a hurry to accomplish unification, 
and since the first stage of President Roh's "Road to Korean 
Unification" calls for the "establishment of a peace and 
cooperation system" -- but it is a shift in rhetoric:  the 
June 2000 Joint Declaration referred to reunification four 
times in its one page, as have most ROKG speeches.  It will 
be interesting to see how prominently unification is 
mentioned during the upcoming summit. 
 
---------------------------- 
WHAT ABOUT DENUCLEARIZATION? 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Roh's message on denuclearization was, in effect, 
that the Six-Party Talks are doing a great job so let that 
process continue.  He said that the North Korean nuclear 
issue "is entering into the road toward a solution," and that 
"I have faith that every concerned member of the Six-Party 
Talks will follow through on the September 19 Joint Statement 
and the February 13 agreement in good faith."  Critics have 
of course argued that the situation requires more than faith, 
but Roh has chosen to look at the bright side, seeing the 
inter-Korean dialogue and the Six-Party Talks as a "virtuous 
cycle" and -- looking ahead -- that the Six-Party Talks "will 
develop into the establishment of a peace regime on the 
Korean Peninsula." 
 
---------------- 
U.S. NOT CENTRAL 
---------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The United States did not figure prominently in 
Roh's speech, but U.S.-ROK relations were described as 
"comprehensive and dynamic," with references to ongoing 
adjustments to the alliance to build the ROK's self-reliance: 
 the transfer of wartime operational control, redeployment of 
U.S. Forces Korea, and the relocation of Yongsan Garrison. 
In what could be seen as a mildy anti-U.S. reference or 
simply an assertion of independence, Roh said that "my 
Administration has made an effort to overcome the nation's 
psychological dependence on the United States."  On the other 
hand, one would not learn from the speech that the United 
States played any role in South Korea achieving national 
liberation ("...after numerous hardships and much suffering, 
the country was finally liberated") or during the Korean War. 
 
 
------------------ 
IMPROVED SITUATION 
------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) Two differences from Roh's August 15, 2006 speech 
show how the ROK's mood has changed.  Last year's speech, 
after North Korea had boycotted the Six-Party Talks for the 
better part of a year and had just carried out provocative 
missile tests, alluded to these tensions and called on the 
North to "return to the Six-Party Talks without 
preconditions."  This year's speech not only makes much of 
the fact that the DPRK is back at the Talks, it seems to get 
ahead of the negotiations by implying that the nuclear issue 
is already heading toward resolution.  In addition, the 2006 
speech, in the context of tension with Japan over the 
disputed Liancourt Rocks and the Yasukuni Shrine, included a 
lengthy passage admonishing Japan to think twice about 
amending its constitution to allow extra-territorial military 
action.  The lack of criticism of Japan this year probably 
reflects the informal agreement between the ROK and Japan to 
avoid unilateral forays to the Liancourt Rocks, and improved 
working relations between the two governments. 
VERSHBOW