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Viewing cable 07SEOUL2361, KOREAN MEDIA TAKES THE RIGHT LINE ON AFGHAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL2361 2007-08-07 07:38 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2361/01 2190738
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 070738Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5879
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0081
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2940
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3056
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
UNCLAS SEOUL 002361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
COMM CENTER PLEASE PASS TO COMUSKOREA SCJS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PROP PTER KS AF
SUBJECT: KOREAN MEDIA TAKES THE RIGHT LINE ON AFGHAN HOSTAGE CRISIS 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In an August 6 meeting with Embassy Seoul PAO, a 
senior writer for one of Korea's three largest and most influential 
national dailies explained that the mainstream media have made a 
conscious editorial decision to advise Koreans not to blame the 
hostage crisis on the United States or allow it to be used as an 
excuse for cynical political attacks and anti-Americanism.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On August 6 PAO and Acting Deputy PAO met over lunch with 
Kim Young-hie, Senior Writer for Joong-ang Ilbo, who is viewed by 
many as the "Dean" of Korea's journalists.  At 71 Mr. Kim remains 
fully engaged with his profession, penning a monthly column and 
contributing news analyses several times a week.  A one-time 
Washington correspondent, he also serves as the self-described 
"Minister of Foreign Affairs" for the paper, representing Joong-ang 
Ilbo in its many interactions with foreign think tanks and other 
outside organizations with which Joong-ang has relationships.  The 
fact that the mandatory retirement age at Joong-ang Ilbo is 55 
speaks to the value his organization places on Mr. Kim's talents. 
Next year in fact, Mr. Kim will celebrate 50 years as a journalist, 
a record unlikely to soon, if ever, be broken. 
 
3.  (SBU) The discussion quickly turned to the ongoing Korean 
hostage situation in Afghanistan.  Citing an editorial appearing 
that morning in Dong-A Ilbo and similar editorials and op-ed pieces 
that had appeared in Chosun Ilbo and Joong-ang Ilbo over the past 
several days, Mr. Kim said that the mainstream media, which he 
described with the neologism "CHOJOONGDONG" (CHOsun Ilbo, JOONG-ang 
Ilbo and DONG-a Ilbo), had made a conscious decision not to let the 
fringe media and political activists steal the issue in order to 
bludgeon the U.S. as they had in the heat of the 2002 Korean 
presidential election campaign. 
 
4.  (SBU) Asked if journalists from the three papers had actually 
had a meeting about this strategy, Mr. Kim said not as such, but it 
was the kind of concern that senior journalists discussed over 
coffee and on the fringes of any number of receptions and meetings 
on other topics.  Thus, while there had been nothing as overt as a 
coordinating session to work out a common strategy, there was at all 
three papers, he said, a serious determination not to let this issue 
be hijacked, and hence the prominence of several editorials and 
op-ed pieces of the previous week or so arguing that responsibility 
for the hostage crisis did not lie with the U.S. 
 
5. (SBU) Mr. Kim said journalists at the "big three" newspapers were 
acutely aware that the distorted coverage of the accidental deaths 
of the two Korean school girls in 2002 was a key factor in the 
election results that year.  He said the mistakes the papers made in 
2002 were that (1) they were distracted by other stories, mainly the 
election itself, and (2) they drastically underestimated the 
potential of that story as a vehicle with which to hammer at the 
U.S. and the U.S.-ROK alliance and influence the election. 
According to Mr. Kim, the mainstream media were not going to let 
this happen again, and so far Joong-ang Ilbo had followed that 
editorial line as had both Chosun Ilbo and Dong-a Ilbo. 
 
6. (SBU) Recalling the emotion-laden meeting the Charge had had with 
the families of the hostages, the PAO noted that the family members 
present had expressed deep appreciation for the Embassy's concern 
and support, and that subsequently the family members had requested 
civic organizations and other progressive activists to refrain from 
demonstrations against and criticism of the U.S.   Agreeing, Mr. Kim 
said that, in his view, the families, even in their grief, were 
acutely aware of the embarrassment to Korea this incident had caused 
and the tremendous burdens, financial and otherwise, their own 
government and fellow countrymen were being forced to assume on 
behalf of them and their loved ones.  The last thing in the world 
these people wanted, Mr. Kim said, was to make the fate of the 
hostages a domestic political issue.  Whether or not they would 
succeed in keeping the situation non-political, according to Mr. 
Kim, was not entirely in their hands, but he believed Korean society 
had learned a lot in the past few years and, despite wishes to the 
contrary among some quarters, he did not see the issue, whatever the 
outcome, rising to the level of the 2002 incident as a factor in 
this year's election. 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment: Post will continue to closely monitor domestic 
Korean media coverage of the hostage issue, but to date we are 
pleased to see that the mainstream media are, perhaps 
uncharacteristically, getting it right.  End Comment. 
 
STANTON